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The Council of Canadian Academies
The Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) is an independent, not-for-profit 
organization that supports independent, evidence-based, authoritative expert 
assessments to inform public policy development in Canada. Led by a Board 
of Directors and advised by a Scientific Advisory Committee, the CCA’s work 
encompasses a broad definition of science, incorporating the natural, social, and 
health sciences as well as engineering and the humanities. CCA assessments 
are conducted by independent, multidisciplinary panels of experts from across 
Canada and abroad. Assessments strive to identify emerging issues, gaps in 
knowledge, Canadian strengths, and international trends and practices. Upon 
completion, assessments provide government decision-makers, researchers, and 
stakeholders with high-quality information required to develop informed and 
innovative public policy. 
All CCA assessments undergo a formal peer review and are published and made 
available to the public free of charge. Assessments can be referred to the CCA 
by foundations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, or any level 
of government. 
The CCA is also supported by its three founding Academies:
The Royal Society of Canada (RSC) 
Founded in 1882, the RSC comprises the Academies of Arts, Humanities and 
Sciences, as well as Canada’s first national system of multidisciplinary recognition 
for the emerging generation of Canadian intellectual leadership: The College 
of New Scholars, Artists and Scientists. Its mission is to recognize scholarly, 
research, and artistic excellence, to advise governments and organizations, and 
to promote a culture of knowledge and innovation in Canada and with other 
national academies around the world.
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The CAE is the national institution through which Canada’s most distinguished and 
experienced engineers provide strategic advice on matters of critical importance 
to Canada. The Academy is an independent, self-governing, and non-profit 
organization established in 1987. Fellows are nominated and elected by their 
peers in recognition of their distinguished achievements and career-long service 
to the engineering profession. Fellows of the Academy are committed to ensuring 
that Canada’s engineering expertise is applied to the benefit of all Canadians.
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timely, informed, and unbiased assessments of issues affecting the health of 
Canadians and recommends strategic, actionable solutions. Founded in 2004, 
CAHS appoints new Fellows on an annual basis. The organization is managed 
by a voluntary Board of Directors and a Board Executive.
www.cca-reports.ca 
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Message from the Chair
The ability of microbes to resist antimicrobials (antimicrobial resistance, 
AMR) is a serious existential threat to millions, and may result in countless 
deaths globally over the next few decades. As antimicrobial use continues, 
resistance levels continue to rise (currently about 26% to first line 
antimicrobials in Canada and potentially increasing significantly). 
Resistant organisms cause a major problem to the healthcare system, and 
also agriculture and other activities such as tourism. One problem is that AMR 
does not respect borders — antimicrobial use in one country today leads to 
AMR in another country tomorrow. Increasing AMR is predicted to cause 
significant disruptions to society, although determining the extent of these 
problems is difficult.
If actions are not taken to combat the increase of AMR, Canada will be greatly 
changed within a few decades. The economy will shrink, the healthcare system 
will be less sustainable, and social inequality will further increase. It is clear that 
AMR needs not only to be seen as a scientific and healthcare issue, but also as 
an economic and security threat. It is an insidious problem that increasingly 
permeates all aspects of our society.
For a country like Canada, there have been few studies that measure and 
predict future economic and social impacts related to AMR. This report 
directly addresses this, and provides important evidence on how AMR not only 
has tragic human costs, but also real and tangible economic costs to Canada. 
Members of the Expert Panel have diverse expertise, and are engaged at the 
cutting edge of infectious diseases, healthcare delivery, agriculture, research 
and innovation, and economic modelling. Their collective wisdom was 
immensely useful in addressing this significant and wide-ranging problem in 
our society. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the members 
of the Panel for their incredibly hard and focussed work and strong 
commitment to this project. Their wisdom, guidance, questioning, 
challenging, and congenial yet constructive discussions were invaluable. 
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On behalf of the Panel, I would like to give thanks to the reviewers whose 
thoughtful critiques led to an improved report. Finally, I would like to express 
my sincere appreciation to the staff members of the Council of Canadian 
Academies, for their hard work, major effort in helping draft and edit the report, 
and congeniality throughout the process, making meetings and discussions 
both constructive yet also enjoyable. We are confident this report helps define 
the potential social and economic impacts of AMR in Canada, and can guide 
decisions and policies in the future to help combat this significant threat to 
our society.
B. Brett Finlay, PhD, O.C., O.B.C., FRSC, FCAHS, Chair
Expert Panel on the Potential Socio-Economic Impacts of Antimicrobial
Resistance in Canada
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Message from the CCA President and CEO
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is now recognized as a global threat that if 
not addressed will have a devastating impact on the health and welfare of the 
planet that may be difficult to reverse. 
AMR is an example of the “tragedy of the commons:” the very benefits enjoyed 
by the public from the availability and use of antimicrobials can lead to the 
overuse, limited effectiveness, and eventual reduction in benefit. The impact 
of AMR will not be limited to the immediate effect on human and animal 
health — broader impacts are also expected.
Recognizing this, the Minister of Science, requested that CCA undertake an 
assessment on behalf of the Public Health Agency of Canada to better understand 
the socio-economic impacts of AMR in Canada. This acknowledges the potential 
impact of AMR for all of Canada and the broad types of policy decisions that 
may be required to address this problem. 
The CCA brought together a multidisciplinary panel of 13 experts in biology, 
microbiology, epidemiology, infectious diseases, veterinary medicine, public 
health, medicine, sociology, economics, public policy, and industrial practices. 
The final report, When Antibiotics Fail, presents novel analyses that quantify 
current and future economic impacts of AMR, while also exploring the social 
impacts in a future with limited antimicrobials. 
The magnitude of the economic estimates in this report are alarming, and 
provide evidence to support decision-making about this topic. The Panel’s 
report couldn’t be more timely as the Public Health Agency of Canada is set 
to release an Action Plan on AMR in 2020. 
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contributing their time and expertise to produce this report. The CCA Board 
of Directors, Scientific Advisory Committee, and the CCA’s three founding 
Academies — the Royal Society of Canada, the Canadian Academy of Engineering, 
and the Canadian Academy of Health Sciences — all provided guidance and 
input. Particular appreciation is extended to our colleagues at the CAHS, 
who convened an influential forum on AMR in 2017 that provided valuable 
leadership and insight on this topic from some of the world’s foremost experts. 
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Effective antimicrobials are extremely valuable. Medical, veterinary, and 
agricultural practices depend extensively on the widespread availability of 
antimicrobials to prevent and treat bacterial infections in humans, animals, 
and crops. But with their use, disease-causing bacteria have increasingly evolved 
to become resistant to these antimicrobials, resulting in drugs that are no 
longer effective at treating infections. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is 
increasing worldwide, and with widespread trade and travel, resistance can 
spread globally within a short time, posing a serious threat to all countries. 
While AMR predates the use of antimicrobials, it drastically increased after the 
introduction of antimicrobial therapy in the last century. For a country such 
as Canada, the implications of AMR are stark. AMR is already having negative 
health, economic, and social impacts, and these will only worsen if actions are 
not taken to combat it. 
Recognizing how little is known about potential AMR impacts on the Canadian 
public and healthcare system, the Minister of Science, on behalf of the Public 
Health Agency of Canada, asked the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) to 
convene an expert panel to provide an evidence-based, authoritative assessment 
that answers the following question:
What is the socio-economic impact of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for Canadians 
and the Canadian healthcare system?
In order to address this charge, the CCA’s Expert Panel on the Potential Socio-
Economic Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance in Canada looked at AMR 
impacts today and how these could change in the future if resistance grows. 
There is no doubt that antimicrobials are an essential part of Canada’s economy. 
According to the Panel’s economic model, first-line antimicrobials contributed 
to saving at least 17,000 lives and preventing 2.6 million hospital days in 2018 
while generating $6.1 billion in economic activity in Canada. This contribution 
is at risk because the number of effective antimicrobials are running out. The 
consequences of a future with limited or no antimicrobials are alarming.
Executive Summary
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AMR Negatively Impacts the Canadian Economy
The Canadian economy has already begun to shrink as a result of AMR, as 
the number of deaths have increased and fewer people are able to work due 
to illness. Based on the Panel’s economic model that uses current estimates 
of resistance, AMR’s impact on labour productivity reduced Canada’s GDP by 
$2.0 billion in 2018, with much of this effect concentrated in industries such as 
hospitality, transportation, and education, where human interaction is central 
to the services provided. Agriculture is also experiencing the effects of AMR, 
with the health of animals and current industrial practices under threat. 
By 2050, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials (i.e., those generally first 
prescribed to treat an infection) remains constant at today’s rate of 26%, or 
reaches 40%, the Panel estimates that AMR would reduce Canada’s GDP by 
$13 to $21 billion per year, respectively (Table 1). The Canadian economy 
would be up to 0.7% smaller in 2050 if resistance remained constant at today’s 
rates, a significant decline about equal to one-third of the GDP of Manitoba 
or the oil sands extraction industry. If resistance were to reach 40% by 2050, 
a scenario the Panel deems likely, Canada’s cumulative GDP would decline by 
about $388 billion. 
AMR Negatively Impacts the Healthcare System
The ubiquity of antimicrobials in modern medicine means that declining 
effectiveness will place an increasing pressure on an already strained healthcare 
system. Antimicrobials are used for the treatment, but also prevention, of 
infections. For example, many surgeries and other medical procedures, including 
chemotherapy, are dependent on prophylactic treatment with antimicrobials. 
Ineffective antimicrobials will ultimately change the way that most people access 
and plan the care of their health. This lack of prophylactic treatment will become 
especially problematic for hospitalized patients who require invasive care. 
The Panel found that, in 2018, lengthier hospital stays, longer courses of 
treatment, and other expenses attributable to AMR cost the Canadian healthcare 
system about $1.4 billion. Eventually, if resistance rates continue to rise, they 
will lead to substantial financial implications for Canada’s healthcare system, 
fundamentally changing the delivery of most services and eroding public trust. 
By 2050, Canada’s healthcare costs as a result of increasing AMR would grow 
to about $6 to $8 billion per year, were resistance to first-line antimicrobials to 
remain constant or reach 40%. The latter amount is roughly equal to about 1% 
of Canada’s healthcare spending or about the total expenditure on all hospitals 
in Atlantic Canada or all physicians in Quebec. In the unlikely scenario that 
resistance to first-line antimicrobials reaches 100% AMR may cost the equivalent 
of 1.6% of Canadian healthcare spending, equal to the current total expenditure 
for all physicians in Quebec and Ontario.
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AMR Negatively Impacts Health
Numerous bacterial infections are becoming more difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, to treat as antimicrobials become less effective. Because an average of 
about 26% of bacterial infections are currently resistant to first-line antimicrobials, 
the Panel estimates that resistant bacterial infections were responsible for 
the deaths of over 14,000 people in Canada in 2018 (about 1 in 19 deaths) 
(Figure 1). Of these deaths, 5,400 (or almost 15 a day) could be considered 
directly attributable to AMR itself. In other words, these 5,400 deaths would 
not have occurred if these patients’ infections had been susceptible to first-
line antimicrobials. In 2018, AMR was therefore the attributable cause of only 
slightly fewer deaths in Canada than from Alzheimer’s disease in 2016.
The risk of acquiring a resistant infection is not uniform across Canada. Groups 
that have a higher likelihood of consuming antimicrobials, or being exposed 
to AMR in healthcare settings, are often at greater risk. For example, those 
with compromised or weaker immune systems (including the very young and 
older adults), as well as those with other medical conditions, are most at risk. 
Marginalized groups, including people living in poverty, homeless people, 
and people with substance use disorder, are at higher risk of acquiring some 
types of resistant infections. The greatest risk factor for acquiring a resistant 
infection is previous antimicrobial treatment. 
AMR Negatively Impacts Society
The social impacts of AMR may far outweigh the economic costs. If antimicrobials 
are limited in the future, everyone will be at risk and more people in Canada will 
see their quality of life decline as a result of the morbidity and mortality associated 
with resistant infections. By 2050, if resistance to all first-line antimicrobials 
reaches 40%, a scenario the Panel deems highly plausible, 13,700 people in 
Canada would die each year from resistant bacterial infections, and cumulatively 
Canada’s population decline would reach almost 400,000 by 2050. In the 
unlikely scenario that resistance to first-line antimicrobials reaches 100% by 
2050, 39,600 people would die each year from resistant bacterial infections, 
and cumulatively Canada’s population decline would reach 800,000. Notably, 
this impact will be unequally distributed, as some socio-demographic groups 
will be more at risk of infection.
Broader social impacts, beyond those related to healthcare, include the potential 
for decreases in social trust, social capital, quality of life, and equality among 
different socio-demographic groups. Social connectivity may weaken, and 
discrimination may be targeted at those with resistant infections or deemed to 
be at risk of infection. Canadian society may become less open and trusting, 
with people less likely to travel and more supportive of closing Canada’s borders 
to migration and tourists.
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Resistant Infections 
(n = 250,000)
would not have occured if the infection 
was susceptible to first-line antimicrobials 
Susceptible Infections 
(n = 730,000)
Of 730,000 susceptible infections
 30,000 people died
Of 250,000 resistant infections
 14,000 people died
Of these 14,000 deaths:
Types of Infections in Canada 2018
4 in 10 
In 2018, there were approximatively 980,000 
              bacterial infections in Canada
Susceptible InfectionsResistant Infections 
Figure 1 
Bacterial Infections and Resulting Deaths in Canada, 2018
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Multi-Faceted Mitigation Strategies Can Limit the Impact of AMR
Limiting AMR impacts requires a complete re-evaluation of healthcare, centred on 
reducing the rate of infections so that the use of antimicrobials is less necessary. 
Since healthcare is a complex system, it is nearly impossible to predict any given 
intervention’s impact on the behaviour of patients, healthcare providers, hospitals, 
governments, communities, and companies. The effect of each intervention 
is subject to significant uncertainty, since feedback loops among behaviour, 
infection rates, resistance rates, and costs per patient are interconnected. As 
such, the Panel concluded that the most effective approach to addressing AMR 
is globally coordinated, multifaceted, and combines elements of four mitigation 
strategies — surveillance, infection prevention and control, stewardship, and 
research and innovation — that have been shown to be effective. 
Surveillance underpins successful mitigation efforts, as it allows for targeted 
use of resources by providing an up-to-date and accurate portrayal of the 
current state of resistance and use of antimicrobials. Surveillance programs 
monitor antimicrobial use and AMR, thereby providing governments, hospitals, 
prescribers, and other stakeholders involved in mitigation a sense of where and 
how to best target interventions. Surveillance can also be used for monitoring 
and feedback, such as providing prescribers with anonymous benchmarking 
data. Weaknesses in current Canadian surveillance include limited data on 
infections attributable to priority pathogens (especially in community settings), 
on antimicrobial use in many regions of Canada, on AMR in domestic animals 
and wildlife, as well as the lack of an effective federal/provincial/territorial 
surveillance system. Additionally, the data that are collected are not easily 
accessed. One of the Panel’s major findings is that there is a lack of comprehensive 
surveillance data describing the number of resistant infections across Canada, 
and their characteristics. 
Infection prevention and control measures are wide-ranging, and have the 
ultimate goal of decreasing infection, and therefore the use of antimicrobials. 
To reduce infections, including those due to resistant microbes, hospitals and 
other settings where healthcare is delivered must, for example, meet current 
standards of handwashing, hand hygiene, environment and equipment cleaning, 
and adhere to patient treatment protocols. This will require that all healthcare 
providers are adequately trained, and that hospitals and other healthcare 
settings have adequately resourced teams to optimize both patient care and 
institution-wide infection prevention and control, not to mention other relevant 
programs. When healthcare is provided outside of institutions, appropriate 
methods for infection prevention and control must also be followed. Similar 
improvements are possible in the agricultural sector, with major opportunities 
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for infection prevention and control (biosecurity) through increased vaccination 
and improved hygiene standards, for example, as antimicrobial use decreases 
in this sector.
Stewardship initiatives, which promote the judicious use of antimicrobials, 
represent another major opportunity to limit the impact of AMR. The Panel 
concluded that stewardship requires a One Health approach, which includes 
all sectors collaborating to address AMR and incorporating leading practices, 
while stakeholders from both the human and animal health sectors coordinate 
actions. The Canadian agriculture industry has already made strides in 
decreasing antimicrobial use. Although the industry accounted for about 
78% of antimicrobial use in Canada in 2016, the federal government halted 
the use of antimicrobials for growth promotion in 2018 and, for the first time 
(among other regulatory changes), mandated that all antimicrobial use in food 
animals be under veterinary prescription. From the human health perspective, 
antimicrobial use as measured through prescriptions dispensed remains stable 
in Canada, but there may be an opportunity for targeted interventions that 
reduce unnecessary use.
Research and innovation is a fundamental mitigation strategy, complementing 
known interventions that  already have an immediate impact in reducing the 
effects of AMR. Given current trends, it seems unlikely that novel, broad-spectrum 
antimicrobials will be discovered. But, by using innovative methods, such as 
focusing on unconventional targets, new narrow-spectrum antimicrobials that 
treat infections caused by specific bacteria may be discovered. Making such 
discoveries will require more fundamental research, more flexible regulations, 
and new economic incentives to address a challenging commercial model, 
thereby reconciling public health needs with return on investment for the 
pharmaceutical industry. Alternative therapies are also being developed to treat 
or prevent resistant infections, including vaccines, phage therapy, lysins, and 
antimicrobial adjuvants, and the potential of the microbiome is being explored. 
Research and innovation can also offer ways of measuring the effectiveness of 
interventions, provide new technology (such as rapid diagnostics that allow for 
more accurate and systematic measures of antimicrobial use and for tracking 
AMR), update methods for data sharing and analysis, and provide evidence 
on which interventions are likely to be most effective. 
There are also opportunities to limit the impact of AMR that extend beyond the 
health sector, animal industry, and government. Informed and encouraged by 
public health campaigns, everyone in Canada can improve their handwashing 
and food-handling, obtain recommended vaccinations, engage in safer sexual 
xx When Antibiotics Fail
practices, and change their behaviour in other ways that help to prevent the 
spread of infections. They can also engage in their own personal stewardship, 
asking their doctors, dentists, veterinarians, and other healthcare providers 
to prescribe antimicrobials only when necessary. Canada is in the middle of 
the pack among OECD countries when it comes to antimicrobial use, rates 
of AMR, and mitigation efforts. While there is much room for improvement, 
Canada can build on its existing strengths with key investments in infrastructure, 
innovation, and education. 
The Need for Action is Urgent
AMR is a threat to millions, potentially responsible for the loss of some 300 million 
lives globally over the next 30 years. There is both a disconnect and time lag 
between the cause and effect of AMR: antimicrobial use in one country today leads 
to AMR in another country tomorrow. Antimicrobial stewardship, antimicrobial 
use and AMR surveillance, and innovation all require a coordinated global 
effort, with countries such as Canada leading the way. There is an opportunity 
for coordinated action and change across Canada through the development 
and use of the national action plan on AMR. 
AMR is a looming public health threat and potential economic disaster in 
Canada. The implications of inaction are significant for Canadian society and 
the economy; AMR will unequally impact different socio-demographic groups 
as well as food security. Few health and economic crises have had the potential 
for such a prolonged impact in post-war Canadian history. If actions are not 
taken to combat the increase of AMR, Canada will be greatly changed within 
a few decades. The economy will shrink, the healthcare system will be less 
sustainable, and social inequality will further increase. Even more serious will 
be the hundreds of thousands of deaths caused by infections that have been 
treatable for the last century. In order to change course, action is required now.
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Glossary
Antibiotic
“A type of antimicrobial used to treat infections caused by bacteria” (GC, 
2017).
Antimicrobial
“A natural, semisynthetic or synthetic substance that is capable of killing or 
inhibiting the growth of microbes.” They can include antibiotics, antivirals, 
antifungals, and antiparasitics (PHAC, 2014b).
Antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR)
A phenomenon whereby antimicrobials no longer inhibit or kill microbes 
because the microbes’ biological makeup has changed (PHAC, 2014b). 
Antimicrobial 
stewardship (AMS)
“A system-wide approach that includes coordinated interventions designed to 
promote, improve, monitor, and evaluate the judicious use of antimicrobials to 
preserve their future effectiveness and promote and protect human and 
animal health” (AMR Stewardship Task Group, 2017).
Antimicrobial use 
(AMU)
The use of antimicrobials in humans, animals, and agriculture.
One Health
An assessment that considers “wider societal costs of lost labour, changes in 
health seeking behavior, impacts on animal health and welfare, higher costs 
of animal-origin food production, and reduced consumer confidence in safety 
and international trade of such food” (Queenan et al., 2016).
Socio-
demographic 
group
A group defined by its sociological and demographic characteristics, such as 
homeless people, racialized people, people with substance use disorder, or 
people with lower incomes.
Syndrome
An infection characterized by a group of associated symptoms that typically 
occur within a common location in the body. For example, bacterial 
gastro-intestinal infections are infections caused by pathogenic bacteria in the 
gut, leading to symptoms that may include vomiting, severe abdominal 
cramps, fever, and diarrhea.
xxii When Antibiotics Fail
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in the Report
AGP antimicrobial growth promoter
AMR antimicrobial resistance
AMS antimicrobial stewardship
AMU antimicrobial use
API active pharmaceutical ingredient
BGI bacterial gastro-intestinal infection
BSI bloodstream infection
CARSS Canadian Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System
CDI Clostridioides difficile infection
CIPARS Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
CNISP Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program
CRE carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae
DCGE dynamic computable general equilibrium
DDD defined daily dose
ESBL extended-spectrum beta-lactamase
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP gross domestic product
GLASS Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System
HAI healthcare-associated infection
IAI intra-abdominal infection
IPC infection prevention and control
LOS length of stay (in hospital)
MDR multi-drug-resistant
MIA medically important antimicrobial
MRSA methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
MSI musculoskeletal infection
MSSA methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health
PHAC Public Health Agency of Canada
xxiiiList of Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in the Report
SSI surgical site infection
SSTI skin and soft tissue infection
STI sexually transmitted infection
TB tuberculosis
UTI urinary tract infection
VRE vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus
WHO World Health Organization
xxiv When Antibiotics Fail
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ............................................................................ 1
1.1 The Charge ......................................................................................3
1.2 The Panel’s Approach .....................................................................4
1.3 A Framework for Understanding AMR Impact and  
Structuring of the Report ................................................................8
1.4 Report Relevance ...........................................................................11
2 Antimicrobial Use and Resistance in Canada Today .......... 13
2.1 The Relationship Between Antimicrobial Use  
and Antimicrobial Resistance  .......................................................14
2.2 Antimicrobial Use in Canada ........................................................22
2.3 Resistant Infections in Canada ......................................................25
2.4 Conclusion .....................................................................................38
3 Hospital Costs of Antimicrobial Resistance in Canada ...... 39
3.1 Estimating the Hospital Costs of  
Antimicrobial-Resistant Infections ................................................41
3.2 The Cost of AMR to the Canadian Healthcare System ................54
3.3 Conclusion .....................................................................................59
4 The Impact of Antimicrobial Resistance on  
the Canadian Economy ........................................................ 61
4.1 Modelling the Economic Impact of AMR .....................................63
4.2 Economic Impact of AMR .............................................................70
4.3 The Impact of AMR on the Animal Farming Industry .................76
4.4 Conclusion .....................................................................................86
5 The Social Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance Today  
and in a Future with Limited Antimicrobials ...................... 87
5.1 Risk Factors Associated with Resistant Infections in Humans ......89
5.2 The Potential Severity of Infections in a Future with  
Limited Antimicrobials ................................................................104
5.3 Potential Social Impacts of AMR in a Future with  
Limited Antimicrobials ................................................................106
5.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................120
xxvTable of Contents
6 Policy Options and Lessons Learned:  
Reducing Infections, Slowing Resistance ......................... 121
6.1 Surveillance ..................................................................................123
6.2 Infection Prevention and Control ...............................................127
6.3 Stewardship ..................................................................................138
6.4 Research and Innovation .............................................................145
6.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................158
7 Conclusion .......................................................................... 161
7.1 Key Findings .................................................................................162
7.2 A Time for Action ........................................................................167
References   ................................................................................... 169
Appendix A — Epidemiological Estimates of Important  
Clinical Syndromes ............................................................. 218
Appendix B — Hospital Costs and Bacterial Weighting ............. 227
Appendix C — Technical Details of the Panel’s DCGE Model ..... 229

1Chapter 1 Introduction
•	 The	Charge
•	 The	Panel’s	Approach
•	 A	Framework	for	Understanding	AMR	Impact	
and	Structuring	of	the	Report
•	 Report	Relevance
1
Introduction
2 When Antibiotics Fail
1 Introduction
With antimicrobial use (AMU) underpinning much of modern medicine and 
agriculture, the prospect of a world where antimicrobials no longer work is 
alarming. In such a world, infections that are now treatable would be more 
difficult, or, in extreme cases, impossible to treat. Illnesses would be longer and 
more severe, treatments more expensive, and the risk of death higher. If infections 
could not be treated or prevented, many standard medical interventions that 
rely on prophylactic antimicrobials, such as organ transplants, chemotherapy, 
surgery for joint replacements, or caesarean deliveries, would be deemed too 
risky to be made widely available (GC, 2017). Furthermore, the food we eat 
may be more expensive or limited in quantity. 
The risk of a post-antimicrobial era in the 21st century is no longer remote. 
Indeed, antimicrobial treatments no longer work for some infections, and 
these treatment-resistant infections are on the rise globally (PHAC, 2014b; 
OECD, 2018a). Currently 700,000 people worldwide are estimated to die 
each year from treatment-resistant infections, with the potential cumulative 
loss of 300 million lives by 2050 (O’Neill, 2016a). A projected increase in the 
consumption of antimicrobials, coupled with a lack of new antimicrobials 
(Klein et al., 2018), means that antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is expected 
to increase in the future. AMR has the potential to impact everyone — it is a 
global problem that ignores wealth or status. 
The rise in AMR has prompted many warnings. The United Nations, for example, 
has acknowledged AMR as “a fundamental, long-term threat to human health 
[and] sustainable food production and development,” adding that “it is a 
very present reality — in all parts of the world, in developing and developed 
countries; in rural and urban areas; in hospitals; on farms and in communities” 
(UN, 2016). The World Economic Forum (2013) has recognized antibiotic-
resistant bacteria as arguably the greatest risk to human health. 
Bacterial infections causing pneumonia, gonorrhea, urinary tract infections, 
and gastroenteritis are becoming more difficult, and sometimes impossible, 
to treat as antimicrobials become less effective. Canada for its part is already 
experiencing the impacts of treatment-resistant infections. This report estimates 
that about 1 in 19 deaths in Canada are attributable to bacterial infections 
that are resistant. 
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Medical, veterinary, and agricultural practices depend extensively on the 
widespread availability of antimicrobials to prevent and treat bacterial infections 
in humans, animals, and crops (PHAC, 2014b); AMR therefore has the potential 
to impact many facets of contemporary social and economic life in Canada. 
This interconnectedness of AMU in humans and animals, and the presence 
of antimicrobials and resistant bacteria within the environment, have led 
to widespread support internationally for taking a One Health approach to 
responding to AMR, whereby programs, policies, legislation, and research are 
developed with communication across multiple sectors (WHO, 2017a).
1.1 THE CHARGE 
Recognizing how little is known about potential AMR impacts on the Canadian 
public and healthcare system, the Minister of Science, on behalf of the Public 
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC, the Sponsor), asked the Council of Canadian 
Academies (CCA) to convene an expert panel to provide an evidence-informed, 
authoritative assessment. Specifically, the CCA was asked to answer the following 
question and sub-questions:
What is the socio-economic impact of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for 
Canadians and the Canadian healthcare system?
What data are available to determine the state of antimicrobial usage (AMU) 
in human and non-human environments in Canada, and what can these 
data reveal about the contribution of AMU in different environments to AMR 
problems in humans in Canada? 
What data are available to determine the state of and socio-economic impact of 
AMR in general, and particularly in hospitals and community-based settings 
and across particular populations in Canada? If not, what information is 
needed, and how can the data gap be closed?
How is the state and impact of AMR assessed in other OECD countries, and 
are these data and lessons learned comparable to Canada?
What are the policy implications of the impact of AMR? (i.e., how can this 
evidence inform policy and investment)?
What are the science and technology gaps in the understanding of these impacts?
What lessons from other OECD countries could assist in improving AMR 
surveillance and stewardship in Canada?
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1.2 THE PANEL’S APPROACH
To address the charge, the CCA assembled a multidisciplinary panel of 13 experts 
(the Expert Panel on the Potential Socio-Economic Impacts of Antimicrobial 
Resistance in Canada, hereafter the Panel) from Canada and abroad. Panel 
members brought knowledge from biology, microbiology, epidemiology, 
infectious diseases, veterinary medicine, public health, medicine, sociology, 
economics, public policy, and industrial practices. Each member served on the 
Panel as an informed individual rather than as a representative of a specific 
discipline, organization, region, or set of values.
Over the course of a year, the Panel met in person five times to refine its 
assessment of the issues at hand. At the beginning of the assessment process, 
the Panel met with the Sponsor to acquire a full understanding of the charge. 
At this meeting, the Panel confirmed with the Sponsor that the primary focus 
of the assessment was quantifying socio-economic impact. The Panel confirmed 
the use of a One Health approach (Section 1.2.3) to better understand the 
problem of AMR, which meant that AMU and AMR within healthcare, agriculture, 
and the broader environment were all within scope. The Panel also confirmed 
that the focus of this assessment was on bacterial pathogens, not all microbes. 
1.2.1	 Evidence	
The Panel’s assessment is based on a review of various sources of health, social, 
and economic evidence, drawn from peer-reviewed publications, publicly 
available government information and statistics, and other grey literature1 
related to AMR impacts, both within Canada and internationally. To find the best 
available evidence, the Panel conducted keyword-based searches of published 
literature and explored the websites of PHAC, Health Canada, Statistics Canada, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and other relevant government agencies in 
Canada and abroad. This report is not based on a systematic review, but rather 
a detailed analysis of the key references as identified by the Panel.
To estimate the economic impact of AMR, the Panel also commissioned a 
quantitative economic model to explore the complex relationship among 
AMR, health, labour productivity, agriculture, and trade (Section 4.1 and 
Appendix C). The model considers production and trading patterns among 
industries and countries, assuming that if AMR affects labour productivity in 
one country, global production and trade adjust throughout the world. This 
1 Grey literature refers to various types of documents produced by government, academia, industry, 
and other organizations that are not published commercially/formally.
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method is similar to those used in reports estimating AMR’s economic impact 
published by other groups (e.g., KPMG, 2014; RAND Europe, 2014; OECD, 
2015; World Bank, 2017). 
The Panel’s model differs from those used in other reports. It includes more 
comprehensive epidemiological data on resistant infections germane to a 
Canadian perspective, in order to strengthen the linkage between economic 
projections and existing data. Specifically, the Panel examined the impacts 
of resistant infections through the lens of a syndrome (a group of associated 
symptoms that may involve multiple causal bacterial pathogens, such as 
bloodstream infections). Estimates from this model — which are based on 
scenarios of resistance rates to first-line antimicrobials staying at today’s rate 
(26%) or increasing gradually to 40% by 2050 — also consider the impact of AMR 
on Canada’s industries. These projections are the first of their kind in Canada, 
and provide policy-makers and other stakeholders with credible estimates of 
the potential magnitude of AMR impacts over the next three decades. 
1.2.2	 Limitations
Any socio-economic analysis is limited by available data as well as methodology. 
Three types of inherent limitations constrain this report’s socio-economic analysis 
of AMR: (i) data limitations relating to the current epidemiological measures of 
resistant infections in Canada (i.e., limitations in quality, availability, and quantity 
of data); (ii) limitations based on the methodology of the Panel’s economic 
model, which estimates AMR’s impact on Canada’s gross domestic product 
(GDP); and (iii) limitations based on the methodology used to approximate 
healthcare costs, which estimates increased costs associated with treating 
resistant infections. Where assumptions were necessary, the Panel took a 
conservative approach.
Data limitations in particular hampered the Panel’s ability to accurately 
characterize the current state of AMR in Canada. To the extent possible, the 
Panel sought to ensure Canadian data on resistant bacterial infections informed 
both current and future estimates of impact. However, in some cases, these data 
were not available, so data from comparable countries were used. Furthermore, 
the current Canadian evidence on the amount of resistance, and its variation 
geographically and among bacterial species, is inconsistent. Indeed, one of the 
Panel’s major findings is the lack of comprehensive surveillance data describing 
the number of resistant infections across Canada and their characteristics (e.g., 
morbidity, mortality, and associated costs); these are needed for informed 
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decision-making (Section 6.1). Because of this knowledge gap, the Panel chose 
to focus on 10 important clinical syndromes that, in their expertise, encompass 
the majority of resistant infections in Canada: 
•	 bacterial gastro-intestinal infection (BGI)
•	 bloodstream infection (BSI) 
•	  Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) 
•	 intra-abdominal infection (IAI) 
•	 musculoskeletal infection (MSI)
•	 pneumonia 
•	 sexually transmitted infection (STI) 
•	 skin and soft tissue infection (SSTI)
•	 tuberculosis (TB) 
•	 urinary tract infection (UTI)
While encompassing most resistant infections, these syndromes do not capture 
all resistant infections in their entirety. All estimates deriving from these data 
therefore underestimate the actual magnitude of resistant infections in Canada.
Assessing the relative significance of the economic and social impacts of AMR 
is also made difficult by the fact that the economic dimension of impact can be 
quantified with simulations based on current data, while the social dimensions 
of impact are often qualitative. Ultimately, however, economic impacts are 
embedded within a social system, and the social impacts of AMR in the future 
may outweigh the economic costs.
1.2.3	 Key	Concepts
What Are Antimicrobials? 
Antimicrobials are drugs that kill or inhibit the growth of disease-causing 
microbes, such as certain bacteria, viruses, parasites, and fungi (PHAC, 2014b). 
Since antimicrobials began to be used widely about 70 years ago, they have 
saved hundreds of millions of lives (World Bank, 2017). The most common and 
familiar antimicrobials are antibiotics, which treat infections caused by bacteria. 
This report focuses on resistant bacteria, but the broader term antimicrobial is 
generally used because surveillance data tend to be collected under this heading. 
How Are Antimicrobials Used?
Globally, antimicrobials are used for prevention and treatment of infections 
in humans, animals, and plants. In Canada in 2016, 78% of antimicrobials 
used were in the production of food animals, 20% were for human use, 1% 
for crops, and 1% for companion animals (measured by kilograms of active 
ingredient) (PHAC, 2017a). While the presence of antimicrobials in healthcare 
and agricultural settings is easily explained based on AMU, it is less clear why 
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antimicrobials are also found in other environments. Some antimicrobials may 
be naturally occurring, but others may reach environments through various 
pathways including sewage systems (e.g., from hospitals) and run-off from 
farms (PHAC, 2017a). Any AMU creates opportunities for the evolution and 
spread of resistance. 
What Is Antimicrobial Resistance? 
AMR is a phenomenon whereby antimicrobials no longer kill or inhibit the 
growth of microbes because the biological makeup of the microbe has evolved 
(PHAC, 2014b). As a result, antimicrobials are ineffective in stopping infections 
in humans, animals, and plants. While much research focuses on resistant 
bacteria, there are four groups of pathogenic microbes that evolve AMR and may 
be important to human health and agriculture: bacteria (e.g., Escherichia coli), 
viruses (e.g., HIV), fungi (e.g., Candida species), and parasites (e.g., Plasmodium 
falciparum, which causes malaria). When antimicrobials are present within the 
environment of a population of microbes, the microbes with genetic traits that 
allow them to grow in the presence of the antimicrobial will survive and multiply, 
while those that are susceptible to antimicrobials will die (Andersson & Hughes, 
2010). Over time, as populations of microbes are repeatedly exposed to various 
antimicrobials, the surviving microbes become increasingly resistant to a wider 
range of drugs. This report focuses on resistant bacteria.
AMR has been observed since the first antimicrobials were discovered. In 
fact, genes conferring resistance predate the use of antimicrobials by many 
years (Hughes & Datta, 1983; Wright, 2007; D’Costa et al., 2011; Perry et al., 
2014; Perron et al., 2015). For example, resistance genes have been identified 
in permafrost sediments in Yukon (D’Costa et al., 2011). AMR has become 
increasingly problematic because of “a unique convergence of overuse and 
misuse of antibiotics, the remarkable genetic plasticity of bacteria, the acquisition 
of resistant bacterial infections in both community and hospital settings, and 
a market failure of antibiotic development [that] has created an enormous 
public health concern” (IDSA, 2011).
A One Health Approach to AMR
One Health is defined as “the collaborative effort of multiple health science 
professions, together with their related disciplines and institutions — working 
locally, nationally, and globally — to attain optimal health for people, domestic 
animals, wildlife, plants, and our environment” (One Health Commission, 2018). 
Many believe that taking action to mitigate AMR exemplifies the principles of 
this approach (e.g., Queenan et al., 2016; Robinson et al., 2016; Kahn, 2017; 
WHO, 2017a; McEwen & Collignon, 2018). In an AMR context, One Health 
recognizes that resistant organisms exist in humans, animals, food, and the 
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environment, and that the major driver of resistance is AMU (Queenan et al., 
2016). It also acknowledges that tackling AMR requires a global approach and 
therefore advocates for coordinated actions across domestic and international 
borders, sharing solutions for a comprehensive, effective response (GC, 2017). 
This requires that human and animal health, agriculture, and food production 
sectors all work together to contain the emergence and spread of AMR (WHO, 
2016b). 
One of the challenges of addressing AMR “has been the blame game going 
on between medicine and agriculture as to who is most at fault for causing 
the crisis” (Kahn, 2017). While many current estimates of AMR impact focus 
on the costs and benefits to human health, a One Health assessment looks at 
“wider societal costs of lost labour, changes in health seeking behavior, impacts 
on animal health and welfare, higher costs of animal-origin food production, 
and reduced consumer confidence in safety and international trade of such 
food” (Queenan et al., 2016). The Panel agrees and has explored these wider 
societal costs to the extent possible given the current evidence, which are 
examined in Chapters 3 through 5. 
In Canada, federal, provincial, and territorial governments are using a One 
Health approach to combat AMR. This approach is outlined in a 2017 report 
entitled Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance and Antimicrobial Use: A Pan-Canadian 
Framework for Action (hereafter Pan-Canadian Framework) (GC, 2017). Although 
the focus of the Panel’s report is primarily focused on AMR’s impacts on human 
health, examining the problem through a One Health lens means looking also 
at AMU in animals and the environment, and how this contributes to AMR 
in humans and impacts the Canadian healthcare system and economy. The 
Pan-Canadian Action Plan, a follow-up report that will identify deliverables, 
measurable outcomes, and timeframes to support the implementation of the 
Pan-Canadian Framework (PHAC, 2017b), is currently being developed, and 
is expected to be released in 2020.
1.3 A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AMR IMPACT 
AND STRUCTURING OF THE REPORT
The Panel developed a framework showing the main groups of economic and 
social impacts that may result from AMR (Figure 1.1). The framework is reflected 
in the structure of this report, with the exception of direct AMR impacts on 
animals and farmers in the agricultural sector, which are outside the remit of 
this assessment. However, the Panel did choose to model agricultural scenarios 
that briefly examine how changes to productivity and trade that may occur as a 
result of AMR and related issues would impact the food animal agriculture sector.
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ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OUT OF SCOPE
SOCIAL IMPACTS
Healthcare System
Canadian Economy
Agricultural System Policy and Legislation
Community
Individual
Agricultural System
• Increase in Resistant Infections in Humans
• Additional Treatment Costs
• Increased Morbidity, Mortality, and Inequality
• Decreased Quality of Life
• Reduced Social Cohesiveness
• Lower Trust and Social Capital
• Changes in Healthcare Delivery 
• Travel Restrictions
• Reduction in Workforce
• Reduction in GDP
• Decrease in Animal Farming Industry Productivity
• Decrease in Animal  Exports
• Impact of AMR on Animals and Plants
Figure 1.1 
A Framework for the Socio-Economic Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance in Canada
This report examines the economic and social impacts of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in Canada. 
The economic impact of AMR is examined through the impact of resistant infections on hospital 
costs (Chapter 3), through changes to Canada’s economy based on simulated changes to labour 
productivity and through impacts to the agricultural system through decreases in productivity and 
animal exports (Chapter 4). Possible future social impacts of AMR on the Canadian public are examined 
at the individual and community level (Chapter 5).
Chapter 2 provides context necessary to understand the charge by outlining 
current AMU and AMR in Canada. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the economic impacts of AMR on healthcare systems 
due to the increased hospital costs associated with treating more patients for 
longer periods of time, and in some cases with more expensive antimicrobials 
(Gandra et al., 2014; Valiquette et al., 2014; NAS, 2018). Using measurements 
of the costs associated with treating resistant bacterial infections, the Panel 
estimates the Canadian hospital costs associated with resistant infections for 
specific bacterial pathogens. These costs are expected to increase as the number 
of resistant infections increase. A number of studies have estimated the costs of 
a specific type of resistant bacteria in a given hospital, region, or country, but 
only one has extrapolated measures across bacteria to estimate the healthcare 
costs of resistance as a whole for an entire country (OECD, 2018a). 
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The Panel’s report differs from a recent OECD report that provides healthcare 
costing and economic projections of AMR impacts in Canada but does so 
using contrasting methods in order to present a high-level cross-country 
analysis (OECD, 2018a). The OECD report was informed by limited Canadian 
epidemiological data; only one bacterial species was used (E. coli) over a three-
year period. The epidemiological data underlying the Panel’s report, however, 
stem from a variety of sources (e.g., from both hospital and community settings 
where available), and encompass 10 different syndromes accounting for many 
species of bacteria. The OECD report estimates that, currently, about 400 people 
in Canada die annually from resistant infections, whereas — based on more 
comprehensive data and members’ clinical experience — the Panel estimates 
more than 5,000 deaths in 2018 could be attributed to AMR. The OECD report 
provides a high-level analysis; the Panel’s report focuses on Canadian-specific 
data and projections, using Canadian experts to validate the results. For these 
reasons, the OECD report does not reflect the Canadian reality.
Chapter 4 projects the future impact of AMR on Canada’s GDP stemming mainly 
from decreased labour productivity due to increased morbidity and mortality 
associated with resistant infections. A number of studies have estimated GDP 
impacts resulting from potential decreases in labour market productivity and a 
shrinkage of the workforce (e.g., O’Neill, 2014; OECD, 2015; World Bank, 2017). 
A recent study by the World Bank, for example, estimates that by 2050 AMR 
impacts could decrease global GDP by 3.8% and cause 28.3 million additional 
people to become impoverished (World Bank, 2017). Similarly, the OECD 
estimates that the economic impact associated with current rates of AMR will 
reach 0.78% of GDP in OECD countries by 2050, resulting in cumulative losses 
of approximately US$2.9 trillion (OECD, 2015). By employing an economic 
model similar to those used in these studies, the Panel estimates the potential 
future AMR impacts on Canadian GDP.
The potential social impacts arising from widespread AMR are discussed in 
Chapter 5, with a focus on those affecting individuals and communities, and 
those that come about through changes in policy and legislation. To aid in the 
identification of impacts, the Panel uses a future scenario in which AMR has 
continued to increase such that many antimicrobials are ineffective. In this 
scenario, everyone in Canada will be impacted by AMR — quality of life will 
decrease while morbidity and mortality will increase. Less trust in institutions 
such as the healthcare system will lead to changes in care-seeking behaviour. 
A more pervasive lack of trust will fundamentally alter society such that people 
will also become less trusting of others, growing more insular, travelling less, 
and being less willing to open the nation’s borders to immigrants and visitors. 
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Chapter 6 looks at the policy implications of the impact of AMR and four 
mitigation strategies — surveillance, stewardship, infection prevention and 
control, and research and innovation — and investigates how each strategy 
might contribute to slowing the spread of AMR. 
The report concludes by stating that now is the time to act, encouraging 
Canada to take immediate action to address the problem of AMR using a One 
Health approach. 
1.4 REPORT RELEVANCE
This report is unique because of both its comprehensive approach and Canadian 
point of view, making it different from previous reports that also examined 
AMR impacts on GDP (e.g., KPMG, 2014; RAND Europe, 2014; OECD, 2015; 
O’Neill, 2016a; World Bank, 2017). First, it is more comprehensive than 
previous reports that measured the global economic impact of AMR because 
it (i) uses epidemiological measures of current resistant infections within 
Canada to inform the economic model, (ii) investigates how several mitigation 
strategies might reduce the future impacts of AMR using the economic model, 
and (iii) includes impacts on the agricultural sector through changes to the 
labour force as a result of AMR within the economic model, to better reflect 
a One Health approach.2  
Second, this report examines AMR impacts from a distinctly Canadian perspective. 
It looks at impacts on both the Canadian healthcare and agricultural sectors 
through effects on human health, which is crucial for a One Health approach. 
It also considers social impacts using past Canadian experiences, examining 
socio-demographic groups and data relevant within a Canadian context.
2 The Panel notes that the direct impact of AMR on animals and farmers is not modelled or 
included in this report, as it was out of scope.
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2 Antimicrobial Use and Resistance in Canada Today
Antimicrobial use (AMU) in humans and agriculture contributes to increased 
AMR (Section 2.1). A One Health approach to AMR — which considers AMU 
in all sectors, as well as antimicrobials found in the environment — removes 
the blame from any one sector since all stakeholders must work together to 
find a solution (Figure 2.1). AMR is not just a One Health issue but a “One 
World” issue as the global mobility of people and food facilitates the spread 
of AMR genes (Robinson et al., 2016). 
This chapter examines AMR in Canada through a One Health lens. The Panel 
presents evidence on current AMU in Canada, in both the healthcare system 
and in food animals and other food sources. This is followed by a discussion 
of the relationship between AMU in people and animals, and AMR. Finally, 
the chapter surveys AMR in Canada today, as represented by mortality and 
morbidity associated with resistant infections linked to 10 important clinical 
syndromes identified by the Panel. 
2.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTIMICROBIAL USE  
AND ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE 
The most important driver for the emergence and increase in AMR is AMU 
(Aarestrup, 2015). Therefore AMU, even if appropriate or conservative, leads 
to the development of AMR (Cars et al., 2008; Ventola, 2015; Roope et al., 
2019). As explained by Laxminarayan et al. (2013), “antibiotic use is a main 
driver of selection pressure that contributes to resistance.” However, misuse, 
Key	Findings
The main cause of AMR is antimicrobial use, with misuse acting as a key driver.
Based on the Panel’s research, one in every four bacterial infections in Canada is 
resistant to a first-line antimicrobial treatment.
Resistant infections already result in a substantial burden of disease among people 
in Canada.
The Panel estimates that 14,000 deaths in Canada in 2018 were associated with 
resistant infections. Of these, 5,400 deaths (almost 15 a day) were directly attributable 
to AMR. In 2018, AMR was therefore the attributable cause of only slightly fewer 
deaths in Canada than Alzheimer disease in 2016.
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including overuse, plays a significant role in the emergence of AMR in both 
humans and agriculture (WHO, 2012b; Laxminarayan et al., 2013; Holmes et 
al., 2016). There are many factors that impact the acquisition, persistence, and 
transmission of antimicrobial-resistant microbes among people, animals, and the 
environment, including a lack of access to clean water, open (as opposed to 
closed) sewage systems, suboptimal healthcare infection-control practices, 
insufficient provision of antimicrobials and diagnostics, and high population 
density (Holmes et al., 2016). 
Spread between 
animals
Spread between 
humans
Spread between 
animals and humans, 
including via food
Spread in the 
environment, 
including via 
contaminated water 
and fertilizer
Adapted with permission from GC (2017)
Figure 2.1 
A One Health Approach to Antimicrobial Resistance
The movement of resistant bacteria among and between humans, animals, and the environment 
underscores the importance of taking a One Health approach to the problem of antimicrobial 
resistance.
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2.1.1	 AMU	in	Humans	Leads	to	AMR	in	Humans
There is clear evidence that AMU in humans leads to the evolution of resistance 
in microbes that affect humans. For example, Goosens et al. (2005) examined 
AMU and AMR in Europe and found that countries with higher use of a 
class of antibiotic (as measured by out-patient defined daily dose, DDD,3 
per 1,000 inhabitants) also had higher rates of resistance to a particular 
antibiotic within that class. Significant correlations were identified for all four 
organisms studied, with the greatest observed between Streptococcus pneumoniae 
non-susceptibility (which includes intermediate and high-level resistance) to 
penicillins and use of penicillins. Albrich et al. (2004) observed similar results 
when examining the outpatient use of antibiotics and the rate of pencillin-non-
susceptibility in S. pneumoniae in 20 countries (Figure 2.2). More recently, the 
Joint Interagency Antimicrobial Consumption and Resistance Analysis  also 
looked at associations between AMU and AMR in Europe (JIACRA, 2017). 
Significant positive associations were found between AMU and AMR for some 
combinations of antimicrobials and bacteria, including fluoroquinolones and 
Escherichia coli, and carbapenems and polymyxins in Klebsiella pneumoniae. On 
a smaller scale, within hospitals, there is evidence of a relationship between 
AMU and AMR for some bacterial species and antimicrobials (e.g., ceftazidime 
and Gram-negative bacilli) (Lopez-Lozano et al., 2000). 
In some instances, reducing the use of a particular antibiotic has led to declines 
in resistance rates, but not always (Enne, 2009). In Finland, a decrease in 
macrolide (a class of antibiotic) prescribing led to a significant decrease 
in the frequency of erythromycin resistance among S. pneumoniae (Seppälä 
et al., 1997). Similarly, in Iceland, a decrease in the use of penicillin led to a 
decrease in penicillin resistance among pneumococci (Austin et al., 1999), and 
in Israel a decrease in quinolone prescribing was associated with a decrease in 
quinolone resistance in E. coli (Gottesman et al., 2009). However, in Sweden, 
a decrease in trimethoprim prescriptions was not associated with any effect 
on trimethoprim resistance levels in E. coli (Sundqvist et al., 2009); and, in the 
United Kingdom, as sulfamethoxazole prescriptions decreased by 97%, the 
prevalence of sulphonamide resistance increased in E. coli (Enne et al., 2001).
While AMU is linked to AMR, establishing a causal relationship between the 
frequency of resistance and AMU in humans is not straightforward. Some have 
modelled the relationship using population genetic models and epidemiological 
data (Austin et al., 1999), while others have investigated the relationship 
between AMR and AMU for a specific organism and antimicrobial (Seppälä 
3 Defined daily dose is “a standardized metric for human drug use, allowing for comparisons to be 
made between populations” PHAC (2017a). Refer to the same reference for more information 
on how this term is defined.
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et al., 1997; Monnet et al., 1998; Bronzwaer et al., 2002; JIACRA, 2017), but 
no clear relationship exists for all bacteria and all antimicrobials. The lack 
of a universal relationship between AMU and AMR is not surprising given 
the complexity of factors affecting the activity of different antimicrobials 
against different bacterial pathogens, as well as the development and spread 
of resistance. Additionally, JIACRA (2017) notes a complex epidemiological 
relationship between resistance and many other factors in addition to AMU; 
this may account for whether a certain drug and resistance in a certain species 
of bacteria are significantly associated or not. Other factors may include 
resistance to other antimicrobials (co-resistance), travel by humans, patient 
transfers between different healthcare settings, importation and trade of food 
and live animals (both within and between countries), and the exposure of 
animals and humans to antimicrobials via the environment (JIACRA, 2017).
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Figure 2.2 
Correlation Between Penicillin Use and Prevalence of Penicillin Non-Susceptible  
S. pneumoniae
There is a positive correlation between the total outpatient use of penicillin in a country, as measured 
by the defined daily dose (DDD) per 1,000 inhabitants per day, and the proportion of S. pneumoniae 
isolates that are non-susceptible (i.e., with intermediate or high-level resistance) to penicillin.
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2.1.2	 AMU	in	Animals	Leads	to	AMR	in	Humans
AMU in food and companion animals may lead to the development of AMR that 
affects humans through a variety of direct or indirect routes. Webb et al. (2017) 
offer multiple examples of how AMU in food-animal production contributes 
to the selection and dissemination of resistance determinants reaching human 
populations. Importantly, one of the studies reviewed by Webb et al. (2017) 
showed how AMU in animals contributed to resistance to the third-line antibiotic 
colistin, which is now classified as a critically important antimicrobial (WHO, 
2016a). In countries like Canada, where there are generally drinking-water 
treatment and sewage systems, and where most people have little or no direct 
contact with food-producing animals, the transmission of resistant bacteria 
from agricultural sources is primarily foodborne through the contamination 
of meat during slaughter and processing (McEwen & Collignon, 2018). There 
may also be indirect transmission of resistant bacteria to humans from fruits 
and vegetables contaminated by manure or irrigation water (McEwen & 
Collignon, 2018). 
Using the same antimicrobials in farm animals that are used to treat human 
infections increases the likelihood that human pathogens will develop resistance 
or cross-resistance (Shea, 2003; Tang et al., 2017). Complex host-pathogen-
environmental factors determine whether infection occurs after exposure to 
resistant bacteria which limits the understanding of the extent to which AMU 
in animals (and the resultant AMR) impacts humans. However, there is good 
evidence illustrating the contribution of animal AMU to human-pathogen AMR 
in studies of human gut bacteria with a food-animal origin (e.g., Campylobacter 
jejuni, Enterococcus faecium, E. coli, non-typhoidal Salmonella enterica), as well as 
livestock-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (Cameron 
& McAllister, 2016). A study commissioned by the WHO also shows how AMU 
in animals “contributed to the selection — and subsequent transfer — of 
resistance determinants from food animals to humans” for streptothricins, 
glycopeptides, and colistin (Webb et al., 2017). 
The data on ceftiofur-resistant Salmonella Heidelberg (S. Heidelberg) in chickens 
and humans present the clearest direct evidence of the impact of AMU in food 
animals on AMR in humans (Dutil et al., 2010; Seiffert et al., 2013; McEwen & 
Collignon, 2018). Third-generation cephalosporins are broad-spectrum beta-
lactam antimicrobials used widely in both humans and animals (e.g., cefotaxime 
or ceftriaxone in human medicine, ceftiofur in food animals) (McEwen & 
Collignon, 2018), and are classified as critically important antimicrobials by 
the WHO (WHO, 2016a). Ceftiofur is used at times for mass therapy in food-
producing animals (McEwen & Collignon, 2018), and ceftiofur resistance gives 
cross-resistance to ceftriaxone, a first-line antimicrobial used to treat serious 
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salmonellosis in people (Dutil et al., 2010). The Canadian Integrated Program 
for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance (CIPARS) (Deckert et al., 2015) showed 
a high correlation between ceftiofur resistance in both S. Heidelberg and E. coli 
indicator bacterial contaminants in chicken products collected at retail stores 
and ceftiofur-resistant S. Heidelberg in humans (Dutil et al., 2010). Voluntary 
reduction of ceftiofur use in hatcheries was followed by a decline in ceftiofur 
resistance in E. coli in retail chicken, and in S. Heidelberg in retail chicken and 
humans (Dutil et al., 2010; McEwen & Collignon, 2018). As a result of these 
findings, in 2014, the Chicken Farmers of Canada banned the preventative 
use of ceftiofur and other critically important antimicrobials against bacterial 
diseases in chickens (McEwen & Collignon, 2018), and in 2018 extended this 
ban on preventative use to antimicrobials of high importance (Health Canada’s 
Category II ranking system) (CFC, 2019).
AMU in companion animals may also contribute to AMR in humans, but few 
studies have explored this relationship. In general, AMR in companion animal 
pathogens is increasing and is problematic due to close contact between 
pets and people (Wieler et al., 2011). Since about 2000, there has been a 
rapid emergence and global spread of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
pseudintermedius (MRSP) — a common pathogen in dogs — that is difficult to 
treat because of multi-drug resistance (Perreten et al., 2010; McCarthy et al., 
2014). The increasing prevalence of MRSP was identified as a wake-up call for 
veterinarians, demonstrating the need for more focus on AMR and improved 
infection control in companion animals (Lloyd, 2012). There is also evidence 
that S. pseudintermedius impacts human health. There were 24 cases in humans 
over a two-year period in the Calgary Health Region, 3 of which were methicillin-
resistant (Somayaji et al., 2016). 
While the contribution of AMU in animals to AMR in humans has not been 
precisely quantified, recent research has focused on how restricting AMU 
impacts AMR rates. Two systematic reviews, commissioned by the WHO, assessed 
whether a restriction of AMU in food-producing animals reduces the presence 
of resistant bacteria in these animals, and in humans (Tang et al., 2017; Scott et 
al., 2018). Tang et al. (2017) analyzed 13 studies that examined AMR outcomes 
in human populations following an intervention that restricted AMU in animals; 
they found AMR decreased by 24% compared to control groups. The authors 
note that the overall effect of reducing AMU in food animals on the resistomes 
(antibiotic-resistant genes) of both animals and humans remains unknown 
(Tang et al., 2017). The second systematic review was narrative, and not a meta-
analysis. It concludes that limiting AMU in food animals reduces AMR in food 
animals and probably reduces AMR in humans, but that the magnitude of the 
effect could not be quantified (Scott et al., 2018). 
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Attributing the source of resistant pathogens that affect humans to AMU in 
food animals should be done with some caution. For example, it was assumed 
that vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (a type of VRE) emerged in 
European hospitals because of the use of a glycopeptide, avoparcin, as a growth 
promoter in European livestock (Kahn, 2017). A European ban on avoparcin 
in 1997 dramatically reduced VRE in pigs and chickens, but hospital VRE rates 
varied dramatically across the continent. In some countries (the Netherlands, 
Sweden), these rates were consistently low, while they fluctuated and increased 
in others (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece). Whole genome sequencing 
has shown that VRE strains in European farm animals are distinct from those 
in hospitalized human patients (Kahn, 2017). 
2.1.3	 Antimicrobials	Present	in	the	Environment	May	Lead	to	AMR		
in	Humans
Many pathogens, as well as the antimicrobials used to treat them, have 
environmental origins as soil and other environments are sources of highly 
diverse populations of bacteria (McEwen & Collignon, 2018). There are examples 
of resistance to a number of antimicrobials in environmental bacteria isolated 
from pre-antimicrobial-era soil, as well as from areas that have not been exposed 
to modern antimicrobials (Holmes et al., 2016). The natural environment may 
therefore play an important role as both a reservoir and source of resistance 
(Martinez, 2009; Berendonk et al., 2015). There is concern that resistance genes 
and antimicrobial residues in the environment may impact human health, but 
more definitive evidence is needed to understand whether there is a link and 
its relative contribution to AMR that impacts humans. 
Specific concerns exist over antibiotics found in natural environments close 
to areas of agriculture (You & Silbergeld, 2014). Sources of environmental 
contamination with antimicrobials include AMU in crops. Although the 
amount of AMU in crops is very small, their application may increase the risk 
of environmental contamination. Typically, antimicrobials are applied to crops 
in a fine mist, part of which may settle into the soil or drift off-site (McManus, 
2014). However, a number of studies that examined the use of aerosolized 
streptomycin on fruit orchards found that streptomycin application did not 
change bacterial community structure, or increase the abundance of resistance 
genes in orchards (McManus, 2014). The use of manure on croplands also adds 
antimicrobials to the environment (Levy & Marshall, 2004).
Antimicrobials are also used in fish farming (aquaculture). They are primarily 
present in food given to fish, which results in their consumption by both healthy 
and diseased fish; by some estimates, up to 30% of unconsumed medicated food 
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is deposited in sediments under and around aquaculture sites (Sapkota et al., 
2008; Pelletier et al., 2009; Rodgers & Furones, 2009). Of the antimicrobials that 
are ingested, approximately 80% move “into the environment in unabsorbed 
form in faeces, or after absorption [through] urine and other secretions” 
(Armstrong et al., 2005; Cabello et al., 2013). Both unabsorbed and absorbed 
antimicrobials in the environment can remain in sediment and the surrounding 
waters for long periods. Many studies show increases in the frequency of resistant 
bacteria found near aquaculture farms that use antimicrobials, suggesting a 
causal relationship (e.g., Dang et al., 2007; Gordon et al., 2007; Suzuki, 2010). 
Some genetic elements and resistance determinants are shared among “aquatic 
bacteria, fish pathogens, and human pathogens, and [seem] to have originated 
in aquatic bacteria” (Cabello et al., 2013). Therefore, there is some evidence 
that AMU in aquaculture can lead to AMR in humans through several pathways. 
For example, laboratory and field evidence show that there is transfer of 
genetic material between bacteria in the aquatic environment and human 
pathogens, thereby linking the aquatic and terrestrial reservoirs of resistance. 
Alongside selection and dissemination of resistant bacteria, “excessive [AMU] 
in aquaculture can have other detrimental impacts on human health” (Cabello 
et al., 2013). For example, fish products consumed by humans can have higher 
than allowed residues of antimicrobials, thereby potentially altering human 
intestinal flora. Additionally, workers in aquaculture sites and food mills may 
become exposed to antimicrobials and resistant bacteria (Burridge et al., 2010; 
Castillo Neyra et al., 2012).
Evidence shows that antimicrobial-resistant genes are present in urban sewage. 
Hendriksen et al. (2019) found that, while AMR genes are present in sewage 
around the world, the abundance and diversity varied by region. Overall, the 
predicted abundance of AMR in urban sewage in Canada was low (Hendriksen 
et al., 2019). Concerns exist over whether the release of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients into the environment during the manufacturing process leads to 
AMR. Contamination of water, for example, as a result of manufacturing can 
lead to “elevated concentrations of resistant bacteria” (Wellcome Trust, 2018). 
There is also evidence that people are at higher risk of infection if they are 
exposed to water with high levels of resistant bacteria versus if they are not. It 
is not clear, however, exactly what the significance of manufacturing waste is 
to environmental contamination (Wellcome Trust, 2018).
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2.2 ANTIMICROBIAL USE IN CANADA
In Canada, antimicrobials are primarily used in humans and animals. Adjusting 
for population size and average mass (i.e., mg drug/kg animal or mg drug/kg 
human), approximately 1.5 times more antimicrobials were used in animals than 
humans in Canada in 20164 (PHAC, 2017a). New regulations implemented in 
2018, however, are expected to significantly reduce AMU in animal agriculture 
(Section 2.2.2). This section briefly outlines current AMU in humans (within 
the healthcare system), animals, and other food sources.
2.2.1	 Antimicrobials	Form	the	Basis	of	Canadian	Healthcare
Antimicrobials are an essential part of healthcare systems around the world. 
They have reduced the economic, medical, and social burden of infectious 
diseases and are part of many commonplace medical interventions (Davies & 
Davies, 2010; Smith & Coast, 2012; Laxminarayan et al., 2013). In Canada, the 
majority of antimicrobials used in humans are available by prescription only 
(PHAC, 2017a). The majority of AMU in humans occurs in communities (i.e., 
prescribed by a general practitioner, dentist, or other healthcare provider 
through a pharmacy); 92% of DDD in 2016 were dispensed through pharmacies, 
compared to 8% purchased by hospitals (PHAC, 2017a). 
In 2015, people in Canada filled more than 25 million prescriptions for antibiotics 
through a pharmacy (CIHI, 2018c). Overall prescription rates have been lowest 
among adults aged 15 to 59, followed by children (0 to 14 years). Older adults 
(60+) have the highest rates by far, which have risen slightly from 2010 to 2017. 
The prescription rates for children have decreased significantly since 2010, 
and were approximately equal to the rates for adults in 2017 (PHAC, 2017a). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates these rates, as measured by antimicrobials dispensed by 
Canadian pharmacies between 2010 and 2017.
In 2015, Canadian antibiotic prescription volumes, as measured by DDDs, per 
1,000 population per day, were approximately equal to the average for OECD 
countries (CIHI, 2019a). Canada’s rate is more than twice that of the Netherlands, 
the OECD country with the lowest prescribed DDDs, per 1,000 population 
per day. However, Canada is a heterogeneous federation of provinces and 
territories, and AMU varies across the country. For example, the DDDs per 
inhabitant dispensed in community pharmacies in Quebec and the territories 
is approximately half of what is dispensed in Newfoundland and Labrador, the 
province with the highest rate of AMU (PHAC, 2016a).
4 This estimate does not include the amount of antimicrobials used in aquaculture (Section 2.1.3) 
and therefore is an underestimate of the total AMU in animal farming.
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2.2.2	 Antimicrobials	Are	Used	in	Food	Animals	and		
Other	Food	Sources
AMU is not restricted to human populations. As noted in Section 2.1.2, numerous 
antimicrobials are used in food-producing animals, many of which are closely 
related, or identical, to those used to treat human infections (WHO, 2017c; 
McEwen & Collignon, 2018). Canada is a major food-producing country for 
both domestic and international markets, and has roughly 19 times more 
food-producing animals than inhabitants (PHAC, 2016a). Historically, in food-
producing animals, antimicrobials were used to prevent disease, promote growth 
(even in the absence of disease), and treat bacterial infections (Page & Gautier, 
2012; PHAC, 2014b, 2017a). In 2014, Canada ranked seventh highest (out of 
27 countries) for antimicrobial sales for animals, adjusted by populations and 
weights, compared to countries in the European Surveillance of Veterinary 
Antimicrobial Consumption Network (PHAC, 2016a). 
In 2016, approximately one million kg of medically important antimicrobials 
(MIAs) were distributed for sale by Canadian Animal Health Institute member 
companies. Since 2010, there has been an 11% decrease in the quantity of MIAs 
per kilogram of animal (PHAC, 2017a). Of the total distribution amount, 99% 
of AMU was intended for food-producing animals, and 1% for companion 
animals. Many commonly used antibiotics, including tetracyclines, penicillin, 
macrolides, and sulphonamides, are used in both human and veterinary 
medicine in Canada (Page & Gautier, 2012; PHAC, 2017a). 
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Figure 2.3 
Patterns of Antimicrobial Use by Age Group, 2010–2017
Antimicrobials dispensed by Canadian pharmacies in community settings, as measured by prescriptions 
per 1,000 inhabitants. Since 2010, the prescription rate has risen slightly for older adults (60+), 
decreased slightly for adults (15-59), and dropped significantly for children (0-14).
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A paradigm shift on the use of antimicrobials in food animals led to changes 
in federal regulations. These changes, implemented in 2018, should reduce 
the quantity of AMU in food animals in Canada for three reasons. First, MIAs 
can no longer be used as growth promoters in food animals, only for either 
treatment or prevention of disease (GC, 2018). Second, these regulations 
expand manufacturing requirements according to Good Manufacturing 
Practice (GMP) for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) to all veterinary 
APIs. Pharmacists or veterinarians compounding drugs must hold a Drug 
Establishment Licence when importing MIAs. The “Own Use Importation” 
loophole of earlier regulations has also been closed. Third, all MIAs used in 
food animals now require a veterinary prescription in Canada (GC, 2018). 
The mechanisms and approaches that will be used for AMU surveillance and 
benchmarking under the new regulations are under discussion. Regulations 
in the European Union go further, limiting prophylactic use to single animals 
(as opposed to groups) (EP, 2018).
Antimicrobials are also used in plant agriculture, although less commonly than in 
food animals (Williams-Nguyen et al., 2016); Canadian data are scarce, however. 
Estimates of the total amount of antimicrobials used on crops indicate they are 
not a major source of AMU (e.g., in the United States in 2011, 13,542 metric 
tons of antimicrobials were used in food animals, while 36 metric tons were 
used on crops, or 0.3% of total agriculture use) (FDA, 2014). 
As noted in Section 2.1.3, antimicrobials are also used therapeutically and 
prophylactically in aquaculture (Cabello et al., 2013). There is, however, limited 
information on both AMU and AMR in this sector (Tusevljak et al., 2013). 
Aquacultural AMU in Canada and peer countries is generally restricted to avoid 
use of antimicrobials that are also medically important to humans (Cabello et 
al., 2013). However, several authors note that data on classes of antimicrobials 
used in aquaculture in these countries are lacking, because most regulatory 
agencies do not collect this information (Sapkota et al., 2008; Burridge et al., 
2010). Only Denmark and Norway have AMU surveillance programs that monitor 
aquaculture (DANMAP and NORM-VET, respectively) (DANMAP, 2017; NORM/
NORM-VET, 2017), although British Columbia reports total grams of AMU in 
aquaculture, irrespective of drug class (e.g., DFO, 2017). There are additional 
difficulties quantifying the amount of AMU in aquaculture: the “large size 
and geographical extent of the industry,” the various methods used, and the 
large numbers of species of fish and shellfish involved (Cabello et al., 2013). 
Collecting AMU data is also complicated by types of ownership (family units, 
village ownership, small businesses, international conglomerates) (Cabello et 
al., 2013), and by different national, provincial or territorial regulations that 
do not enable data sharing (Burridge et al., 2010). 
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2.3 RESISTANT INFECTIONS IN CANADA
Bacterial infections contribute substantially to the burden of disease in Canada. 
Infections can be acquired in healthcare settings (healthcare-associated infection, 
HAI), with Gravel et al. (2007b) finding that patients acquire a HAI at a rate of 
1 per 10 hospital discharges. Bacterial infections can also be acquired in the 
community (community-acquired infection). 
2.3.1	 Using	a	Clinical	Syndrome	Approach
One of the Panel’s first tasks was to estimate Canada’s burden of resistant 
infections. To do this, a method was needed for classifying infections. While 
studies and reports on AMR often focus on causal pathogens (e.g., PHAC’s 
priority organisms), such an approach puts the focus on biology rather than the 
people infected. As the Panel was charged with examining the socio-economic 
impacts of AMR, they sought an approach that would be relatable to both the 
healthcare providers seeking to identify, treat, and prevent microbial infections, 
as well as the people who bear the burden of disease caused by the infection. 
For this reason, the Panel chose to examine AMR through the symptoms of 
infection and therefore chose a syndrome approach. This approach allowed 
the Panel to take full advantage of the expertise around the table, as it relates 
to the presentation, diagnosis, and treatment of disease in Canada. 
Syndromes are used to describe a group of associated symptoms that typically 
occur within a common location in the body. They can be caused by a single 
pathogen, but more frequently involve multiple pathogens. In short, it is a 
syndrome that presents at a practitioner’s office or hospital, not a particular 
pathogen. Having said this, the syndrome approach does not discount the 
importance of pathogens and the drugs used to treat them; rather, it simply 
examines them through the lens of an individual (i.e., the symptoms they 
experience). This approach recognizes that not every person with a given 
syndrome will have the same causal pathogen(s), but also that a single pathogen 
can cause a variety of different syndromes. Syndromes may also have variable 
impacts depending on patient characteristics, including age, prior treatment 
with antimicrobials, and overall health. 
The Panel chose to examine syndromes that can be caused by bacteria and 
that have the greatest impact on mortality and morbidity in Canada. While this 
approach is not based directly on causal pathogens, by examining syndromes 
with the greatest impact in Canada, the most relevant pathogens are included. 
Using these criteria, the Panel first identified nine important clinical syndromes 
in Canada: bacterial gastro-intestinal infections (BGIs), bloodstream infections 
(BSIs), intra-abdominal infections (IAIs), musculoskeletal infections (MSIs), 
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pneumonia, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), skin and soft tissue infections 
(SSTIs), tuberculosis (TB), and urinary tract infections (UTIs). The Panel then 
identified a tenth important syndrome, Clostridioides difficile infections (CDIs). 
While CDIs could be considered BGIs, they are distinct from all of the other 
clinical syndromes. C. difficile is naturally resistant to many antimicrobials 
(Bloomfield & Riley, 2016), and are almost always contracted either during or 
following antimicrobial treatment (Barbut & Petit, 2001). During treatment, 
antimicrobials disrupt the normal gut flora, which allows C. difficile to both 
establish itself and proliferate in the colon (Barbut & Petit, 2001). Because 
people with a resistant infection are more likely to require longer or multiple 
courses of antimicrobials (as compared to susceptible infections), AMR therefore 
increases the risk a person will acquire a CDI. Like all bacteria, C. difficile can 
also evolve to have AMU-related resistance, which may contribute to infection. 
While these 10 syndromes do not represent all resistant microbes that infect 
people in Canada, in the Panel’s experience, they do represent the majority 
of cases. Each of these syndromes may be acquired in healthcare settings or 
in the community. There is overlap between the 10 clinical syndromes and the 
syndromes caused by the priority AMR organisms identified by both PHAC and 
the WHO (Table 2.1). The third column in Table 2.1 demonstrates that the same 
organism may cause different syndromes and that a given syndrome may be 
caused by different organisms. More details on some of the specific organisms 
that may lead to the 10 important clinical syndromes are provided below.
Table 2.1 
PHAC and WHO Global Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (GLASS)  
Priority Organisms 
PHAC First-Tier Organisms WHO GLASS Priority 
Organisms
Panel’s Important Clinical 
Syndromes
Clostridioides difficile Clostridioides difficile infection 
(CDI)
Extended-spectrum beta-
lactamase (ESBL)-producing 
organisms
Escherichia coli
Klebsiella pneumoniae
Bacterial gastro-intestinal 
infection (BGI) 
Pneumonia 
Intra-abdominal infection (IAI)
Urinary tract infection (UTI)
Skin and soft tissue infection 
(SSTI)
continued on next page
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PHAC First-Tier Organisms WHO GLASS Priority 
Organisms
Panel’s Important Clinical 
Syndromes
Carbapenem-resistant organisms 
(Acinetobacter spp. & 
Enterobacteriaceae spp.)
Acinetobacter baumannii
Escherichia coli
Klebsiella pneumoniae
Bacterial gastro-intestinal 
infection (BGI)
Pneumonia
Bloodstream infection (BSI)
Intra-abdominal infection (IAI)
Urinary tract infection (UTI)
Skin and soft tissue infection 
(SSTI)
Enterococcus spp. Bloodstream infection (BSI)
Intra-abdominal infection (IAI)
Musculoskeletal infection (MSI)
Urinary tract infection (UTI)
Neisseria gonorrhoeae Neisseria gonorrhoeae Sexually transmitted infection 
(STI)
Streptococcus pyogenes (Group 
A Streptococcus) and 
pneumoniae
Streptococcus pneumoniae Pneumonia
Skin and soft tissue infection 
(SSTI)
Musculoskeletal infection (MSI)
Salmonella spp. Salmonella spp. Bacterial gastro-intestinal 
infection (BGI)
Staphylococcus aureus Staphylococcus aureus Bloodstream infection (BSI)
Intra-abdominal infection (IAI)
Musculoskeletal infection (MSI)
Skin and soft tissue infection 
(SSTI)
Mycobacterium tuberculosis Tuberculosis (TB)
Campylobacter spp. Bacterial gastro-intestinal 
infection (BGI)
Shigella spp. Bacterial gastro-intestinal 
infection (BGI)
Data Source: PHAC (2017a) and WHO (2017a)
There is significant overlap between the organisms identified by PHAC and the WHO as particularly 
relevant for antimicrobial resistance. Furthermore, the organisms identified by PHAC and the WHO 
are often the cause of the Panel’s 10 important clinical syndromes.
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Below are brief descriptions of the 10 important clinical syndromes; their 
incidence, resistance, mortality, and morbidity are discussed in Section 2.3.2. 
Bacterial Gastro-Intestinal Infections (BGIs)
BGIs are caused by pathogenic bacteria in the gut, which cause gastroenteritis, 
the inflammation of the gastrointestinal tract, possibly involving both the 
stomach and the intestine. Symptoms include vomiting, severe abdominal 
cramps, fever, and diarrhea. These infections are most often caused by ingesting 
contaminated food or water. Common causes of infection include Shigella species 
(sources include contaminated water), Salmonella enterica (sources include 
contaminated beef, poultry, dairy, and eggs), Campylobacter jejuni (sources 
include contaminated beef, pork, and poultry), and E. coli (sources include 
contaminated beef and vegetables) (Heredia & García, 2018). 
Bloodstream Infections (BSIs)
BSIs occur when bacteria are present in the blood (bacteremia), which frequently 
invokes an immune response (sepsis) consisting of symptoms such as fevers, 
chills, and hypotension. Septic shock is a subset of sepsis involving persistent 
hypotension, which is associated with a high mortality rate (Singer et al., 
2016). Bacteria can infect the bloodstream because of complications from 
other infections (such as pneumonia), during surgery, or due to catheters 
or other foreign bodies entering veins or arteries. BSIs are a major cause of 
“infectious disease morbidity and mortality worldwide” (Laupland & Church, 
2014). 
Clostridioides difficile Infections (CDIs) 
As discussed above, all CDIs are caused by the same bacteria (C. difficile) 
and often occur following antimicrobial treatment. C. difficile is naturally 
resistant to many antimicrobials. The symptoms of CDIs can range from mild 
diarrhea to more serious complications, such as colitis (Barbut & Petit, 2001). 
While traditionally CDIs were largely acquired in healthcare settings, in the 
last 20 years, community-associated cases have become increasingly common 
(Bloomfield & Riley, 2016). 
Intra-Abdominal Infections (IAIs)
IAIs are infections of the abdominal cavity by pathogenic bacteria. These 
types of infections are either uncomplicated, where they involve one organ, 
or complicated, where the infection spreads beyond the initial organ, into 
the peritoneal space, resulting in inflammation of the peritoneum or abscess 
(Walkty & Karlowsky, 2012). 
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Musculoskeletal Infections (MSIs)
MSIs are infections of muscle and bones by pathogenic bacteria. These can 
include osteomyelitis (bacterial infection of the bone), myositis (bacterial 
infection of the muscle), and septic arthritis (bacterial infection of the joint). 
Complications from these types of infections may result in long-term morbidity 
(Fayad et al., 2007).
Pneumonia
Pneumonia is an infection in one or both lungs stemming from bacteria, viruses, 
or fungi. While there are other important respiratory diseases in Canada, 
pneumonia is responsible for the vast majority of incidence of respiratory disease 
that are microbial in origin. This report focuses on bacterial pneumonia, which is 
the most common type of pneumonia in adults. Most pneumonia in Canada 
is treated with antimicrobials. In 2016, about 80% of pneumonia diagnoses 
were given an antimicrobial recommendation (PHAC, 2017a).
Sexually Transmitted Infections (STIs)
STIs are spread by sexual activity. In some cases, STIs do not initially cause 
symptoms, which can result in greater risk of transmission. Over 30 different 
bacteria, viruses, and parasites can be transmitted through sexual activity (WHO, 
2019b). Symptoms may include genital discharge, ulcers, and pelvic pain. The 
negative impacts of STIs are often predominately felt by women and the very 
young. For example, gonococcal infections in women that are untreated or 
inadequately treated may cause serious complications like pelvic inflammatory 
disease, infertility, ectopic pregnancy, premature birth, low birth weight, or 
neonatal gonococcal conjunctivitis (eye infection due to passage of gonorrhea 
from a mother to a child during pregnancy, delivery, or immediately after 
birth) (Eschenbach et al., 1975; Donders et al., 1993; Skerlev & Čulav-Košćak, 
2014; Heumann et al., 2017). Bacterial STIs include chlamydia, gonorrhea, 
mycoplasma, and syphilis (and does not include HIV). The Panel uses gonorrhea 
as a representative STI throughout this report.
Skin and Soft Tissue Infections (SSTIs)
SSTIs result from microbial infection of the skin and supporting structures. 
They include infections of the skin and underlying soft tissue, and have a wide 
variety of presentations, from cellulitis (red, swollen areas of infected skin) to 
necrotizing fasciitis (infection where skin and underlying muscle are destroyed) 
(Ki & Rotstein, 2007). SSTIs can be simple — resulting from a single bacterium 
and infecting a localized area — or they can be complicated, with multiple 
bacteria present within the infected area, leading to systemic inflammation. 
Between 7 and 10% of hospitalized patients are affected by SSTIs, and they are 
especially common in emergency care settings (Ki & Rotstein, 2007). 
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Tuberculosis (TB)
Like CDIs, TB is caused by a single bacterium (Mycobacterium tuberculosis). 
While TB can affect any part of the body, it usually affects the lungs, presenting 
as a respiratory infection (PHAC, 2017a). TB can be divided into latent TB 
(where a person is infected with TB but the bacteria are in an inactive state 
and a person shows no symptoms and is not contagious) and active TB (where 
the TB can be transmitted to others and the person exhibits symptoms). 
Symptoms of active TB include coughing, coughing up blood, chest pain, 
weight loss, fatigue, fever, and night sweats and chills (CDC, 2019). While TB 
is not prevalent across Canada, it is a serious problem in certain communities 
(e.g., among Inuit in the North (ITK, 2018)).
Urinary Tract Infections (UTIs)
UTIs can affect any part of the urinary system (kidneys, ureters, bladder, and 
urethra). A UTI is classified as either lower (confined to bladder) or upper 
(pyelonephritis — infection of the kidney), and as either complicated or 
uncomplicated (Foxman, 2010). Symptoms of UTIs include a burning feeling 
when urinating, frequent and intense urges to urinate, pain and pressure in the 
lower back or abdomen, discoloured and strange-smelling urine, and fever or 
chills. UTI diagnosis is made using a combination of urinary symptoms together 
with a urine culture growing a uropathogen above a given concentration 
(Foxman, 2010). In aging populations, the most frequent bacterial infections 
are UTIs (Nicolle, 2013).
2.3.2	 AMR	Leads	to	a	Significant	Number	of	Infections	and	Deaths		
in	Canada
For each important clinical syndrome, the Panel used published data to estimate 
how frequently these infections occur (incidence), the percentage of infections 
resistant to one or more first-line antimicrobials (resistance) (Table 2.2), the 
percentage of infections that lead to death (mortality), and the length of stay 
in hospital (morbidity) (Table 2.3). The derivations for these estimates are 
described in Appendix A. The expertise of Panel members was essential for 
both identification of the relevant literature, and for ensuring these values 
were consistent with Canadian clinical experience. 
First-line antimicrobials are defined as those being prescribed first for a 
particular syndrome. The Panel notes that what is considered a first-line 
antimicrobial for a given syndrome will vary by location, patient history, and 
time. For instance, if resistance to a particular antimicrobial becomes relatively 
ubiquitous, physicians will cease to prescribe that antimicrobial (Section 
2.3.3), and a patient with a history of infection may be prescribed a different 
treatment than someone with their first infection. The Panel notes that adaptive 
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prescribing makes identifying what is considered a first-line antimicrobial 
challenging, and therefore has clearly identified the antimicrobials considered 
in Appendix A. Where possible, Canadian data were used to establish these 
estimates; however, international data were used to fill in gaps in Canadian 
data. The Panel’s expertise was critical for evaluating the international data 
selected to ensure they were approximately consistent with the Canadian context. 
That international data needed to be used highlights the important data gaps 
in Canadian surveillance of the important clinical syndromes. Filling these 
gaps would be beneficial for targeting efforts related to AMR in Canada, and 
would allow the measurement of the effectiveness of any interventions meant 
to reduce incidence or resistance of infections.
Incidence, resistance, and mortality rates were used to estimate the number of 
infections, resistant infections, and deaths in 2018, based on the total population 
of Canada (StatCan, 2018d) (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). These estimates are unique 
in that they are specifically focused on Canada, have a strong evidentiary base, 
and have benefited from the vast clinical expertise provided by the Panel. 
They offer a snapshot of the current health impacts of AMR in Canada, and 
inform the hospital costs of AMR (Chapter 3) and the costs to the economy 
(Chapter 4). Of the 10 important clinical syndromes, SSTIs were by far the 
most common infection type in 2018, followed by UTIs, IAIs, and pneumonia. 
The most resistant infections are MSIs and SSTIs.
The Panel notes that, because of the lack of high-quality data for all of the 
syndrome parameters, these values should not be considered precise, but rather 
approximations. For one, the incidence rates used are based on formal diagnoses, 
which means only confirmed infections are used to produce the estimates 
listed in Table 2.2.5 In some cases (IAIs, pneumonia, UTIs), only infections 
associated with hospitalization are included in the estimates. This means many 
infections are not included. For example, many people who experience BGIs 
in the community do not seek medical attention and/or are therefore never 
formally diagnosed. The mortality rates for some conditions in Table 2.3 are 
likely higher than they would be if all infections were considered. This is because 
infections that do not lead to hospitalization often go unreported, while patients 
with severe infections will generally end up in hospital, as will those who have 
other serious concurrent medical conditions. The metric used for morbidity 
and additional length of stay in hospital does not take into account factors such 
as lost days of work due to an infection that does not require hospitalization.6 
5 The incidence estimates may be more accurate for STIs (modelled by gonorrhea), TB, and 
CDIs, as these three infections are nationally notifiable (GC, n.d.).
6 Additional length of stay in hospital was used to measure morbidity for all infections except 
STIs, which used estimates of Disability-Adjusted Life Year (DALY). The rationale for using this 
different metric is provided in Appendix A.
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The Panel also notes that the estimated rates in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are drawn 
from diverse populations, geographies, years, and sample sizes (Appendix A). 
The Panel’s expertise was therefore critical for ensuring the validity of these 
approximate estimates in the contemporary Canadian context, and for filling 
in gaps when no literature values were available.
The estimates in Table 2.3 demonstrate that AMR is already a serious problem 
in Canada and responsible for significant negative health outcomes. Based 
on the 10 important clinical syndromes, people in Canada acquired at least 
250,000 resistant infections in 2018;7 over 14,000 deaths were caused by infections 
that were resistant to first-line treatment (Figure 2.4). Furthermore, 5,400 of 
these deaths, or almost 15 a day, could be considered to be directly attributable 
to AMR itself. In other words, these 5,400 deaths would not have occurred had 
the people had a susceptible infection. These results suggest that 4 out of every 
10 deaths from a resistant infection would not have occurred if the infection 
were not resistant (Figure 2.4). In 2018, AMR was therefore the attributable 
cause of only slightly fewer deaths in Canada than Alzheimer disease in 2016 
(StatCan, 2019). 
Based on the Panel’s estimates, the average mortality rate of resistant infections 
is 5.6%, compared to 4.1% for susceptible infections. In 2018, there were 
almost 730,000 total bacterial infections related to the 10 important syndromes 
in Canada that were susceptible to first-line antimicrobials. These infections 
were the attributable cause of death of just under 30,000 people. If all of 
these infections were resistant to first-line antimicrobials, however, more than 
10,000 additional people would have died in Canada.
Importantly, an infection that is resistant to first-line antimicrobials does not 
mean that there is no available treatment. In most cases, antimicrobials are 
available to treat resistant infections (e.g., second-line therapies) if the first 
course of treatment fails. Despite this, as discussed, resistant infections have a 
higher mortality rate as compared to susceptible infections. This is likely due 
to complications centred on delays in acquiring effective treatment. This can 
include an increased need for other procedures (e.g., surgery) as a result of 
an infection not responding to treatment (Cosgrove, 2006). Delays in effective 
treatment may be especially problematic in the context of patients who have 
other medical conditions that made them more susceptible to infections in 
the first place (Section 5.1).
7 The numbers for infections and resistant infections in Canada are likely underestimated, as 
some syndrome estimates only include cases that result in visits to a hospital.
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Resistant Infections 
(n = 250,000)
would not have occured if the infection 
was susceptible to first-line antimicrobials 
Susceptible Infections 
(n = 730,000)
Of 730,000 susceptible infections
 30,000 people died
Of 250,000 resistant infections
 14,000 people died
Of these 14,000 deaths:
Types of Infections in Canada 2018
4 in 10 
In 2018, there were approximatively 980,000 
              bacterial infections in Canada
Susceptible InfectionsResistant Infections 
Figure 2.4 
Resistance and Mortality of Bacterial Infections in Canada for the 10 Important Clinical 
Syndromes
The Panel estimates that there were just under one million bacterial infections in Canada in 2018 
leading to one of the 10 important syndromes. Approximately a quarter of these infections were 
resistant to first-line antimicrobials. In that same year, it is estimated that approximately 4 in 10 of 
those who died from resistant infections would have survived were their infection susceptible to 
first-line antimicrobials.
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The current morbidity of resistant infections is also high, with an estimate 
of 880,000 lost days (or over 2,400 years) in 2018. Discussion of current and 
potential future impacts of AMR on healthcare costs and the economy can be 
found in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
2.3.3	 Resistance	Rates	Are	on	the	Rise
Based on the Panel’s research, the average resistance rate to first-line 
antimicrobials in Canada was 26% in 2018. This means that one in every four 
bacterial infections is already resistant to a first antimicrobial treatment choice. 
This level of resistance is not unique to Canada, with the OECD (2018a) finding 
that average resistance in G20 countries was about 30% in 2015.
The average resistance rate is only part of the story since infection resistance 
rates are lower for some bacteria, while for others the rates are significantly 
higher. For example, a study of patients with acute purulent SSTIs presenting 
at Canadian hospital emergency departments and health centres found that 
32% of the infections were due to MRSA8 (versus methicillin-susceptible 
Staphylococcus aureus, or MSSA) (Borgundvaag et al., 2013). Additionally, there 
are infections, such as multi-drug-resistant (MDR) gonorrhea (the second most 
common STI in Canada), for which the Canadian healthcare system is already 
using antibiotic treatments of last resort (WHO, 2017d; Smyczek et al., 2019). 
For example, in the absence of new effective agents to treat resistant gonorrhea, 
growing resistance may “lead to a situation reminiscent of the pre-antibiotic era 
where there were no effective treatments for gonorrhea” (Dillon et al., 2015). 
The first-line resistance rates listed in Table 2.2 are the best estimates of current 
rates of resistance based on the Panel’s research and assessment, but these 
rates will undoubtedly change in the future. If treatment recommendations 
do not change (i.e., if the same antimicrobial continues to be prescribed as 
the first-line treatment), it can be expected that resistance rates will rise over 
time. There is evidence that when an antimicrobial is in frequent use, resistance 
arises and can spread quickly. For example, it was observed that the rate of 
resistance of S. aureus to penicillin (which used to be the first-line treatment for 
infections caused by that bacterium) reached 25% for HAIs only six years after 
the drug was introduced during the Second World War. While it took longer 
for penicillin resistance to spread to community-acquired S. aureus infections 
(15 to 20 years to reach 25% resistance), within 30 years the overall resistance 
rate had dramatically climbed to 80% (Chambers, 2001). 
8 S. aureus that is resistant to anti-staphylococcal beta-lactam antibiotics (e.g., methicillin, oxacillin, 
and cefazolin) (PHAC, 2017a).
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In response to these rising penicillin resistance rates, new antibiotics were 
deployed more widely. MRSA was observed within two years following the 
introduction of methicillin in the United States, became more prevalent within 
just a few years (Ventola, 2015), and over time continued to rise (Figure 2.5). 
It was estimated that the prevalence of MRSA (relative to MSSA) in the United 
States in the mid-1980s was 5 to 10% in large urban medical centres and less 
than 5% in other settings (Chambers, 2001). By the 1990s, the MRSA rate in 
smaller U.S. hospitals had reached 20%, and by 1998 it was approaching 50% 
in some intensive care units. In 2001, it was estimated that MRSA rates in U.S. 
hospitals had reached 50% and similar rates in U.S. communities were expected 
(Chambers, 2001). Data on resistance rates of S. aureus in Canada follow a 
similar trend. While the overall rate of MRSA infections and colonizations 
of S. aureus in Canadian hospitals was just under 1% in 1995, by 2003 it had 
grown to almost 10.5% (PHAC, 2005), mirroring the rate of rise observed in 
the United States. The Panel was unable to identify more recent Canadian 
data specific to resistance rates of S. aureus isolates, illustrating an important 
research gap in Canada.
Resistance to the next line of treatment for S. aureus is also a concern. The 
first isolates of S. aureus that were completely resistant to vancomycin — the 
antibiotic generally used to treat MRSA — were detected in the United States in 
2002 (CDC, 2002). There are also cases of S. aureus with reduced susceptibility 
to vancomycin, and these remain more frequently observed than those with 
complete resistance (McGuinness et al., 2017). While increasing resistance rates 
over multiple decades is generally clear, on more short-term and recent time-
scales, there are also multiple examples where the resistance rate of bacteria to 
certain antimicrobials has increased in Canada. Examples include tetracycline-, 
ciprofloxacin-, and erythromycin-resistant N. gonorrhoeae, and streptomycin- and 
trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole-resistant E. coli (PHAC, 2017a).
These examples demonstrate how resistance rates to antimicrobials increase 
over time. It is therefore highly likely that the resistance rate to first-line 
antimicrobials, as it relates to the 10 important clinical syndromes, will increase 
from where it is today. For this reason, in later chapters where the Panel presents 
a model that quantifies future economic impacts of AMR, simulations are done 
assuming both a status quo resistance rate (i.e., using the values in Table 2.2) 
and an increase to 40% by 2050. Given past trajectories of resistance rates, the 
Panel is confident that 40% resistance to first-line antimicrobials by 2050 is 
reasonable and, potentially, even an under-estimate of AMR rates in the future.
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2.4 CONCLUSION
The growing problem of AMR must be examined holistically in order to 
gain a full picture of its causes and impacts. AMU in Canada is a ubiquitous 
and valuable part of healthcare and agriculture. But eventually AMU leads 
to resistance with misuse, including overuse, acting as an important driver. 
The effects of AMR are already significant in Canada, with people dying as a 
result of resistant infections. Using data related to resistance and 10 important 
clinical syndromes in Canada, the Panel estimates 5,400 deaths in Canada in 
2018 could be attributed to AMR, and led to almost 900,000 extra days spent 
in hospital. In addition to these significant health impacts, the monetary costs 
of resistant infections are also very high. In the following chapter, the Panel 
estimates AMR’s current and future costs to the Canadian healthcare system.
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Figure 2.5 
Methicillin Resistance Rates of S. aureus in U.S. Hospitals Over Time
Methicillin was first used as a treatment for S. aureus in 1959; hospital-acquired methicillin-resistant 
S. aureus (MRSA) isolates were first observed only two years later in the United States, and in Canada 
in 1964. Starting in the late 1970s, resistance rates began to climb steadily in the United States.
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3 Hospital Costs of Antimicrobial  
Resistance in Canada
People in Canada were hospitalized more than three million times in 2018, and 
about 1 in 10 patients acquired infections (Gravel et al., 2007a; Gravel et al., 
2007b; CIHI, 2019b). Antimicrobials are integral to healthcare. For instance, 
they are given to women delivering by caesarean section, to patients before knee 
or hip surgery, and to those undergoing chemotherapy for cancer treatment. 
According to the Panel’s estimates, in 2018 there were almost one million bacterial 
infections that resulted in the clinical presentation of 10 important clinical 
syndromes (Table 2.2). About 26% of these infections — about 250,000 — were 
resistant to first-line antimicrobials. Resistant infections are already a problem 
in Canada, and if rates of resistant pathogens continue to rise, the financial 
sustainability of the healthcare system will be increasingly under threat. This 
chapter examines the costs of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) — an 
estimated 80,000 in 2018 — drawing on estimates from a range of studies. Using 
the Panel’s economic model, the future hospital costs of AMR are projected 
to 2050 in three resistance scenarios. 
Key	Findings
Antimicrobial-resistant infections cost approximately $18,000 per patient in 2018. 
The most common treatment-resistant infections, skin and soft tissue infections, urinary 
tract infections, pneumonia, and intra-abdominal infections, account for about 91% 
of the hospital costs associated with AMR. 
AMR’s additional cost to the Canadian healthcare system is estimated to have been 
$1.4 billion in 2018, or about 0.6% of national healthcare spending. This amount is 
roughly equal to the total expenditure on all hospitals in Newfoundland and Labrador 
or all physicians in Manitoba.
Based on the Panel’s economic model, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains 
at today’s rate of 26% or reaches 40% by 2050, Canada’s additional hospital costs 
would increase to $6 to $8 billion per year, respectively. 
In 2050, AMR may comprise almost 1% of Canadian healthcare spending if resistance 
reaches 40%. This amount is roughly equal to the total expenditure on all hospitals 
in Atlantic Canada or all physicians in Quebec.
Antimicrobials saved the Canadian healthcare system $4.1 billion in 2018. If resistance 
to first-line antimicrobials reaches 40% by 2050, their failure could cumulatively cost 
the healthcare system nearly $120 billion.
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3.1 ESTIMATING THE HOSPITAL COSTS OF  
ANTIMICROBIAL-RESISTANT INFECTIONS
Resistant infections are more difficult to treat, requiring lengthier hospital stays 
and longer courses of antibiotics and other therapies (Gandra et al., 2014), 
and as a result more care by hospital personnel. As Valiquette et al. (2014) 
note, “although it is difficult to estimate...[the] spending attributed to the 
management of nosocomial [healthcare-acquired] infections, overuse and/or 
misuse of antimicrobials, and [community-acquired] infections due to multi-
drug-resistant bacteria is significant.” Yet despite this known healthcare burden 
and the growing need for cost containment, relatively few studies have examined 
the costs of AMR in Canada. In order for the Panel to do so, it examined six 
Canadian studies and a dozen international studies that estimate the hospital 
costs of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci (VRE), extended-spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) gram-negative 
bacteria, and Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI). These studies were identified 
by an iterative search process and vetted by Panel expertise. Collectively, 
they reveal a range of cost estimates (using various methods) across patient 
populations and locations. 
Given this range, the Panel did not simply use the average of different studies 
to establish estimates for the costs of resistant infections in Canada. Rather, it 
considered all of these studies and then used members’ expert judgment to 
establish which values best represented the average costs of resistant bacterial 
HAIs in Canada. These bacterial estimates were then converted into cost 
estimates for the 10 important syndromes the Panel identified in Section 2.3. 
The estimates that follow are based on hospital costs (Section 3.1.2)9 and do 
not reflect non-hospital costs, for which there are limited data.
3.1.1	 The	Average	Cost	of	a	Resistant	Bacterial	Infection	in	Hospital		
Is	Estimated	to	Be	$18,000
The three most common antimicrobial-resistant bacteria found in Canadian 
hospitals are MRSA, VRE, and ESBL gram-negative bacteria (Valiquette et 
al., 2014; PHAC, 2017a). Despite decreasing incidence, CDI (which can be 
susceptible or resistant) causes more infections in people in Canada than 
MRSA, VRE, or ESBL gram-negative bacteria (PHAC, 2017a). Most estimates of 
healthcare costs are undertaken for a specific bacterium, and in the context 
of hospitals. This is because data about in-hospital morbidity, mortality, and 
costs associated with treatment are relatively easy to retrieve, and hospitals 
9 All values reported in this chapter have been converted into 2018 Canadian dollars using the 
Bank of Canada yearly exchange rates and inflation calculator, unless otherwise noted.
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are most likely to implement changes in response to information assessed at 
the hospital level. However, there is variation within hospital cost estimates 
because of the variability in morbidity and mortality associated with different 
pathogens and the syndromes they cause. For example, the mortality and 
morbidity burden for a patient with a BSI may be different depending on the 
causative pathogen (e.g., MRSA, VRE). All else being equal, a patient with a BSI 
caused by MRSA may spend a different amount of time in the hospital, receive 
different antimicrobial therapy, and experience different complications than if 
their BSI were caused by VRE. Furthermore, as Gandra et al. (2014) point out, 
current estimates of the disease burden of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria vary 
widely because of heterogeneity in study populations, control groups, bacteria 
with different virulence and pathogenicity, infection location, definitions of 
resistance, and other factors. These limitations render it difficult to accurately 
estimate the cost of resistant bacterial infections, which in turn adds further 
uncertainty to estimates of hospital costs of syndromes (Section 3.1.2).
The majority of studies to date have compared outcomes among patients 
infected with a resistant bacterium with outcomes among uninfected control 
subjects selected on the basis of health or other demographic criteria. Such a 
comparison measures the cost of having a resistant infection rather than no 
infection, resulting in a much higher estimate of cost than is directly attributable 
to the resistant bacteria. The calculations carried out by the Panel in Section 3.2 
reflect the cost of resistant infections relative to no infection, because for some 
bacteria these are the only data available. 
Other studies, by contrast, compare outcomes in patients infected with a resistant 
strain of bacteria to patients infected with a susceptible strain of the same bacteria. 
This provides a measure of the attributable cost of resistance by comparing, for 
example, infections caused by MRSA to those caused by methicillin-susceptible 
Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA). In some cases, such studies demonstrate that there 
can be a significant additional cost associated with resistant infections. It is also 
important to adjust for differences in hospital length of stay (LOS) before the 
onset of infection in patients with resistant infections and in the comparison 
group. There is a direct correlation among hospital LOS before infection 
with its cost, future LOS, and mortality (Gandra et al., 2014). In addition, care 
must be taken to control for pre-infection illness severity and co-morbidities. 
Appendix B describes these and other methodological challenges.
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MRSA Infection
S. aureus is a bacterium that can cause infections in different parts of the 
body — symptoms are dependent on the site of infection. Most often, it causes 
mild infections on the skin, such as sores or boils. However, it may also cause 
more serious SSTIs, BSIs, pneumonia, or MSIs. MRSA infections are associated 
with a number of different syndromes, and the costs associated with these types 
of infections are dependent on both the location of the infection and patients 
themselves. For example, Box 3.1 describes a fatal case of MRSA pneumonia, but 
also shows how the same bacterial strain can cause different types of infections 
in different people. 
The hospital costs of MRSA have been widely estimated in the academic literature. 
There is large variation in these estimates, however, for the reasons outlined 
above (e.g., heterogeneity in study populations, control groups, bacteria with 
different virulence) as well as because of variation in healthcare spending by 
country (OECD, 2017) and degree of infection resistance. For example, in 
South Korea, Joo et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2014) estimate the cost per patient 
infected with MRSA to be $5,809 (total cost) and $13,603 (relative to susceptible 
Box 3.1
Pneumonia	in	an	Ontario	Teen	After	He	Acquired	a		
MRSA	Infection	in	Texas
In 2006, a 17-year-old Ontario high school student (Patient A) and his family stayed 
with relatives in Houston, Texas. One of these relatives had recently suffered from 
an MRSA infection. A few weeks later, the teenager presented to a Scarborough 
emergency department with fever, shortness of breath, and a dry cough that started 
two days earlier. He quickly developed respiratory distress and hypotension, and 
was moved to the ICU to be intubated and ventilated. Patient A was diagnosed 
with severe community-acquired necrotizing pneumonia with septic shock and was 
treated with six antimicrobials. Despite aggressive supportive care, he died five 
days after admission. A fluid sample from his lungs grew a common North American 
community-associated MRSA strain (CMRSA-10) and influenza A virus. Months after 
Patient A’s death, his father and 19-year-old sister developed MRSA SSTIs. The authors 
hypothesized that the family members were colonized with MRSA either during the 
Texas visit or Patient A’s illness. 
(Adam et al., 2007) 
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infection) for BSI patients and hospital-acquired BSI patients, respectively. Some 
of this variation is likely because the estimates are from different populations 
and locations. Nelson et al. (2015a) estimate the in-patient cost of MRSA 
infections among approximately 400,000 U.S. veterans to be about $15,309 per 
patient (relative to patients with no infection), whereas Shorr (2010) found 
that the median cost for 87 patients with MRSA pneumonia was only slightly 
more ($1,489) than those with MSSA in a Detroit hospital. In a North Carolina 
hospital, Engemann et al. (2003) found that the median hospital cost for MRSA 
surgical site infections (SSIs, a type of SSTI) ($188,396) is significantly higher 
than the median cost for MSSA SSIs ($107,680), and patients with either type 
of infection cost significantly more than patients without infection ($60,081). 
As mentioned above, the variation in estimates may be attributable to the 
methods used to estimate cost (e.g., multivariate regression, propensity score 
matching, conventional costing) (Nelson et al., 2015b). 
Table 3.1 summarizes four Canadian studies of MRSA infections, which report 
median hospital costs per patient. Thampi et al. (2015) compare 58 MRSA patients 
to 377 MSSA patients in four Ontario hospitals, finding that MRSA BSIs cost 
$21,511 per patient, an increase of $8,223 over patients with MSSA BSIs. When 
combined with similar findings in Kim et al. (2001) ($21,158), Goetghebeur 
(2007) ($12,371), and Rosner et al. (2004) ($10,080), the average cost per MRSA 
patient is $16,280, which the Panel takes to be an estimate of the hospital cost 
of MRSA in Canada.
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VRE Infection 
VRE infections can occur anywhere in the body, but common sites include the 
urinary tract, abdomen, bloodstream, and surgical sites. While they are more 
difficult to treat than susceptible enterococcal infections, they are somewhat less 
common than other bacterial infections (HealthLink BC, 2017). VRE infections 
are associated with higher levels of mortality and morbidity for patients who 
receive bone marrow, liver, kidney, and other transplants (Freitas et al., 2006; 
Rolston et al., 2007; Linfield et al., 2018).
Only one study has estimated the cost of VRE in Canada. Lloyd-Smith et al. 
(2013) compared 217 VRE patients to a random sample of 1,075 other patients 
in a Vancouver hospital. They found that VRE increased the mean additional 
hospitalization cost per patient by $21,185, relative to hospitalized patients 
who did not have VRE. As this was the only Canadian study, the Panel used this 
value as their estimate for the hospital cost of VRE in Canada.
Table 3.2 summarizes the study by Lloyd-Smith et al. (2013), along with four 
other studies from Australia and the United States. As with MRSA, however, it is 
difficult to compare the cost of VRE across studies; the five studies summarized 
in Table 3.2 cover different medical conditions (e.g., leukemia, transplants) 
and countries (Australia, Canada, United States), and use different methods. 
While not directly comparable, these studies suggest that VRE infections are, 
on average, costlier than MRSA infections. This difference may be due to the 
fact that the studies mostly focus on BSIs, or may show that the actual costs 
associated with treating patients with VRE infections are greater.
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ESBL Infection
ESBL gram-negative bacteria produce an enzyme, beta-lactamase, that has the 
ability to break down commonly used antimicrobials, rendering them ineffective 
for treatment (i.e., the bacteria are resistant). Syndromes that can be caused 
by ESBL-producing bacteria include UTIs, IAIs, pneumonia, and BGIs. 
The one Canadian study of ESBL infections (Chaulk et al., 2014) did not 
measure costs of infection but instead estimated 30-day mortality associated 
with third-generation cephalosporin-resistant spontaneous bacterial peritonitis 
(SBP, a type of IAI) in an Edmonton hospital. It found that cirrhosis patients 
who develop resistant infections are approximately five times more likely to die 
within 30 days as a control group of cirrhosis patients. The high mortality rate 
for SBP may help explain the relatively low additional mean cost per patient 
($719 relative to patients with susceptible infections) in a study from a Singapore 
hospital (Vasudevan et al., 2015). This study and three others are summarized in 
Table 3.3, providing international cost estimates for UTIs and other infections 
caused by ESBL. The Panel used the average hospital cost per patient with 
ESBL infections (relative to no infection) from these studies — $20,893 per 
patient — as their estimate for the cost of ESBL infections. This estimate is 
similar to the estimated cost of VRE infections. 
50 When Antibiotics Fail
Ta
b
le
 3
.4
 
Es
ti
m
at
es
 o
f t
he
 H
os
pi
ta
l C
os
ts
 o
f C
D
I, 
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 F
iv
e 
St
ud
ie
s
D
efi
ni
ti
on
Lo
ca
ti
on
H
os
pi
ta
ls
Sa
m
pl
e 
Si
ze
M
et
ho
ds
Ye
ar
Co
st
 
Re
fe
re
nc
e
H
os
pi
ta
l 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d-
an
d 
Co
m
m
un
it
y 
A
cq
ui
re
d-
CD
I
Ca
na
da
Al
l
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
 li
ne
ar
 
re
gr
es
si
on
20
12
$1
3,
02
8 
(t
ot
al
 c
os
t)
Le
vy
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
5
H
os
pi
ta
l 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d-
CD
I
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
(P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a)
6
25
5 
CD
I  
vs
.  
76
5 
no
n-
CD
I
Pr
op
en
si
ty
 s
co
re
 
m
at
ch
in
g,
 ra
nd
om
-e
ffe
ct
s 
m
od
el
20
07
–2
00
8
$2
5,
82
2 
(t
ot
al
 c
os
t)
$5
,3
61
 (c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
ho
sp
ita
l p
at
ie
nt
 w
ith
  
no
 C
DI
)
Ta
ba
k 
et
 a
l.,
 2
01
3
H
os
pi
ta
l 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d-
CD
I
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
1,
00
0 
ad
ul
ts
 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
si
m
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
 
1,
00
0 
tim
es
Co
m
pu
ta
tio
n 
si
m
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
20
10
$1
0,
86
9 
(t
ot
al
 c
os
t)
M
cG
lo
ne
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
2
H
os
pi
ta
l 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d-
CD
I
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
(N
ew
 Y
or
k)
Al
l
3,
82
6 
CD
I v
s. 
4,
84
9,
91
7 
co
nt
ro
ls
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
 li
ne
ar
 
re
gr
es
si
on
20
07
–2
00
8
$3
7,
28
5 
(c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
ho
sp
ita
l p
at
ie
nt
s 
w
ith
 
no
 C
DI
)
Li
pp
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
2
H
os
pi
ta
l 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d-
CD
I i
n 
pa
ti
en
ts
 w
it
h 
re
na
l d
is
ea
se
, 
ca
nc
er
, 
in
fla
m
m
at
or
y 
bo
w
el
 d
is
ea
se
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
(M
is
so
ur
i)
74
4,
52
1 
CD
I, 
no
 
co
nt
ro
ls
 s
pe
ci
fie
d
Pr
op
en
si
ty
 s
co
re
 m
at
ch
in
g
20
05
–2
01
1
$6
,3
83
 (c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
si
m
ila
r p
at
ie
nt
s 
 
w
ith
ou
t C
DI
)
Ca
m
pb
el
l e
t a
l.,
 2
01
3
Th
is
 t
ab
le
 c
o
m
p
ar
es
 fi
ve
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
o
f 
th
e 
co
st
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 C
lo
st
ri
d
io
id
es
 d
if
fi
ci
le
 in
fe
ct
io
n
s 
(C
D
Is
).
 C
o
st
s 
h
av
e 
b
ee
n
 c
o
n
ve
rt
ed
 in
to
 2
01
8 
C
an
ad
ia
n
 d
o
lla
rs
.
51Chapter 3 Hospital Costs of Antimicrobial Resistance in Canada
CDI
CDIs are the most frequent cause of infectious diarrhea in hospitals and long-term 
care facilities in Canada and peer countries (PHAC, 2018b). CDIs frequently 
occur alongside other resistant infections and the use of antimicrobials, which 
alter patients’ internal gut flora. Because of this relationship to other resistant 
infections (as discussed in Section 2.3.1 in reference to CDI morbidity), the 
total cost estimates discussed here refer to all types of CDI, both susceptible 
and resistant.
A recent study has estimated the cost of CDI in Canada. Levy et al. (2015) 
developed an economic model to estimate the costs of managing both hospital- 
and community-acquired CDI. In 2012, across an estimated 37,900 cases, they 
found that CDIs increased the mean hospitalization cost by greater than $13,000 
for an initial episode (the cost was even greater for a recurrent episode). 
The authors found that the cost of CDIs to Canada in 2012 was $281 million 
dollars (in 2012 dollars); 92% ($260 million) of this was for in-hospital costs, 
4% ($12 million) was due to direct medical costs in the community, and 3.5% 
($10 million) was linked to lost productivity. This study also highlights differences 
across provinces and territories; the estimated rate of CDI in Quebec (17 cases 
per 10,000 bed days) is nearly twice the estimated rate in British Columbia 
(8.3), and six times that in Atlantic Canada (2.8). The four additional U.S. 
studies summarized in Table 3.4 provide cost estimates of CDI that are slightly 
higher, on average, than the Canadian values estimated by Levy et al. (2015). 
The differences in the values in Table 3.4 likely reflect differences between 
the healthcare systems in the two countries as well as other differences related 
to patient populations and methods of estimating costs. The Panel chose to 
use the value reported in the Canadian study as their estimate of the cost of 
CDI ($13,028), which is less expensive than the estimates of ESBL, VRE, and 
MRSA infections.
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In summary, while not always directly comparable, and while based on different 
syndromes, populations, locations, and methods, 18 studies (summarized in 
Tables 3.1 through 3.4) were considered by the Panel in the development 
of its estimate of the average Canadian hospital costs of MRSA, VRE, ESBL 
infections, and CDI. These results indicate that patient costs associated with 
resistant bacteria are sizeable. It costs about $18,000 more to treat a patient 
with a resistant bacterial infection than a patient without an infection. The 
bacterial estimates in Figure 3.1 are used to construct hospital costs for each 
of the Panel’s 10 important syndromes in the next sub-section.
3.1.2	 TB,	BGIs,	IAIs,	and	UTIs	Are	the	Most	Expensive	Resistant	
Syndromes	to	Treat
In Chapter 2, the Panel examined 10  important clinical syndromes for which 
AMR is prevalent and leads to high levels of mortality and morbidity in Canada. 
For each syndrome, Table 3.5 presents the Panel’s estimates of the hospital 
costs per resistant infection. 
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Figure 3.1 
Hospital Costs per Patient by Bacterial Pathogen, Selected Studies, 1996–2015
This figure plots the hospital costs per patient with a resistant infection in 2018 Canadian dollars, 
averaged across selected studies. VRE, vancomycin-resistant Enterococci; ESBL, extended-spectrum 
beta-lactamase gram-negative bacteria; MRSA, methicillin-resistant S. aureus.
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Since about 1 in 10 patients acquires an infection while in hospital (Gravel 
et al., 2007a; Gravel et al., 2007b), about 300,000 infections were acquired in 
Canadian hospitals in 2018.10 Based on the assumption that the infection and 
resistance rates presented in Chapter 2 can be applied to hospital settings, the 
Panel used its own estimates of resistant HAIs for each syndrome to calculate 
hospital costs (Table 3.5). The Panel recognizes that the method used to estimate 
costs does not take into account the likelihood of a syndrome being acquired 
in a hospital-setting. The Panel chose to calculate the hospital costs of AMR 
using HAIs for two reasons. First, most of the studies outlined above relate to 
the cost of bacterial HAIs; the Panel was unable to find reliable estimates of 
the costs of community-acquired infections. Second, by estimating the costs 
of HAIs only, the Panel is providing a conservative estimate of the impact of 
AMR on the Canadian healthcare system.
10 This calculation is based on the 2018 total number of hospital discharges (3,074,965) (CIHI, 
2018a).
Table 3.5 
Estimated Hospital Costs of Antimicrobial Resistance by Syndrome in Canada, 2018
Syndrome
Hospital Costs per 
Resistant Infection
BGI $20,893
BSI $18,733
CDI $13,028
IAI $20,893
MSI $16,280
Pneumonia $18,587
SSTI $16,280
STI (gonorrhea) $247
TB $38,466
UTI $20,893
Average $17,900
This table presents the estimated hospital costs by syndrome weighted by the cost of causal bacteria 
identified in Section 3.1.1 (further described in Appendix B). Cost per infection for STIs and TB are 
based on estimates in Chesson (2018) and Diel (2014), respectively. The Panel recognizes many other 
pathogens can cause these syndromes, but were unable to obtain costing estimates for these pathogens. 
The Panel also recognizes that the method used to estimate costs does not take into account the 
likelihood of a syndrome being acquired in a hospital-setting. BGI, bacterial gastrointestinal infection; 
BSI, bloodstream infection; CDI, C. difficile infection; IAI, intra-abdominal infection; MSI, musculoskeletal 
infection; SSTI, skin and soft tissue infection; STI, sexually transmitted infection; TB, tuberculosis; UTI, 
urinary tract infection. The syndrome totals for cases are rounded due to the uncertainty in the 
estimates.
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To calculate hospital costs per resistant infection, the Panel converted the 
hospital costs of resistant bacteria (Figure 3.1) into costs for resistant syndromes. 
This conversion was based on the Panel’s expert judgment on the causative 
relationship between bacteria and syndromes, calculating the cost of a syndrome 
as the average cost of the causative bacteria. For example, since SSTIs are 
predominantly caused by MRSA bacteria (along with other bacteria, for which 
there is no attributable cost estimate), the Panel based the cost of resistant 
SSTIs on the average cost of MRSA  infections ($16,280).11 By contrast, since 
pneumonia can be caused by MRSA and ESBL bacteria, the Panel estimated 
the cost of resistant pneumonia as the average hospital cost of these two 
bacteria ($18,587). Using this bacterial weighting method, the four most 
expensive resistant syndromes to treat per patient are TB, UTIs, IAIs, and 
BGIs. The Panel recognizes that this weighting is imperfect, as syndromes are 
also caused by other bacteria.12 Data were  not available to allow the Panel to 
directly estimate the cost of resistant syndromes. This highlights an important 
area of future research.
3.2 THE COST OF AMR TO THE CANADIAN  
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Healthcare spending in Canada is forecast to have reached $254 billion in 2018 
(CIHI, 2018b). Equal to $6,839 per person annually, this spending represents 
more than 11% of Canada’s GDP. While trending upward since 1975, healthcare 
spending has more than doubled over the last decade. This section outlines 
current and future AMR costs to the Canadian healthcare system based on the 
estimates discussed in Section 3.1.
3.2.1	 AMR	Cost	the	Canadian	Healthcare	System	an	Estimated		
$1.4	Billion	in	2018
Based on resistant HAIs, the Panel estimates that AMR cost Canadian hospitals 
about $1.4 billion in 2018. While only about 0.6% of national healthcare 
spending, this amount is roughly equal to total expenditure on all hospitals 
in Newfoundland and Labrador or all physicians in Manitoba (CIHI, 2018b). 
11 While VRE infections sometimes cause UTIs, IAIs, and BGIs, especially among vulnerable 
populations, ESBL bacteria more frequently cause these three resistant syndromes. Therefore, 
the Panel based its attributable cost estimate on ESBL bacteria only. Since VRE infections are 
costlier to treat than ESBL infections, this leads to an underestimate of the cost per resistant 
UTI, IAI, and BGI.
12 For example, IAIs can also be caused by Bacteroides fragilis and Bacteroides distasonis (in addition 
to ESBL bacteria).
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As depicted in Figure 3.2, SSTIs were the most costly resistant syndrome in 
2018. Along with UTIs, IAIs, and pneumonia, these four syndromes accounted 
for 91% of the hospital costs associated with AMR. This is because they had 
the highest infection rates and among the highest resistance rates as shown 
in Figure 3.3. Comprising about 90% of resistant HAIs, these four syndromes 
were only slightly more expensive to treat than other syndromes (except for 
TB) (recall Table 3.5). Despite a similar number of resistant cases, IAIs cost 
the Canadian healthcare system almost $40 million more than pneumonia 
because of a higher incidence of infection and the higher costs associated with 
its treatment ($20,893 vs. $18,587). MSIs were the fifth costliest syndrome in 
2018, responsible for about 5% of hospital costs, which is partially the result of 
having the highest resistance rate. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between 
hospital-associated resistant infections, resistance rate, and total hospital costs 
for the 10 important clinical syndromes.
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Figure 3.2 
Canadian Hospital Costs Associated with Antimicrobial Resistance, 2018
This figure plots the estimated 2018 hospital costs associated with 10 important syndromes in Canada. 
BGI, bacterial gastrointestinal infection; BSI, bloodstream infection; CDI, C. difficile infection; IAI, 
intra-abdominal infection; MSI, musculoskeletal infection; SSTI, skin and soft tissue infection; STI, 
sexually transmitted infection; TB, tuberculosis; UTI, urinary tract infection.
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The Panel recommends exercising caution in interpreting these calculations. 
The costs of resistant HAIs are heterogeneous, varying by hospital, geographic 
location, and patient group. As will be described in Chapter 6, AMU, surgical 
procedures, handwashing, and other practices differ across hospitals. Similarly, 
infection rates can vary across provinces and territories, reflecting differences 
in socio-demographics, public health policies, and other factors. For older 
adults, for example, costs can be significant after they are discharged from 
the hospital as these may include home care, long-term care, or other types of 
healthcare services. Therefore, using estimates from a single study or even the 
average from academic literature could be misleading if applied to all hospitals, 
provinces/territories, or patients.
As in Chapter 2, the Panel used its clinical expertise and expert judgment to 
select the studies highlighted in Figure 3.1 and used in this chapter. Where 
possible, it examined Canadian studies to avoid assigning variation in hospital 
costs to what are actually differences in healthcare systems. While somewhat 
imprecise, the Panel considers $1.4 billion to be a conservative approximation 
of the healthcare costs of AMR for three reasons. First, this estimate does not 
include community-acquired resistant infections, which account for upwards 
of 70% of total infections (CIHI, 2018a). There are healthcare costs associated 
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Figure 3.3 
Healthcare-Associated Resistant Infections, Resistance Rates, and Hospital Costs, 2018
This figure plots estimated resistance rates, hospital costs, and number of healthcare-associated resistant 
infections (size of circle areas) for 10 important syndromes in Canada. BGI, bacterial gastrointestinal 
infection; BSI, bloodstream infection; CDI, C. difficile infection; IAI, intra-abdominal infection; MSI, 
musculoskeletal infection; SSTI, skin and soft tissue infection; STI, sexually transmitted infection; TB, 
tuberculosis; UTI, urinary tract infection.
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with these infections, such as physician visits and prescription drugs, which 
the Panel’s estimate does not include. Second, if infection and resistance rates 
are under-reported (which might be expected for some syndromes, such as 
BGIs), hospital costs would be proportionally higher. Third, to the extent that 
susceptible infections increase the likelihood of acquiring resistant infections 
(Chapter 5), the Panel’s estimate does not include the future costs associated 
with the present use of antimicrobials.
3.2.2	 AMR	May	Comprise	About	1	to	2%	of	Future	Canadian	
Healthcare	Spending
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Panel commissioned a quantitative economic 
model to help estimate the future impact of AMR (discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 4). According to this model, by 2050, if resistance to first-line 
antimicrobials remains constant at approximately 26%, or reaches 40%, 
Canada’s additional hospital costs would increase to about $5.5 to $7.6 billion 
per year, respectively (Figure 3.4). The latter amount is roughly equal to total 
expenditure on all hospitals in Atlantic Canada or all physicians in Quebec 
(CIHI, 2018b). It is likely an under-estimate of the future healthcare costs of AMR 
because it assumes that Canadian healthcare spending growth remains constant 
(Figure 3.2), that immigration remains constant (Bohnert & Dion, 2013), and 
that new health technology does not alter costs (Chandra & Skinner, 2012). 
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Figure 3.4 
Projected Canadian Annual Hospital Costs Associated with Antimicrobial Resistance, 
2020–2050 
This figure plots the estimated total Canadian annual hospital costs based on three resistance scenarios 
in the Panel’s model: status quo (26%), 40%, and 100%. It assumes that hospital costs grow at 4.2% 
per year from 2020 to 2050.
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The Panel’s estimate of Canadian healthcare costs differs significantly from 
a recent estimate provided by the OECD (2018a) for two main reasons. First, 
the OECD uses a pathogen approach, basing their estimates of resistance, 
mortality, and morbidity on data from the Center for Disease Dynamics, 
Economics & Policy and the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
Network, which allow for international comparisons. However, as noted in 
Chapter 1, Canadian data from these sources were limited to E. coli resistance 
between 2012 and 2014. As a result, the OECD estimates of annual deaths and 
LOS (approximately 400 deaths, 28,000 hospital days) due to AMR in Canada 
is an order of magnitude lower than the Panel’s estimates (approximately 
5,400 deaths, 880,000 hospital days). Second, the 2018 OECD report combines 
several models (mixed-effects linear regression, exponential smoothing with 
an additive trend, and random forecast) to forecast future resistance levels 
and thereby estimate future mortality, LOS, and healthcare costs. By contrast, 
and as described in more detail in Chapter 4, the Panel estimated future deaths, 
LOS, and hospital costs based on three resistance scenarios (i.e., 26% (status 
quo), 40%, and 100%), focusing on collecting comprehensive Canadian data 
on 10 syndromes. The Panel adopted this approach because the focus of its 
modelling was the impact of AMR on labour productivity. As a result of these 
differences in approach, the Panel’s estimate of current and future healthcare 
costs is based on hospital costs for resistant syndromes (e.g., $16,280 per SSTI) 
under three resistance scenarios, whereas the OECD’s estimate is based on 
LOS for a single resistant bacterium under forecasted resistance rates. When 
combined with very limited Canadian data, the OECD’s healthcare cost estimates 
($380 million by 2050 at 14% resistance) are much lower than the Panel’s 
($7.6 billion by 2050 at 40% resistance). Ultimately, the Panel’s approach is 
more accurate for the Canadian context.
Figure 3.4 underscores why it is imperative to slow the increase in resistance rates. 
It highlights the sizeable gap in 2050 healthcare spending between a scenario 
in which there is complete resistance (100%) to all first-line antimicrobials and 
more conservative projections of 40% or status quo first-line resistance. In 2050, 
AMR may comprise between 0.9 to 1.6% of Canadian healthcare spending, up 
from 0.6% today, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials reaches 40% or 100%, 
respectively. Such a major increase in one dimension of healthcare would 
put significant financial strain on the rest of the system, perhaps resulting in 
spending cuts elsewhere in the health system or in government services. The 
annual growth in healthcare costs attributable to AMR between 2020 and 
2050 — about 6 to 8% — would comprise the largest single growth factor for 
Canadian health expenditures, dwarfing the impact of the Canadian population’s 
changing age structure on health expenditures. AMR is a problem for the 
Canadian healthcare system that may get much worse in the future.
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3.3 CONCLUSION
Left unaddressed, AMR has the potential to debilitate the Canadian healthcare 
system. While the current cost of resistant infections represents a relatively 
small share of healthcare spending, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials 
rises to 40% by 2050, the healthcare system will be less sustainable — the 
gradual failure of antimicrobials could cost almost $120 billion over the next 
30 years. This unsustainability is driven by the healthcare system’s dependence 
on antimicrobials. As Smith and Coast (2012) argue, ineffective antimicrobials 
would be a “catastrophic blow to health system development . . . requiring 
[the] redesign of many facilities, the reintroduction of sanatoria and so forth.” 
It is difficult to imagine the broad impacts of such a shock to the Canadian 
healthcare system.
Effective antimicrobials are extremely valuable to medicine and modern 
healthcare. While first-line antimicrobials were unable to treat about 26% of 
bacterial infections in 2018, they were able to treat almost 230,000 susceptible 
HAIs. Antimicrobials thus saved the Canadian healthcare system at least 
$4.1 billion in 2018. This value is at risk. The world is running out of effective 
antimicrobials and Canada cannot ignore the urgency and gravity of this issue.
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4 The Impact of Antimicrobial Resistance  
on the Canadian Economy
Key	Findings
Current
In 2018, AMR reduced the Canadian effective-labour supply by an estimated 
9,000 person years of employment. 
Based on the Panel’s economic model, AMR reduced Canada’s GDP by an estimated 
$2 billion in 2018, or about 0.13% of the economy. This amount is about equal to 
one-third of the size of the economy of Prince Edward Island or the Canadian motor 
vehicle manufacturing industry.
About 50% of this decline in economic activity occurred in the most labour-intensive 
industries: recreation and culture, transportation, and public services.
According to simulations of the Panel’s model, first-line antimicrobials contributed 
$6.1 billion to the Canadian economy in 2018 by saving some 17,000 lives and 
2.6 million hospital days.
Future
In 2050, AMR will reduce Canada’s GDP by an estimated $13 to $21 billion per year 
if resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant at today’s rate of 26% or 
continues to rise to 40%, respectively.
If resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant at 26% or rises to 40%, 
the Canadian economy will be 0.5 to 0.7% smaller in 2050 than it is today, the 
latter about equal to the one-third the size of the GDP of Manitoba or the oil sands 
extraction industry.
Canada’s economy could lose an estimated $268 to $388 billion in GDP between 
2016 and 2050 if resistance rates remain constant at 26% or reach 40%.
AMR could lead to a prolonged economic contraction that is rare in Canada’s post-war 
history, about equal to losing more than the combined GDPs of Prince Edward Island 
and Nova Scotia or one-quarter the GDP of the manufacturing sector each year if 
resistance were to reach 100% by 2050.
Based on simulations of the Panel’s model, the Canadian animal farming industry 
may lose an estimated $26 to $37 billion if resistance rates remain constant at 26% 
or reach 40% by 2050. 
If AMR were also to reduce animal farming productivity and animal product exports by 
up to 10%, the industry could lose an additional $190 billion over the next 30 years.
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This chapter examines the impact of AMR on the Canadian economy. It 
describes the Panel’s model and how it was applied to estimate the current 
and future economic impacts of AMR, including the data and assumptions 
underlying them. Chapter 4 also presents the Panel’s findings on the current 
and future impacts of AMR on the Canadian labour force, GDP, and industries, 
including the animal farming industry. The final section considers the global 
economic impact of AMR.
4.1 MODELLING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AMR
To better understand the impact of AMR on the Canadian economy, the 
Panel commissioned a quantitative economic model to estimate the effects 
of mortality and morbidity on the labour force and GDP. Estimates from this 
dynamic computational general equilibrium (DCGE) model — which considers 
scenarios wherein future resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant 
at today’s rate (26%) or grows to either 40% or 100% by 2050 — also weigh 
the impact of AMR on international trade, as well as on Canada’s industries.
4.1.1	 AMR	Could	Cost	the	World	Economy	Up	to	an	Estimated	3%		
of	GDP	by	2050
DCGE models can illustrate production and trading patterns among industries, 
regions, and countries. If AMR or other economic and social factors affect 
labour productivity in one country, global production and trading patterns 
adjust (within a model). This captures the dynamic, interconnected nature of 
global markets. As discussed by Dervis (1982), Shoven (1992), Lofgren (2002), 
and many others, DCGE models view the many markets of goods and inputs 
as an interrelated system, whereby values at equilibrium for all variables are 
simultaneously determined. Applied general equilibrium modelling is now a 
standard tool for empirical analysis, predominantly used for analyzing policy 
issues such as income distribution, trade policy, environment, structural 
adjustments to external shocks, growth and structural changes, government 
tax (subsidy) policy, and others. It has also gained ground recently in health 
economics through its application to estimating the impacts of AMR, HIV/
AIDS, malaria, pandemic influenza, and certain non-communicable diseases 
(Dixon et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2006; Keogh-Brown et al., 
2010; RAND Europe, 2014; Keogh-Brown et al., 2015). As summarized in 
Table 4.1, several reports have used similar models to simulate the effect of 
AMR on the global economy.
Based on these models, AMR could reduce annual global GDP by up to 3% by 
2050 as morbidity and mortality increase (KPMG, 2014; RAND Europe, 2014; 
World Bank, 2017). In these models, as AMR rises, fewer people are able to work 
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because they are sick or have died. These models consistently show major variation 
across countries (e.g., greater than 10% decline in GDP in some countries for 
the most extreme scenarios) and industries (e.g., agriculture, healthcare). The 
impact to Canada is on the low end of these models’ estimates — around 2% 
reduction in annual GDP — reflecting the fact that it uses more capital (e.g., 
machinery, infrastructure) in production than the world average and has less 
population density.
Table 4.1 
International Estimates of the Potential Economic Impact of Antimicrobial Resistance 
on the Global Economy
Report Model & Assumptions Data Selected Key Findings
Drug-Resistant 
Infections: A Threat 
to Our Economic 
Future (World Bank, 
2017)
 • DCGE (multi-country, 
multi-industry) with 
neoclassical growth
 • If resistance rate = 
100%, with number of 
cases of infection 
constant
 • Other scenarios
 • Industry 
and 
regional 
data
 • World 
Bank
 • WHO
2050
 • 3.8% reduction in world GDP
 • US$30–110 trillion loss
 • US$6.1 trillion world GDP loss 
per year
 • Low-income countries: >5% 
GDP 
 • 28.3 million people in 
extreme poverty
 • Healthcare costs $1.2 trillion 
per year 
Estimating the 
Economic Costs of 
Antimicrobial 
Resistance (RAND 
Europe, 2014)
 • DCGE (multi-region); 
reduction in effective 
labour 
 • AMR rates = 100% in 
2025, with number of 
cases of infection 
constant
 • Other scenarios
 • Regional 
data
 • Expert 
opinion
 • WHO
 • UN
2050
 • 0.83% reduction in world 
GDP 
 • US$2.7 trillion world GDP loss 
per year
 • US$37.5 trillion cumulative 
world GDP loss
 • Significant differences by 
region
The Global Impact 
of Antimicrobial 
Resistance (KPMG, 
2014)
 • DCGE (multi-region) 
with neoclassical 
growth; reduction in 
labour stock
 • If AMR rates increased 
by 40% and number 
of infections doubled 
 • Other scenarios
 • Regional 
data
 • Expert 
opinion
 • WHO
 • UN
2050
 • 3.44% reduction in world 
GDP 
 • Significant differences by 
region
This table summarizes three key reports that estimate the global cost of AMR.
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4.1.2	 The	Panel’s	Model	Accounts	for	Global	Production		
and	Trade	Patterns	
For the purpose of estimating AMR’s economic impact, the Panel used a DCGE 
model in which Canada is viewed as an open economy, connected to the rest of 
the world through trade and investment. Like other DCGE models, the Panel’s 
model links production and trading patterns among industries and countries 
such that, if AMR (or other economic factors) affects labour productivity in 
one country, global production and trade adjust throughout the world (and 
within the model).
Figure 4.1 depicts the linkages in the Panel’s DCGE model as it relates to 
AMR. It also highlights the main effects that AMR could have on the economy. 
Production sectors, which include different agricultural, manufacturing, and 
service industries, require labour and capital inputs accessed through the 
labour and capital markets. Firms hire labour and rent capital from households 
(i.e., consumers/workers), enabling firms to produce goods and providing 
households with income. Through product markets, the economy also trades 
with the rest of the world via a complex set of international linkages. In this 
way, Canadian firms, households, and governments are connected to each other 
and the rest of the world through production and trading patterns. Further 
technical details of the model can be found in Appendix C. 
The Panel’s quantitative economic model is just that — a model. It is intended 
to be a helpful simplification of the complex relationship among AMR, human 
health, labour productivity, and trade. Like all analytical models, it relies on a 
set of assumptions, modelling choices, and uncertainties, which are often driven 
by data availability (Appendix C). The purpose of the model is to impose a 
logic on the above relationships in order to study how they interact and evolve; 
this allows for estimates of the future economic impact of AMR.
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Mortality, Morbidity, and Demographics
In the Panel’s model, the impact of AMR is captured through two direct effects 
that reduce the supply of effective labour, a crucial economic resource. The 
effective-labour supply is defined as the productivity level of the working age 
population (GDP per hour worked) as opposed to simply the number of workers 
(i.e., the labour supply). Based on different infections and resistance scenarios, 
the reduction in effective-labour supply is measured by two health outcomes:
•	 Increased	Mortality: Deaths attributable to AMR permanently reduce the 
population size; the effect of increased mortality on economic production 
is channelled through decreases in the growth rate of the working-age 
population, lowering the supply of available labour and increasing the 
dependency ratio (the ratio of the labour force to the dependent population, 
i.e., ages 0 to 14, 65+).
•	 Increased	Morbidity: Prolonged periods of sickness attributable to AMR 
temporarily reduce the country’s workforce and may in severe cases lead to 
permanent reductions in labour productivity. Furthermore, children affected 
by resistant infections might lose schooldays or have permanent physical 
disabilities that could lower productivity when they reach adulthood. In 
addition, increased morbidity of non-working people may also affect the 
labour supply if their condition requires the attention of a carer who would 
otherwise be economically productive.
The logic linking health outcomes to economic impact is straightforward: as 
AMR increases, fewer people are able to work, either because they are sick 
or have died. Using the best available Canadian data (Table 2.3), the Panel 
estimated the reduction in effective labour supply as the number of deaths and 
days in hospitals attributable to AMR. Taking 2016 as the baseline, the Panel 
then simulated the growth rate of employment up to 2050, using population 
projections and resistance scenarios described below (Section 4.2).
This approach rests on two assumptions. First, the model assumes that the 
likelihood of acquiring a resistant infection, and then either becoming sick or 
dying, is uniformly distributed across the population by age. Since susceptibility 
to infection is generally greater in children (0 to 14 years) and older adults 
(65+) (Section 5.1.1) who are not generally part of the labour force, this 
assumption likely leads to an over-estimate of economic impact. Second, the 
model considers morbidity measured by LOS, which only accounts for infections 
that require hospitalization. Since some resistant infections may entail time off 
work but not hospitalization, this assumption likely leads to an under-estimate 
of economic impact (Section 4.2.1).
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The population projections in the Panel’s model are based on data from the 
United Nations Population Database (UNPD) (UN, 2018). They are divided 
into four geographic regions in the model (see below). Also used in O’Neill et 
al. (2016a), the UNPD’s large set of population and demographic data contains 
information on virtually every country in the world. Since these data are drawn 
from national statistics offices (e.g., census data), they are comparable to 
Canadian data in terms of coverage and collection methodology. The advantage 
of using UNPD data, instead of country-specific population forecasts, is that 
they allow population forecasts for the countries included in the rest of the world 
region (see below) and contain information needed to project population 
changes across various cohorts such as fertility by age, mortality by age and 
gender, gender birth ratios, and net migration. This cohort component of the 
model assumes exogenous fertility and migration rates, which are not affected 
by resistance levels. The demographic and population data used in the Panel’s 
model are listed in Appendix C.
Countries, Economies, and Industries
The Panel’s model includes four different regions: (i) Canada, (ii) the 
United States, (iii) other OECD countries, and (iv) the rest of the world. 
The United States is modelled separately as it is a direct neighbouring country 
to Canada, with a large shared border and very close trade linkages across 
many industries. All other OECD countries are included as one region, as 
they characterize other high-income countries that are likely to be affected 
in similar ways by AMR. The fourth region is the rest of the world in order to 
incorporate all global trade flows into the model.
The Panel’s model is calibrated to the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
features of Canada and other countries using the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) database (Aguiar et al., 2016). GTAP covers 140 regions, 57 commodities, 
and includes all bilateral trade patterns, production, consumption, and 
intermediate inputs for the reference year 2011. Using this database, the model 
is based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), a complex table expressed in 
terms of incomes and expenditures (i.e., double entry accounting) developed 
from national accounts data (e.g., use-supply tables, input-output tables) 
and information from household survey and trade data. GTAP collects, cleans, and 
standardizes the economic data required to produce SAMs that are comparable 
across countries. The use of GTAP is an improvement over other reports (e.g., 
O’Neill, 2014), which was calibrated to five aggregated world regions with 
limited specificity in terms of production, consumption, and trade.
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As is standard in DCGE models, production is a function of labour, capital, and 
multi-factor productivity (MFP), a measure of the overall efficiency with which 
labour and capital inputs are used together in the production process. Over 
the long run, economic growth is primarily driven by the rate of innovation, 
which is often proxied by MFP growth. For simplicity, the Panel’s model assumes 
constant MFP growth across all years and industries. As shown in Table 4.2, 
Canadian MFP growth is relatively slow, reflecting Canada’s poor innovation 
performance (Nicholson, 2018).
The 57 industries in the GTAP database are aggregated into 8 industries in the 
Panel’s model. Production in these industries is characterized by different capital-
labour ratios, with industries such as transportation and recreation requiring 
relatively more labour than industries such as farming or manufacturing. All 
else being equal, industries with higher capital-labour ratios will be impacted 
less than industries that use labour more heavily in production. The eight 
aggregated industries that the Panel included in the model are:
•	 Crop Farming 
•	 Animal Farming
•	 Animal Product Manufacturing
•	 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
•	 Transportation 
•	 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
•	 Recreation and Culture 
•	 Health, Education, Defence, Other Public Services (Public Services)
Table 4.2 
MFP Growth Rates, 2016
5-Year Average MFP Growth Rates
Canada 2.64%
United States 4.58%
OECD 6.12%
Rest of world 2.80%
 Panel calculations based on Feenstra et al., 2015
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Scenarios
The Panel’s model simulates the economic impact of AMR in three future 
scenarios with respect to rates of resistance to first-line antimicrobials, always 
in relation to the 10 important clinical syndromes discussed in Section 2.3. 
Under each resistance scenario, the infection rate is held constant so that the 
number of infections increases only with population growth.
•	 Status	Quo	— The resistance rate for each syndrome remains constant at 
current levels (26%) until 2050 (Tables 2.2 and 3.5).
•	 40%	— Based on observed and projected future resistance rates in some 
countries, a second scenario is considered in which resistance gradually 
increases to 40% between 2020 and 2050. The Panel considers this scenario 
to be realistic of what may happen in 2050 (Section 2.3.3).
•	 100%	— The worst-case scenario in the Panel’s model, in which there is 
complete resistance to all first-line antimicrobials by 2050. 
The Panel’s model also simulates today’s world without first-line antimicrobials 
where the resistance rate is 100% into the future (2020-2050). The Panel 
interprets the difference between this hypothetical world and the status quo as 
the value of first-line antimicrobials. Since first-line antimicrobials are effective 
(about 75% of the time), their value can be thought of in terms of the lives or 
GDP they save (as opposed to the deaths or GDP declines their resistance causes).
4.2 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AMR
This section summarizes the Panel’s findings in terms of the current and future 
impact of AMR on the Canadian economy. 
4.2.1	 AMR	Reduced	Canada’s	GDP	by	an	Estimated	$2	Billion	in	2018
The Canadian economy has already begun to shrink as a result of AMR, as the 
number of deaths increase and fewer people are able to work due to resistant 
infections. In 2018, AMR was responsible for 5,400 deaths and 880,000 additional 
days (3,500 work years) in hospital (Table 4.3). If these people were in the 
labour force, it would correspond to an economy-wide loss of approximately 
9,000 person years of employment. As shown in Figure 4.2, UTIs were responsible 
for the greatest decrease in the effective-labour supply in 2018. Along with IAIs 
and SSTIs, these three syndromes accounted for about 75% of the reduction 
in person years of employment.13 
13 To test the sensitivity of the model estimates to changes in clinical inputs, the Panel ran the 
model with a 10% increase and decrease in input parameters. This led to an approximate 
10% change in population and GDP across all resistance (status quo, 40%, 100%) and clinical 
scenarios.
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As described in Chapter 5, older adults and children, who are not in the labour 
force, account for some of the estimated deaths and hospitalizations that 
comprise effective labour supply. However, the Panel believes that this is likely 
still a conservative estimate of the negative impact of AMR on the labour force. 
The estimates in Table 4.3 do not include the work days lost due to infections 
that do not require hospitalization. For the working-age population, syndromes 
such as BGIs, pneumonia, STIs, and UTIs may result in staying home from 
work rather than going to the hospital. In addition to lost work days, resistant 
syndromes may also diminish the physical and mental capabilities of workers, 
and these types of health effects are likely to lead to lower labour productivity 
(Sharpe & Murray, 2011). Moreover, if AMR affects older adults who help with 
childcare, working parents may work fewer days or exit the labour force. A lack 
of Canadian data prevented the Panel from including sick leave and worker 
performance as dimensions of morbidity.
Table 4.3 
Canadian Estimates of Lost Years of Employment, 2018 
Syndrome Total Deaths
Attributable
Deaths
LOS  
(Work Years)
Lost 
Employment 
(Work Years)
BGI 3 1 28 29
BSI 630 221 134 355
CDI 211 115 255 370
IAI 2,266 1,956 439 2,395
MSI 376 231 268 499
Pneumonia 2,072 366 108 474
SSTI 1,781 636 1,018 1,654
STI (gonorrhea) 1 1 4 5
TB 7 0 45 45
UTI 6,732 1,900 1,216 3,116
Total 14,000 5,400 3,500 8,900
This table presents total deaths, attributable deaths, and attributable length of stay (LOS) in hospital 
for resistant infections (in work years), as estimated in Table 2.2. Lost years of employment are 
calculated as the number of attributable deaths plus LOS. For example, resistant UTIs are estimated 
to have caused 1,900 deaths and 1,216 years (304,045 days) in hospital in 2018, which translates to 
3,116 lost years of employment (where one year equals 250 days in LOS). See Table 2.3 for references. 
BGI, bacterial gastrointestinal infection; BSI, bloodstream infection; CDI, C. difficile infection; IAI, 
intra-abdominal infection; MSI, musculoskeletal infection; SSTI, skin and soft tissue infection; STI, 
sexually transmitted infection; TB, tuberculosis; UTI, urinary tract infection. The totals for deaths and 
LOS are rounded due to the uncertainty in the estimates.
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Based on the Panel’s economic model, mortality and morbidity due to resistant 
infections reduced Canada’s GDP by $2.0 billion in 2018. For comparison, 
this decline in economic activity — about 0.13% of real (inflation-adjusted) 
GDP — is about 6% of the average growth (2.1%) of real Canadian GDP over 
the last five years (between 2013 and 2018). This is a significant decline, more 
than one-third the size of the economy of Prince Edward Island or the Canadian 
motor vehicle manufacturing industry (StatCan, 2018c).
In the Panel’s model, production is a combination of labour, capital, and MFP. 
As noted above, industries that use relatively more labour will be relatively 
harder hit by AMR. Figure 4.3 breaks down the percentage point change in 
real GDP by industry, highlighting that about 50% of this decline in economic 
activity occurred in the most labour-intensive industries: recreation and culture 
(-0.19%), transportation (-0.18%), and public services (-0.18%). These are 
industries where human interaction is central to the services provided such 
as at sporting/music venues, museums/galleries, airports/train stations, and 
educational institutions. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, these reductions 
in economic activity are consistent with declining tourism and business travel 
resulting from AMR. 
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Figure 4.2 
Infection Rate, Mortality Rate, and Lost Years of Employment, by Syndrome, 2018
This figure plots infection rate, mortality rate, and lost years of employment (size of circle) for 
10 important clinical syndromes in Canada in 2018. BGI, bacterial gastrointestinal infection; BSI, 
bloodstream infection; CDI, C. difficile infection; IAI, intra-abdominal infection; MSI, musculoskeletal 
infection; SSTI, skin and soft tissue infection; STI, sexually transmitted infection; TB, tuberculosis; UTI, 
urinary tract infection.
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By contrast, more capital-intensive industries such as crop farming (-0.05%), 
animal farming (-0.10%), and ICT, real estate and finance (-0.10%) saw smaller 
declines in economic activity. Because the Panel’s model does not consider 
the effect of AMR on animal health, animal industrial practices, or trade in 
animal products, the impact on animal farming estimated by the model is an 
under-estimate. The Panel addresses this issue in more detail in Section 4.3.
Canada spent over $800 million on antimicrobials for human health in 
2017 (PHAC, 2018a). Based on simulations of the Panel’s model, if first-line 
antimicrobials were completely ineffective, resistant infections would have 
caused an additional 17,300 deaths and 2.7 million days in hospital in 2018.14 All 
else being equal, by saving lives and preventing hospitalizations, antimicrobials 
contributed $6.1 billion to the Canadian economy in 2018. The Panel interprets 
this as an estimate of the current economic value of first-line antimicrobials. When 
viewed this way, effective antimicrobials are an important input into economic 
activity, generating a significant rate of return.
14 In the Panel’s model, 17,300 equals the difference between current resistance (26%) and a 
simulated world where resistance is 100% to first-line antimicrobials.
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Figure 4.3 
Reduction in GDP by Industry, 2018
This figure plots the percentage point decline in GDP for eight Canadian industry sectors. In 2018, the 
Canadian economy was about 0.2 percentage points smaller as a result of antimicrobial resistance.
74 When Antibiotics Fail
4.2.2	 Canada’s	Economy	May	Lose	an	Estimated	$268	to	$388	Billion	
in	GDP	by	2050	if	Resistance	Rates	Remain	Constant	or	Continue	
to	Rise	to	40%
According to simulations of the Panel’s model, if resistance to first-line 
antimicrobials were to reach 40% or 100% by 2050, about 1 in 26 to 1 in 9 deaths 
in Canada will be attributable to AMR, respectively. This is a sharp increase 
from the status quo as shown in Figure 4.4. If resistance rates were to rise to 
40% or 100%, AMR would be responsible for about 13,700 to 39,600 deaths 
in 2050. When combined with higher levels of hospitalization, this reduction 
in the effective labour supply would reduce Canada’s GDP by $21 to $44 billion 
per year in 2050 (Figure 4.5). Even if resistance rates were to remain constant 
with today’s levels (26%), AMR would reduce Canada’s GDP by an estimated 
$13 billion by 2050.The Canadian economy, on average, would be about 0.5 
to 0.7% smaller in 2050 if resistance remains at today’s rates or rises to 40%, 
the latter about equal to the one-third the size of the GDP of Manitoba or the 
oil sands extraction industry (StatCan, 2018c).
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Figure 4.4 
Lost Years of Employment in Three Resistance Scenarios in 2050
This figure compares lost years of employment — deaths plus length of stay (LOS) in hospital — in 
2050 using three resistance scenarios: resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant at 26%, 
resistance reaches 40%, and resistance reaches 100%. 
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As shown in Figure 4.6, in a worst-case scenario where resistance to first-line 
antimicrobials reaches 100% by 2050, the largest reduction in GDP would 
be in the most labour-intensive industries, recreation and culture (-3.2%), 
transportation (-3.0%), and public services (-2.5%). Such an economy-wide 
contraction is rare in Canada’s post-war history, with a loss close to this magnitude 
experienced only during the height of the 1980s and 2008–2009 recessions. In 
a world where there was 100% resistance to first-line antimicrobials, by 2050 
Canada would lose more than the equivalent of the combined GDPs of Prince 
Edward Island and Nova Scotia, or one-quarter of the manufacturing sector 
GDP each and every year (StatCan, 2018c).
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Figure 4.5 
Annual Change in Canadian GDP, 2016–2050
This figure plots the annual decline in Canadian GDP for the three resistance scenarios: resistance 
to first-line antimicrobials remains constant at 26% (status quo, navy blue), reaches 40% resistance 
(teal), and reaches 100% resistance (red) by 2050.
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Since the deaths attributable to AMR permanently reduce the size of the labour 
force, the effect of AMR accumulates through time. As depicted in Figure 4.5, 
even if resistance were to remain constant at its 2018 level, the Canadian 
economy will still cumulatively lose about $268 billion in GDP between 2018 
and 2050. If resistance reaches 40% or 100%, the impacts of AMR could result 
in an estimated $388 billion or $750 billion loss in GDP during this period, 
respectively. In a sense, the future value of antimicrobials is the difference 
between the status quo and a hypothetical world in which antimicrobials no 
longer work at all. The Panel interprets this difference — $800 billion — as 
the future economic value of antimicrobials. This value is under increasing risk 
as the world runs out of effective antimicrobials.
4.3 THE IMPACT OF AMR ON THE ANIMAL  
FARMING INDUSTRY 
In 2018, the animal farming industry directly contributed about $5.6 billion to 
the Canadian economy (StatCan, 2018c). Like other similarly sized agricultural 
industries such as crop farming, fishing, and forestry, animal farming is a small 
share of the economy, accounting for less than 1% of GDP in 2016. While animal 
farming has grown at similar rates as the Canadian economy, employment has 
declined significantly over the last two decades (StatCan, 2018a, 2018c). Spread 
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Figure 4.6 
Change in Canadian GDP by Industry, 2050
This figure plots the percentage point decline in GDP for eight Canadian industry sectors in 2050 
based on the three resistance scenarios: resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant at 26% 
(navy blue), reaches 40% resistance (teal), and reaches 100% resistance (red) by 2050.
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across the country, Canadian animal farmers are part of a global supply chain, 
which has replaced labour with capital, investing more in automatic feeders 
than farmhands.
The animal farming industry accounted for 78% of the total AMU (as measured 
by kilograms of active ingredient) in Canada in 2016 (PHAC, 2017a). As illustrated 
in Figure 4.7, antimicrobials are used for three main purposes in animal farming. 
First, as in humans, they are used to treat infections. The therapeutic use of 
antimicrobials in clinically sick animals is central to animal welfare and food 
production (Aarestrup, 2015; O’Neill, 2015). Especially on farms with poor 
conditions, antimicrobials are an effective animal health tool. A significant 
volume of antimicrobials has historically been used prophylactically in animals 
to prevent the development of infections within healthy herds or flocks, and to 
promote growth (weight gain). AMU for prevention and growth promotion is 
particularly widespread in intensive animal food production, where animals 
are often stocked at high densities and kept in confined conditions (Aarestrup, 
2015; O’Neill, 2015). As Aarestrup (2015) points out, “[a]ntimicrobials are an 
integrated and routinely used management tool, and in many cases, farmers 
might not even be aware that they are using them or for what purpose.” 
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Figure 4.7 
Three Uses of Antimicrobials in Food Animals
This figure compares three uses and relative dosage of antimicrobials in food animals.
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As shown in Figure 4.8, the majority of antimicrobials consumed by Canadian 
farm animals from 2013 to 2016 were used for preventative purposes. Since 2006 
in the European Union, and since 2018 in Canada, using antimicrobials for 
growth promotion has been banned (EC, 2005; GC, 2018). Recent regulatory 
changes in Canada that require veterinary prescription to use medically 
important antimicrobials in food animals, combined with voluntary actions 
of producers, market requirements, and other influences, are anticipated to 
markedly reduce prophylactic AMU in food animals in Canada. It is expected 
that these regulatory changes will drastically decrease AMU in animal agriculture.
4.3.1	 The	Benefits	of	AMU	to	Promote	Farm	Animal	Growth		
Has	Declined	Over	Time
In principle, antimicrobial growth promoters (AGPs) can have a positive influence 
on farm productivity through at least two mechanisms — by “enhancing the 
growth rate and feed efficiency of animals and by potentially increasing labour 
or capital productivity by substituting AMU for hygiene-management practices 
in animal housing or transportation” (Laxminarayan et al., 2015). There is 
considerable variability in growth response to growth promotional and preventive 
(or sub-therapeutic) doses of antimicrobials according to animal species, age, 
and genetic makeup, and to specific hygiene and management conditions 
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Figure 4.8 
Uses of Antimicrobials in Canadian Food Animals, 2013–2016
This figure shows trends in the proportion of antimicrobials by purpose, used on grower-finisher pigs 
(G-F swine), broiler chickens (Br. Chicken), and turkey sentinel farms based on estimates of mg of use 
per kg of animal. Grower-finisher pigs and broiler chickens are animals in which there is high AMU 
in conventional intensive farming. There is a trend of reduced AMU in these animals.
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(Laxminarayan et al., 2015). The terminology around growth promotional 
and sub-therapeutic use is confusing and confused, but it describes specific 
regulated quantities of antimicrobials, often dating to regulatory approval in 
the 1950s (Prescott, 2006). Despite 50 years of AGP use, recent, reliable data 
on its effect on productivity are lacking; however, there is growing evidence 
that suggests it does not have as much economic benefit as previously thought, 
particularly in countries with advanced farming techniques (Aarestrup, 2015; 
O’Neill, 2015). Studies conducted before the 1980s reported an improvement 
as high as 5 to 15% in the growth rate and feed efficiency of pig, poultry, and 
cattle fed sub-therapeutic antimicrobials (Cromwell, 2002). More recently, 
studies conducted in Denmark, Sweden, and the United States point to more 
limited effects of using AGPs: statistically insignificant or between 1 and 3% 
improvement in production. Seven such studies are summarized in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 
Productivity Change from the Withdrawal of Antimicrobial Growth Promoters
Country Farm Animal Year Effects Source
Denmark Broiler chickens 1995–1999 No effect on productivity
Minor increase (<1%) in 
feed conversion ratio
Emborg et al., 2001
Sweden Dairy calves 2007 Cost saving of US$10 per 
calf
Berge et al., 2009
United 
States
Broiler chickens 1998–2001 Cost saving of 0.45% per 
broiler chicken 
Graham et al., 2007
United 
States
Broiler chickens 1998–2001 1% decrease in feed 
conversion ratio
Engster et al., 2002
United 
States
Grower-finisher 
pigs
1990 and 
1995
0.5% decrease in daily 
average weight gain 
1.1% decrease in feed 
conversion ratio
Miller et al., 2003
United 
States
Broiler chickens 2009 No effect on production MacDonald & Wang, 
2011
United 
States
Feeder to finish 
pigs
2011 1% reduction in production Key & McBride, 2014
This table compares the effects of antimicrobial growth promoters on animal productivity in three 
countries and across seven studies.
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Drawing from this literature, Sneeringer et al. (2015) simulated the removal 
of antimicrobials used for production purposes generally, showing that AGPs 
have limited effects on the productivity of raising livestock at the farm level, 
around 1 to 3%. Laxminarayan et al. (2015) used a CGE model to estimate the 
potential loss to global meat production if AGPs were banned worldwide. They 
compared a high-growth impact scenario (based on 1980s data) to a low-growth 
impact scenario (based on 2000s data), projecting that a ban on AGPs would 
decrease global annual meat production by between US$14 and US$44 billion. 
For Canada, they estimated an AGP ban would decrease production between 
1.1% (2000s data) and 5.6% (1980s data), leading to a loss of between $180 
and $880 million in meat value each year (Laxminarayan et al., 2015). 
One explanation as to why the growth response of farm animals to antimicrobials 
has declined over time is that animal health and herd management practices 
have improved during the same period. The gradual decline in efficacy of AGPs 
in animal farming has been coupled with significant improvements in nutrition, 
hygiene, animal husbandry, infection control, vaccination, biosecurity, waste 
management, diagnostics, benchmarking, and other practices15 (Aarestrup, 
2015; Laxminarayan et al., 2015; O’Neill, 2015). As Laxminarayan et al. (2015) 
noted, with “drastic changes in the animal industry over the last 30 years in the 
OECD countries, all [nutrition, hygiene practices, genetic potential of animals, 
health status] of these key parameters have changed, potentially explaining 
the decrease in the efficacy of AGP.” An additional explanation might be the 
development of resistance in the largely unknown microbial targets of AGPs. 
The experiences of Denmark and the Netherlands demonstrate that reducing 
AMU at farm levels does not have major effects on productivity when coupled 
with good herd management practices. Beginning in 1995, Denmark began 
banning certain antimicrobials, eventually phasing out all AGPs by 2000. It also 
established DANMAP, a surveillance system to monitor AMR in farm animals 
and humans (Cogliani et al., 2011; O’Neill, 2015). Between 1992 and 2008, AMU 
in pigs declined by 51% while production increased by 47%, highlighting that 
AGPs are not necessary for competitiveness (Cogliani et al., 2011). However, 
during this period, the number of pig farms declined, suggesting that “only the 
farms with good farm management techniques in place were able to remain 
profitable” and that there were “up-front costs to Danish farmers as they moved 
to new farming practices less reliant on antimicrobials” (O’Neill, 2015). This 
15 These practices may include “fully enclosed and more tightly constructed housing, improved 
in-house climate control, expanded biosecurity protocols aimed at wildlife and rodent access, 
changing clothes and washing for workers, and limited access for outsiders, all-in, all-out 
production, and feed formulations targeted at stage of production” (Laxminarayan et al., 2015).
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example underscores the point that, while reducing AMU may not hurt the 
animal farming industry as a whole, farms that cannot afford or choose not to 
invest in herd management may become unprofitable.
While the Netherlands established its surveillance system to monitor 
AMR — MARAN — in 1999, it did not ban AGPs until the E.U.-wide ban came 
into effect in 2006 (O’Neill, 2015). Between 2007 and 2012, Dutch animal 
farming production remained constant despite a decline in AMU of 56% 
(McKenna, 2014). By adopting good herd management practices, the “Dutch 
experience shows that it is possible to reduce antibiotic use in a short time 
period and still maintain production” (O’Neill, 2015).
Significant data gaps prevent a more comprehensive estimate of the impact of 
AMR on animal farming productivity. Canada does not have a national system 
for reporting resistance in important endemic animal pathogens in different 
branches of animal agriculture; national data are difficult to obtain. The Panel 
is not aware of published estimates related to the cost of responding to current 
and anticipated increased AMR, which may include:
•	 the possible costs of requiring veterinary prescriptions for antimicrobials 
in food animals;
•	 adjustments in production costs as a result of changes in production methods; 
•	 the impact of any future benchmarking practices (e.g., development of a 
“Yellow Card” system) on requirements for improved production buildings 
(e.g., improved ventilation systems, improved biosecurity systems); or,
•	 the costs of increased vaccination and improved nutrition. 
4.3.2	 AMR	May	Affect	Animal	Farming	Productivity	
The Panel recognizes resistance as an increasing and serious problem in some 
important endemic food animal pathogens. To explore the magnitude of the 
effect of AMR on animal farming, the Panel estimates increased resistance 
could reduce animal farming MFP (Section 4.1) by up to 10% by 2050 as a 
result of declining animal productivity, increasing animal death and disease, 
and the cost of investing in changed herd or flock management practices or 
new production facilities. In the Panel’s model, a reduction in animal farming 
productivity (i.e., the MFP) of 10% translates into about a 3% reduction in animal 
farming production (Laxminarayan et al., 2015; Nicholson, 2018). 
•	 Animal	Productivity	— The literature does not support a significant decline in 
animal productivity as a result of removing medically important antimicrobials 
in countries with well-developed intensive animal agriculture. Estimates 
suggest a productivity decline of between 0 to 3% as a result of reduced 
AMU for growth promotion, provided farms adopt good herd management 
practices (Sneeringer et al., 2015).
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•	 Animal	Health	—	Most notably, the Panel is not aware of estimates of the 
negative effects on animal health resulting from increasing levels of AMR, 
which would limit the effectiveness of antimicrobials for therapeutic or 
preventative use. If AMR were to increase morbidity and mortality rates 
among farm animals, the decline in animal farming productivity could be 
far greater than any decline due to removing antimicrobials for growth 
promotion or disease prevention.
•	 Herd	Management	Practices	— If, as the Panel believes, AMR is a problem 
that is only going to get worse, the animal farming industry will be forced to 
adopt better herd management practices or face productivity declines. Since 
the Panel’s model assumes no adaptation or changes to herd management 
practices, simulating an up-to-10% decline in productivity may capture some 
of the adaptation costs of improving nutrition, hygiene, animal husbandry, 
infection control, vaccination, biosecurity, waste management, diagnostics, 
and benchmarking.
It is exceedingly difficult, in part because national data do not exist, to definitively 
predict AMR’s impact on the animal farming industry. The estimates in the 
Panel’s model are based on what might happen under current herd management 
practices and on a trajectory of increasing resistance in some important food 
animal pathogens. However, if herd management practices improve, AMR may 
have a relatively small effect on the animal farming industry, whereas if herd 
management practices remain constant, and bacterial pathogens continue to 
develop or acquire resistance and continue to spread, AMR may have a sizeable 
impact on both the Canadian and international markets. AMR is a current 
risk and future threat to animal farming. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
this suggests there is a need for a multifaceted approach to addressing AMR 
in animal farming, including more and better surveillance, biosecurity (i.e., 
infection prevention and control), stewardship, and research and innovation.
4.3.3	 AMR	May	Affect	Animal	Product	Trade
Although diversifying through trade with China, Japan, and other countries, 
over half of Canadian trade in animal products is with the United States 
(StatCan, 2018b). Since Canadian and U.S. farms have similar practices and 
use similar quantities of antimicrobials (Sneeringer et al., 2015), and since 
recent regulatory changes in food animal AMU are generally in lock-step, it 
is unlikely that rising AMR would have a major impact on North American 
trade in animal products. However, the situation in relation to trade in animal 
products with other countries may become quite different as global efforts to 
curtail AMR increase. 
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As noted in Section 2.2.2, changes made in 2018 to Canadian federal regulations 
that banned AGPs in food animals should decrease AMU in food animal 
production, and the forthcoming Pan-Canadian Action Plan may lead to further 
decreases (GC, 2018). Similarly, AMR and its influence on global trade in 
animal products have been the subject of intense discussions at the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the international body that sets standards for food 
safety in global trade (FAO et al., 2015; George, 2019). Currently, these guidelines 
provide countries with the option to limit the import of food products with 
antimicrobial-resistant bacteria, although progress on developing international 
standards related to AMU has been slow, owing to technical and scientific 
complexity, political and legal obligations, and the “huge number” of Codex 
standards and guidelines (George, 2019). 
As food animals and food animal products are “traded worldwide... the selection 
of AMR in one country is today a problem for all countries” (Aarestrup, 2015). 
As global concern about AMR increases, it is possible that, like other countries, 
Canada will restrict the import of animal products from countries where AMU in 
food animals is inappropriate and/or AMR in imported foods are identified as 
problematic. Yet, few “if any countries currently systematically test food imports 
for the presence of AMR microorganisms (whether immediately harmful or 
not)” (George, 2019). The reasons given for inaction are often centred on claims 
there is not enough scientific evidence and/or the necessity of first complying 
with the World Trade Organization (George, 2017, 2019). The Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA) does not monitor any imported animal products 
for resistant bacteria (PHAC, 2015) and Codex standards remain complex and 
politically charged (George, 2019).
Having already banned AGPs in 2006, the European Parliament recently voted 
to limit the preventative use of antimicrobials and ban the use of unprescribed 
antimicrobials and human-reserve antimicrobials in food animals (EP, 2018). 
This legislation will also restrict the import of animal products from countries 
using MIAs for growth promotion or disease prevention. The Canadian animal 
farming industry uses more antimicrobials than most European countries, ranking 
8th among 31 OECD countries in mg for drug/kg of animal in 2016 (when using 
Canadian average weights at treatment) (Figure 4.9), and therefore may be a 
possible target for European trade restrictions. Even in the absence of formal 
trade restrictions, Canadian animal products could become less attractive as 
customers in other countries grow more concerned about global AMR. If Canada 
restricts imports from countries where resistant bacteria in animal products 
have been identified, these countries might retaliate by stopping importation 
of Canadian animal products rather than alter AMU in animal production. 
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In sum, if Canada does not decrease AMU in the long run, other countries will 
begin to apply pressure, perhaps by restricting Canadian imports. The Panel 
modelled such a scenario — where Canadian exporters of animal products face 
trade restrictions from import markets — as a 10% reduction in food animal 
exports. The Panel notes that AMU in animal agriculture is expected to decrease 
significantly as a result of the recent regulatory changes discussed above.
4.3.4	 The	Canadian	Animal	Farming	Industry	May	Lose	Between	$26	
to	$235	Billion	by	2050	as	a	Result	of	AMR	
AMR cost the Canadian animal farming industry an estimated $200 million 
in 2018 through its impact on labour productivity. Current resistance (26% 
resistance to first-line antimicrobials) reduced the number and productivity 
of agricultural workers, leading to about a 0.2% decline in animal farming 
GDP. If AMR remains at its current level, it will cumulatively cost the animal 
farming industry $26 billion by 2050 in lost worker productivity. As illustrated 
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Figure 4.9 
Sales of Antimicrobials for Use in Animal Farming, 2016
This figure compares the sales of antimicrobials for use in animal farming between Canada and 30 
European countries. The adjusted Canadian bar is based on the weight of the average Canadian 
animal at treatment, as opposed to the European average animal weight.
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in Figure 4.10, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials were to grow to 40%, the 
animal farming industry could lose about an additional $11 billion due to lost 
worker productivity. Even under this conservative assumption, the declining 
health of the labour force in the animal farming industry could reduce animal 
farming GDP by 0.5% per year by 2050.
However, as noted in Section 4.1.2, the reduction in economic activity in animal 
farming is likely underestimated by the Panel’s model since it does not account 
for changes in animal productivity or animal product trade. To account for 
some of these additional effects on animal farming, the Panel simulated two 
additional scenarios:
•	 Up	to	10%	Productivity	Decline	—	Primarily as a result of growing resistance 
in food animal pathogens, and to a lesser extent reducing AMU for growth 
promotion and prevention, the productivity (MFP) of the Canadian animal 
industry declines by up to 10% by 2050. This effect is large, potentially costing 
up to $185 billion between 2020 and 2050.
•	 Up	to	10%	Export	Restriction	— As a result of concerns over AMU in animals 
and the spread of related AMR, Canada faces export restrictions from import 
markets in other countries. Canadian animal food product exports decline 
by up to 10%. This effect is much smaller than the effect of a productivity 
decline, potentially costing up to $4 billion in exports over the 30-year period.
The individual and combined effects of reductions in labour productivity, as 
well as 10% reductions in animal productivity and exports, are illustrated in 
Figure 4.10. Based on simulations of the Panel’s model, AMR could cost the 
animal farming industry upwards of $225 billion over the next 30 years, if 
resistance to first-line antimicrobials reaches 40% and if animal productivity 
is 10% lower than today.
As AMR increases in food animal pathogens — jeopardizing the health of farm 
animals — and as decreased AMU leads to changing animal farming practices, 
the industry will continue to adjust, finding new ways to use fewer antimicrobials 
by innovating in animal husbandry and housing, herd management, vaccination, 
and disease eradication. What are not clear are the longer-term implications 
of those strategies for animal health, farm profitability, and food prices. The 
Panel believes that a first step towards more clarity around these potential 
impacts is to develop a national system for reporting AMU and AMR in food 
animal agriculture (especially related to medically important antimicrobials 
and endemic animal pathogens), as well as better reporting on production and 
productivity in food animal agriculture.
86 When Antibiotics Fail
4.4 CONCLUSION
The Panel estimates that about 1 in 50 deaths in Canada were attributable to 
resistant bacterial infections in the 10 important clinical syndromes in 2018. 
Should the rate of resistance to first-line antimicrobials increase to 40% by 
2050, 1 in 26 deaths will be caused by resistant bacterial infections, eliminating 
almost $400 billion of GDP along the way. This underscores the substantial time 
lag between the cause and effect of AMR, requiring action today for a problem 
that gets much worse in the future. It is difficult to estimate the future costs 
and impacts of AMR based on current data given the intrinsically uncertain 
pace of AMR emergence and spread; in addition, the estimates presented in 
this chapter are based on several judgments and modelling assumptions that 
can be challenged. On balance, these assumptions result in more conservative 
estimates of future impacts. The magnitude of these estimates is alarming, 
sending a strong signal for global investment and cooperation.
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Figure 4.10 
Possible Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance on Canada’s Animal Farming Industry, 
2020–2050
This figure combines the cumulative annual decline in animal farming GDP resulting from three 
sources: (i) resistance to first-line antimicrobials reaches 40% by 2050 (teal area); (ii) a 10% decline 
in food animal productivity by 2050 (beige area), and (iii) animal product export trade restrictions 
(orange area). By 2050, the cumulative effect of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) could cost almost 
$9 billion per year. 
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5 The Social Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance 
Today and in a Future with Limited Antimicrobials
This chapter summarizes key clinical, behavioural, and socio-demographic risk 
factors that increase the likelihood of developing a resistant infection, and how 
these cluster among certain social groups. The Panel drew on summaries of 
published clinical case studies to provide a tangible illustration of the social 
impacts of AMR today in Canada. Next, drawing on epidemiological and clinical 
evidence, and supported by social science research, the Panel reflected on how 
Canadian society might be impacted in a future with limited antimicrobials. 
In this hypothetical future, impacts are explored as they relate to individuals, 
communities, and social behaviours, and to policies and legislation likely to be 
instituted to limit the spread of AMR. Impacts are described through changes 
to a set of metrics: changes to inequality,16 social capital, trust, and well-being. 
16 The Panel elected to use the term inequality over inequity. The latter indeed refers specifically 
to inequalities that are preventable, modifiable, and deemed unfair, notably because they 
disproportionately affect certain groups because of structural constraints. However, a number of 
the key risk factors discussed in this chapter (e.g., age) do not fall into this category, and thus the 
term inequality was deemed more inclusive in this context. Nevertheless, the Panel agreed that a 
future with limited antimicrobials would most likely pose singular threats to equity in Canadian 
society, and that this question deserves specific consideration in future AMR assessments.
Key	Findings
Contact with the healthcare system is an overarching risk factor for acquiring a 
resistant infection. This is in part because those seeking healthcare may have a history 
of antimicrobial treatment, or prior conditions that predispose them to resistant 
infections (e.g., people with compromised or weaker immune systems, including the 
very young and older adults). 
The greatest risk factor for acquiring a resistant infection is previous antimicrobial 
treatment.
If there are limited antimicrobials in the future, more people in Canada will see their 
quality of life decline as a result of the morbidity and mortality associated with resistant 
infections. This impact will be unequally distributed, as some socio-demographic 
groups will be more at risk of infection.
Increasing rates of AMR will directly impact healthcare delivery, restrict travel, and 
increase surveillance, isolation, and quarantine. 
Responses to increased AMR will likely impact society through decreased trust, social 
capital, and well-being, and increased social inequality in Canadian society.
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Based on its research and expertise, the Panel developed vignettes to describe 
plausible social scenarios, offering a more personal view of the social impacts 
of a future with limited antimicrobials.
5.1 RISK FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH RESISTANT 
INFECTIONS IN HUMANS
In this section, the Panel explores four categories of risk factors — socio-
demographic, clinical, behavioural, and travel — that increase the risk of 
acquiring a resistant infection. However, the Panel emphasizes that no one 
is immune to bacterial infection. For instance, a healthy adult who is at low 
risk for infection based on all of the risk factors described in this section may 
become infected from eating contaminated meat or produce, such as chicken 
contaminated with Salmonella or lettuce contaminated with Escherichia coli. 
How risk factors for bacterial infections translate to risk factors for resistant 
bacterial infections is not always clear due to a lack of data. However, where 
possible, the Panel presents risk factors specific to resistant infections. While 
this section aims to highlight areas requiring the most attention, it is important 
to remember that AMR is a population-wide issue. 
5.1.1	 Socio-Demographic	Factors	Increasing	the	Risk	of	Resistant	
Infection
Age
Resistant infections disproportionately affect certain age groups. Older adults 
are at greatest risk, followed by infants (particularly neonatal patients) and 
children. These higher risks arise out of a combination of immune system 
characteristics (underdeveloped or depressed in neonatal patients and older 
adults, respectively) and higher exposure to infections. Young adults also feature 
in this section as they are disproportionately exposed to certain infections. 
As the immune systems of neonatal patients, especially those born premature, 
are underdeveloped, such patients are particularly at risk of infection (Simon 
et al., 2015). Some of the most fragile pediatric patients are those who spend 
time in neonatal intensive care units, where outbreaks of resistant organisms 
can occur (Lukac et al., 2015). Mortality rates in neonates infected with ESBL-
producing Enterobacteriaceae have been estimated at greater than 30% 
(Stapleton et al., 2016; Flokas et al., 2017b). Box 5.1 describes the case of an 
infant with a resistant infection in Winnipeg, Manitoba.
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Aside from neonatal patients, infants and children do not represent the 
most affected populations for many resistant infections from a prevalence 
standpoint; however, recent increases in infection rates among pediatric 
patients have generated concern (Lukac et al., 2015). From 2011 to 2016, the 
rate of healthcare-associated MRSA BSIs remained stable in adult hospitals 
in Canada, but increased more than five-fold in pediatric hospitals (PHAC, 
2017a). One study in northern Saskatchewan showed that almost half of all 
community-associated MRSA cases occurred in children ages 0 to 10 years 
(Golding et al., 2010). Furthermore, PHAC (2017a) notes that “the rate of 
community-associated MRSA infection in pediatric hospitals from 2011 to 2016 
Box 5.1
Osteomyelitis	in	a	Manitoba	Infant	Caused	by	Resistant	
Bacteria	Acquired	in	Pakistan
While visiting relatives in Pakistan, a four-month-old female infant sustained burns 
on the front of her lower legs from an electric steamer. She was treated locally with a 
standard antibiotic and daily dressing changes, but her wounds became infected within 
a week. Her family flew home to Winnipeg for further treatment, where examination 
revealed full-thickness burns on both legs and feet, three gangrenous toes on the 
right foot, and ear discharge. The infant underwent surgery for wound debridement 
and toe amputation, and began treatment with vancomycin and meropenem (a 
carbapenem antibiotic). Samples from the patient’s ears and nostrils grew two strains 
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) (one Canadian). Swabs from 
the left leg and right foot grew MRSA as well as multi-drug resistant (MDR) strains of 
Klebsiella pneumoniae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Both types of Gram-negative 
bacteria were later confirmed to be carbapenemase producers; the K. pneumoniae 
isolate was also an ESBL producer. One week after admission, a possible bone infection 
on the patient’s right foot was investigated; samples produced MDR Providencia 
stuartii and another strain of P. aeruginosa with a different susceptibility pattern. 
Based on the varied susceptibilities of all isolates, the patient was given six weeks of 
therapy with vancomycin, meropenem (initially intermittent but switched to continuous 
infusion), ciprofloxacin (a fluoroquinolone), and amikacin (an aminoglycoside). After 
the addition of amikacin, the patient improved rapidly and did not experience any 
other complications. This case highlights the extensive testing that must be performed 
when multiple types of bacteria with suspected resistance are present, as well as the 
complex and potentially toxic antimicrobial combinations that may be required for 
treatment. It also highlights how a Canadian hospital can be exposed to resistant 
pathogens from a high AMR country (Section 5.1.4).
 (Sepehri et al., 2014)
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was consistently higher than the rate in adult and mixed-patient hospitals.” 
These trends in rising infection rates may signal an increasing impact of AMR 
in this population.
While older adults and the very young are usually more at risk of acquiring 
infections generally, greater exposure to some infections disproportionately 
impacts younger adults. Gonorrhea is most common in those aged 20 to 24 in 
Canada, but resistant gonorrhea occurs more frequently in adults aged 25 or 
older (PHAC, 2014a). In an Ontario study that compared the characteristics of 
patients who acquired quinolone-susceptible and quinolone-resistant gonorrhea, 
the resistant group had a higher proportion of patients aged 30 and over (Ota 
et al., 2009). 
Older adults are particularly at risk for a variety of infections, in part due 
to normal aging processes, such as impaired immunity and changes in the 
composition of gut microbiota (Berg & Cassells, 1990). The risks introduced 
by these underlying factors may be further compounded by co-morbidities and 
the clustering of other risk factors such as living in long-term care facilities, 
more frequent hospital contacts, and taking more antimicrobials (Cimolai, 
2010; Kline & Bowdish, 2016; Shin et al., 2016; Marshall et al., 2017). Older age 
is a key risk factor for CDI, for example, with 70 to 80% of infections occurring 
among those 65 years or older (Shin et al., 2016; Asempa & Nicolau, 2017). 
Furthermore, a study of CDI in over 4,000 patients in six Ontario and Quebec 
hospitals shows an age-graded association for the risk of healthcare-associated 
CDI (Loo et al., 2011). 
Sex
According to Canadian AMR surveillance data from 2015 and 2016, most resistant 
pathogens affect men and women at similar rates (PHAC, 2017a), but men are 
more likely to be affected by carbapenemase-producing organisms and gonorrhea. 
However, in the case of gonorrhea, these epidemiologic data may be affected 
by underreporting of asymptomatic infections, and certainly underestimate the 
social impacts of these infections, which are largely experienced by women. 
The largest reported difference in infection rates between sexes involved 
carbapenemase-producing organisms (70% of patients were male) (PHAC, 2017a). 
In a cohort of 458 BSIs caused by beta-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae 
between 2000 and 2008, 283 (62%) occurred in males (Chaubey et al., 2014). 
However, of 247 people with community-onset ESBL-producing E. coli infections 
from 2004 to 2006, 81% were female (Laupland et al., 2008a). This increased 
risk was likely due, in part, to the fact that E. coli was isolated from the urine 
in almost all patients and females have a much higher risk of experiencing 
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community-onset UTIs than males (Laupland et al., 2007b). Therefore while 
males may be at greater risk of infection with carbapenemase-producing 
organisms overall, females may be at greater risk of acquiring certain syndromes. 
Reported cases of gonorrhea are also higher among men across Europe and 
North America, (Abraha et al., 2018), as well as in Canada, where 63% of 
infections occur in males (PHAC, 2017a). The Canadian Antimicrobial Resistance 
Surveillance System (CARSS) report does not provide a sex breakdown for 
resistant gonorrhea infections in Canada, but studies from other countries have 
indicated that men also have a greater risk of acquiring resistant gonorrhea 
(Abraha et al., 2018). However, an important caveat is that the lower reporting 
rates among women may be affected by the high proportion of asymptomatic 
infections in this population: up to 80% of females with gonorrhea can be 
asymptomatic, whereas only 10 to 20% of males have no symptoms (Wong et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 2.3, the negative impacts of 
gonorrhea (and some other STIs) are disproportionally experienced by women.
Living Conditions
Living conditions that involve overcrowding and/or poor housing 
conditions — including homeless shelters, military barracks, prisons, and 
subsidized housing — pose risk factors for community-associated MRSA 
SSTIs (Gorwitz, 2008; Loewen et al., 2017). Staphylococci establish reservoirs 
in households or at community sites, either by colonizing individuals or 
contaminating the environment, which leads to further spread and recurrent 
infections (Knox et al., 2012; Knox et al., 2015). Several Canadian studies have 
identified incarceration and homelessness as risk factors for MRSA infection 
(Gilbert et al., 2006; Achiam et al., 2011; Vayalumkal et al., 2012). Similarly, 
homeless and disadvantaged urban populations in Canada experience a 
higher prevalence of invasive pneumococcal disease, although it has not been 
demonstrated that this risk extends to resistant infections (Plevneshi et al., 
2009; Vanderkooi et al., 2011; Marrie et al., 2017).
In contrast, while imprisonment and homelessness have also been associated with 
MDR TB in other countries (Faustini et al., 2006; Story et al., 2007; Biadglegne et 
al., 2015; Pradipta et al., 2018), they do not appear to be risk factors in Canada. 
Indeed, while homeless people in Canada experience higher rates of TB, drug 
resistance is rare in this population (Khan et al., 2011). 
Indigenous Populations
As a result of a legacy of colonialism and the associated intergenerational 
trauma (TRC, 2015), Indigenous people in Canada experience a number 
of structural inequities that put them at higher risk of acquiring infections 
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relative to the rest of the population (Andermann, 2017). TB (PHAC, 2017a), 
pneumococcal disease (Kovesi, 2012; Das & Kovesi, 2015; Marrie et al., 2017), 
and gastrointestinal infections (Bradford et al., 2016) disproportionately impact 
Indigenous people in Canada. They are also disproportionately affected by 
STIs relative to non-Indigenous people in Canada: the rate of chlamydia is 
approximately seven times higher among First Nations adults than the overall 
population (PHAC, 2013). However, in Canada, none of these conditions are 
associated with a higher risk of resistant infections among Indigenous people 
relative to non-Indigenous people. In fact, TB surveillance data indicate that, 
while Indigenous people have higher rates of TB, they also experience much 
lower rates of resistant TB than Canadian-born non-Indigenous people (PHAC, 
2017d; LaFreniere et al., 2019a). 
As such, MRSA is the main resistant infection disproportionately affecting 
Indigenous people. MRSA surveillance data from 1995 to 2002 indicated 
that, compared to non-Indigenous people, hospitalized Indigenous people 
were more likely to have a community-associated strain (Ofner-Agostini et al., 
2006). Furthermore, there is evidence that rates in northern communities 
have been increasing since the early 2000s (Larcombe et al., 2007; Dalloo et 
al., 2008; Golding et al., 2011; Muileboom et al., 2013). Inadequate housing 
and a lack of running water have been suggested as important modifiable risk 
factors for the high MRSA rates in Indigenous communities (Hennessy et al., 
2008; Muileboom et al., 2013; Loewen et al., 2017). 
Occupation
Work that involves contact with agricultural animals is a risk factor for resistant 
infections. In a meta-analysis, Tang et al. (2017) found that the association 
between an intervention to reduce AMU in food-producing animals and a 
decrease in AMR was stronger for humans in direct contact with food-producing 
animals (e.g., farmers). In Ontario, high rates of MRSA colonization have been 
observed in pigs and pig farmers (Khanna et al., 2008), a finding confirmed 
by a systematic review indicating that MRSA carriage is indeed higher in this 
population, particularly among those who directly and frequently contact 
animals such as pigs and cattle (Liu et al., 2015). Compared to veterinarians 
and slaughterhouse workers, farmers have higher rates of MRSA carriage, likely 
due to the intensity of their contact with live animals (Liu et al., 2015), though 
MRSA colonization rates are still higher than expected among non-farmers who 
frequently contact animals, such as horse owners, veterinarians, and veterinary 
personnel (Weese, 2010). Box 5.2 presents an example of animal-to-human 
transmission in Guelph, Ontario. 
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Nativity Status
The greatest risk factor for MDR TB in Canada is being born outside of the 
country (Moniruzzaman et al., 2006; Minion et al., 2013; PHAC, 2017a). From 
2005 to 2015, 83% of the Canadian TB cases that involved resistance to at least 
one first-line drug occurred in people born outside of Canada. Among more 
severe drug-resistant infections (MDR TB and extensively drug-resistant TB), 
96% of cases involved foreign-born patients (PHAC, 2017a).
5.1.2	 Contact	with	the	Healthcare	System	Is	the	Greatest	Risk	Factor	
for	Acquiring	Resistant	Infections
Many resistant pathogens share a similar set of clinical risk factors that often 
act jointly to increase a person’s chances of developing a resistant infection 
(Guillamet & Kollef, 2016). Generally, people at risk of developing a resistant 
infection already have a disease or condition that compromises their health 
(Safdar & Maki, 2002; Trecarichi et al., 2012; Guillamet & Kollef, 2016; Bassetti 
et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018). In addition, the treatment process itself — which 
Box 5.2
Horse-to-Human	MRSA	Transmission	at	a	Veterinary	Hospital	in	
Ontario
In February 2004, a one-day-old foal was brought to a veterinary teaching hospital 
associated with the University of Guelph. It was admitted to the equine neonatal 
intensive care unit, diagnosed with acute renal failure and septicemia. It was cared 
for by university students involved in the Foal Watch program, which provides 24-hour 
nursing care to foals using 4-hour shifts. For most of their shift, students were in 
direct contact with the foal, which may have sat partially on their laps. Gloves were 
the only protective gear typically worn. By day 6 post-admission, MRSA nasal swabs 
from the foal came back positive and the foal had developed MRSA arthritis and 
omphalophlebitis (infection of the umbilical vein). Following these results, additional 
protective gear was worn during contact with the foal. Three female Foal Watch 
students were diagnosed with MRSA skin infections — two had contact with the 
foal on day 2 and one on day 4. Two had lesions on their hands, one on her lower 
arms and left leg, and one also had a facial rash resembling impetigo. In all cases, 
MRSA was isolated from the infected area. One patient was also colonized in two 
uninfected areas (nasal passages and groin). Of 103 additional Foal Watch students 
and veterinary personnel who were screened, 10 were colonized with MRSA, and 
all reported contact with the affected foal; however, personnel had also contacted 
other animals at the hospital, including other horses.
(Weese et al., 2006)
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may involve an in-patient stay, invasive devices (e.g., catheters), surgery, 
chemotherapy or radiation, or treatment with antimicrobials, biologics, or 
other drugs — further compounds the risk that these patients will acquire a 
resistant pathogen (Safdar & Maki, 2002; Ofner-Agostini et al., 2009; Trecarichi 
et al., 2012; Boyle & Zembower, 2015; Gerding & Lessa, 2015; Biehl et al., 2016; 
Guillamet & Kollef, 2016; Bassetti et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018). 
Previous Treatment with Antimicrobials
The strongest, most consistent, and commonly agreed-upon risk factor for 
acquiring a resistant infection is previous antimicrobial treatment (Safdar & 
Maki, 2002; Ofner-Agostini et al., 2009; Trecarichi et al., 2012; Boyle & Zembower, 
2015; Gerding & Lessa, 2015; Biehl et al., 2016; Guillamet & Kollef, 2016; 
Bassetti et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018). The mechanisms by which antimicrobial 
treatment leads to resistant infections are not fully established. In some cases, 
exposure to a particular antibiotic results in resistance to the same antibiotic 
class (Guillamet & Kollef, 2016). For example, treatment with cephalosporins 
(a class of beta-lactam antibiotics) is a risk factor for developing a beta-lactam-
resistant bacterial infection (Ofner-Agostini et al., 2009). Additionally, use of 
one type of antibiotic can also promote resistance to other types (Guillamet 
& Kollef, 2016). P. aeruginosa can develop cross-resistance when treatment 
with one antibiotic activates a membrane efflux pump system that allows it to 
expel multiple classes of antibiotics (Lopez-Dupla et al., 2009). In one study, 
P. aeruginosa isolated from the blood of patients treated with ciprofloxacin (a 
fluoroquinolone antibiotic) prior to developing bacteremia was more likely to 
be resistant not only to ciprofloxacin, but also to several drugs in other classes, 
including cephalosporins and beta-lactams (Lopez-Dupla et al., 2009).
The most important risk factor for MDR TB is previous treatment for TB (Jimma 
et al., 2017; Asgedom et al., 2018; Pradipta et al., 2018). Using data from 1997 
to 2008, Minion et al. (2013) reported that 1.1% of all culture-confirmed cases 
of TB in Canada were MDR, and most occurred in patients who acquired TB 
outside of Canada. This is lower than the global rate of MDR TB (3.6%); almost 
50% of all cases of MDR TB worldwide occur in India and China (WHO, 2010). 
One hypothesis is that treatment with antibiotics may lead to overgrowth of 
other types of pathogenic bacteria in the gut (Cascals-Pascual et al., 2018). 
For example, exposure to antibiotics is the most important risk factor for CDI 
(both healthcare- and community-associated) (Schäffler & Breitrück, 2018). 
Disrupting the complex ecosystem of commensal gut bacteria with antibiotics 
leaves patients vulnerable to CDI (Schäffler & Breitrück, 2018). Historically, 
CDI was considered “a complication of broad-spectrum antimicrobial therapy 
in hospitalized patients” (Bloomfield & Riley, 2016; Eze et al., 2017). However, 
96 When Antibiotics Fail
according to a 2018 review, cases of community-associated CDI have almost 
doubled in the past decade, and approximately half of CDI cases are now 
community-associated (Ofori et al., 2018). Furthermore, depending on the 
country, approximately one-third to two-thirds of community-associated CDI 
cases do not involve patients who were previously treated with antibiotics 
(Bloomfield & Riley, 2016; Ofori et al., 2018); the Panel notes, however, that 
some of these studies did not have complete data regarding antimicrobial 
exposure, and therefore the range may be an over-estimate. Other factors are, 
however, clearly playing a role.
Hospitalization and Long-Term Care
Although some resistant organisms (e.g., MRSA) have emerged as major 
community-based pathogens (Knox et al., 2015), others are primarily found 
in healthcare facilities and hospitalized patients (e.g., carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae) (Bassetti et al., 2017). Thus, contact with a healthcare facility, 
particularly if it is prolonged, represents an important risk factor for developing 
a resistant infection (Safdar & Maki, 2002; Boyle & Zembower, 2015; Bassetti et 
al., 2017). By comparing patients with resistant infections to patients infected 
with susceptible strains of the same species, studies in Canadian hospitals have 
identified an association between prolonged hospitalization and infection with 
resistant Klebsiella species, E. coli, and P. aeruginosa (Ofner-Agostini et al., 2009; 
Parkins et al., 2010). Using the same case-control approach at an Ottawa-area 
hospital, Allen et al. (1999) found that, compared to children who had not 
visited the hospital, children with one or more hospital admissions in the past 
year were more likely to have UTIs caused by resistant E. coli.
Hospitals are also a key Clostridioides difficile reservoir. Rooms occupied by 
patients with CDI are contaminated with C. difficile 9 to 50% of time, and 
recent hospitalization is a risk factor for CDI acquisition (Crobach et al., 
2018). Some studies have suggested an association between a longer hospital 
stay and CDI, but results have been inconsistent; however, LOS is strongly 
associated with C. difficile colonization17 (reviewed in Eze et al., 2017). For all 
infections, it is difficult to disentangle the influence of LOS from other risk 
factors for acquiring a resistant infection, such as severity of underlying illness 
and exposure to antimicrobials, since these factors may also be associated with 
longer hospitalization (Safdar & Maki, 2002). 
17 Colonization with a pathogen may occur without causing any symptoms. This differs from an 
infection, whereby the pathogen causes an illness and there are symptoms of a syndrome.
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Like hospitals, long-term care facilities are reservoirs for resistant pathogens. 
Residence in a long-term care facility is a risk factor for infection with ESBL-
producing organisms and MRSA (Cimolai, 2010; Boyle & Zembower, 2015). 
For example, in North America the colonization rate for ESBL-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae among residents in long-term care facilities was estimated 
at 13% (Flokas et al., 2017a). 
Invasive Devices
Patients who require invasive devices such as catheters, feeding tubes, and 
ventilators face an increased risk of developing a resistant infection (Safdar & 
Maki, 2002; Ofner-Agostini et al., 2009; Trecarichi et al., 2012; Boyle & Zembower, 
2015; Bassetti et al., 2017; Tian et al., 2018). This risk results from the potential 
for pathogens to contaminate the outer or inner surface of the tubing that these 
devices use to deliver or remove substances to and from the body (Gominet et 
al., 2017). The tubing may develop a biofilm (an aggregate of microorganisms 
attached to its surface and within in an extracellular matrix), which is much 
more resistant to antimicrobials than planktonic (single, free-floating) cells 
(O’Flaherty & Crowley, 2014; Gominet et al., 2017). 
One Canadian study identified haemodialysis as one of the most important 
risk factors for developing a BSI caused by S. aureus (Laupland et al., 2008c). 
In this study, the relative risks of acquiring methicillin-sensitive and -resistant 
S. aureus bacteremia were similar for heamodialysis patients (Laupland et al., 
2008c). Additionally, in intensive care units, a main risk factor for pneumonia 
caused by resistant bacteria is mechanical ventilation (Parker et al., 2008; Bassetti 
et al., 2018). Of note, patients who require invasive devices and procedures 
are likely to have other risk factors that increase their chances of acquiring a 
resistant infection, including having a serious illness or undergoing surgery 
(Safdar & Maki, 2002). 
Surgery
As with invasive devices, surgery presents an opportunity for pathogens to 
breach the protective barriers of the body; thus, recent surgery is a risk factor 
for developing a resistant infection (Safdar & Maki, 2002; Boyle & Zembower, 
2015). The most prevalent post-operative complications are surgical site infections 
(SSIs), which may be superficial (involving skin and subcutaneous tissue) or 
deep (involving soft tissue, organs, or body spaces) (Young & Khadaroo, 2014; 
GlobalSurg, 2018). In a systematic review of studies from across the globe, 
the median incidence of SSIs was 3.7%, and incidence was highest in tumour-
related surgeries and transplants (Korol et al., 2013). These two surgery types 
were also associated with the highest incidence of MRSA (Korol et al., 2013). 
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According to a report on 29 Ontario hospitals participating in the Ontario 
Surgical Quality Improvement Network, the surgical outcome with the greatest 
need for improvement in 2017 was SSIs (HQO, 2017). Of particular concern 
is the frequency of SSIs caused by MRSA: the most recent data indicate that, 
in the United States, almost 43% of S. aureus SSIs were caused by MRSA in 
2014 (Weiner et al., 2016). 
In patients undergoing solid organ transplantation, BSIs are the leading cause 
of mortality and morbidity (Berenger et al., 2016). Kidney transplants are 
associated with UTIs, liver transplants with IAIs, and heart and lung transplants 
with chest infections such as pneumonia; these site-specific infections may 
progress to BSIs, or primary BSIs may develop due to catheterization or other 
factors (Berenger et al., 2016; Kritikos & Manuel, 2016). Risk factors for infection 
may be present before the transplant (e.g., underlying diseases such as cystic 
fibrosis), may arise as a result of the transplant operation (e.g., tissue damage 
and other complications that could prolong surgery), or may develop after 
the transplant (e.g., reduced immune function caused by immunosuppressive 
drugs) (Fishman, 2011; Kritikos & Manuel, 2016). In a 10-year Canadian 
study (2003 to 2012) on risk factors for nosocomial BSIs following solid organ 
transplantation, VRE emerged as a key causal pathogen (Berenger et al., 2016). 
No BSIs were due to VRE until 2010, and, by 2012, it was responsible for five 
of the eight BSIs caused by enterococcal pathogens (Berenger et al., 2016). 
Compromised Immune System or Disruptions to Gut Bacteria
Patients with existing diseases or conditions may be particularly vulnerable to 
developing resistant infections due to underlying aspects of their condition 
or because of effects of the medications needed to treat it (Safdar & Maki, 
2002; Trecarichi et al., 2012; Guillamet & Kollef, 2016; Bassetti et al., 2017; 
Tian et al., 2018). For example, those undergoing stem cell transplants have 
increased risk of infection because the procedure itself severely compromises 
the patient’s immune system (Magauran & Salgado, 2011). CDI is particularly 
common in these patients, with studies indicating an occurrence rate ranging 
from 4 to 25% (reviewed in Lavallée et al., 2017; Neemann & Freifeld, 2017). At 
a hospital in Quebec — a province that has been dealing with a CDI outbreak 
since 2003 — the incidence of CDI in patients undergoing certain types of 
stem cell transplants between 2002 and 2011 was 8.6% (65 of 760 patients) 
(Lavallée et al., 2017). There are many other immunocompromised populations 
at a greater risk of resistant infection, including the very young or very old 
(Section 5.1.1), patients with HIV (Sabbagh et al., 2019), and patients with 
cancer (particularly those receiving chemotherapy) (Bello-Chavolla et al., 
2018). Box 5.3 presents an example of a fatal resistant infection in a patient 
who was immunocompromised.
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Medications that damage the gut (e.g., chemotherapy) or disrupt the composition 
of commensal gut bacteria (e.g., antibiotics) result in susceptibility to CDI 
(Furuya-Kanamori et al., 2015; Neemann & Freifeld, 2017; Schäffler & Breitrück, 
2018) and colonization with antibiotic-resistant microbes (Cascals-Pascual et 
al., 2018). Inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) has been associated with CDI 
(Nguyen, 2012; Furuya-Kanamori et al., 2015; D’Aoust et al., 2017), and it has 
been hypothesized that disruption of the gut microbiota that occurs in IBD 
patients might underlie this association (Rao & Higgins, 2016). Hospitalized 
IBD patients are more likely than non-IBD gastroenterology patients and general 
in-patients to become infected with MRSA and VRE, but the mechanisms for 
this increased risk are unknown (Nguyen et al., 2011; Nguyen, 2012). 
Box 5.3
Fatal	Necrotizing	Fasciitis	in	an	Immunocompromised	Patient	at	
a	Canadian	Hospital
A 37-year-old man presented to a rural hospital in Canada with relapsed aplastic 
anemia (where the body does not produce enough blood cells due to damage 
to bone marrow) that had been diagnosed 10 months earlier. His condition had 
improved following immunosuppressive therapy, but his treatment compliance had 
gradually decreased. Immunosuppressive therapy was re-initiated, and on day 10 
post-admission, he developed a fever with abdominal pain, followed by watery 
diarrhea. He was diagnosed with E. coli bacteremia and treated with a beta-lactam 
antibiotic, which dramatically improved his condition. On day 19, he developed a 
high-grade fever, severe rectal and leg pain, and his blood cultures grew Aeromonas 
hydrophila, an opportunistic, water-dwelling pathogen that primarily causes severe 
infections in immunocompromised people. His leg pain worsened, and an MRI on 
day 24 showed extensive necrotizing fasciitis in both legs. Testing of A. hydrophila 
isolates from the patient’s blood and muscle tissue revealed multi-drug resistance. 
Despite multiple surgical procedures to remove damaged tissue, eventual above-knee 
amputations, and broad-spectrum antibiotics, the patient developed septic shock and 
died from cardiac arrest two hours after the final surgery. Given the gastrointestinal 
symptoms and E. coli bacteremia that preceded the A. hydrophila infection, the 
authors hypothesized that the patient’s immunosuppressed state led to intestinal 
colonization with Aeromonas, followed by bacterial translocation through the wall of 
the gut, entry into the bloodstream, and seeding of soft tissue and muscle in the legs. 
(Ugarte-Torres et al., 2018)
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5.1.3	 Certain	Behaviours	Can	Increase	the	Risk	of	Acquiring	a	
Resistant	Infection
Behaviours that increase the risk of acquiring a resistant infection include 
certain sexual practices, substance use disorder, participating in certain sports, 
and having pets. 
Sexual Practices
A person’s sexual practices may elevate their risk of acquiring a resistant STI 
(Abraha et al., 2018). In Canada, the three main STIs that are reported to 
public health agencies are chlamydia, gonorrhea, and syphilis18 (PHAC, 2014a). 
Resistance is extremely rare in Chlamydia trachomatis (Mestrovic & Ljubin-
Sternak, 2018). Although the syphilis rate has recently risen dramatically in 
Canada — increasing by 232% between 2002 and 2011 (PHAC, 2014a) — very 
limited data on the prevalence of resistant syphilis are available; however, a few 
resistant cases have been reported (Morshed & Jones, 2006; Martin et al., 2009). 
Due to increasing rates of infections and resistant Neisseria gonorrhoeae, gonorrhea 
is a concern in Canada and around the world (Dillon et al., 2015; Alirol et al., 
2017; PHAC, 2017c; Abraha et al., 2018; Blank & Daskalakis, 2018). An estimated 
78 million people contract the disease each year and resistance, including to the 
last-resort treatment (extended-spectrum cephalosporins), has been reported 
in more than 50 countries (WHO, 2017d). The first case of ceftriaxone-resistant 
gonorrhea in Canada was observed in a woman in Quebec in 2017 (Lefebvre 
et al., 2018). The patient acquired gonorrhea through a sexual relationship 
with a man who reported having unprotected sex in China and Thailand in 
2016 (Lefebvre et al., 2018). Similarly, a male patient acquired the second case 
of ceftriaxone-resistant gonorrhea following intercourse with two women, one 
from Taiwan and one visiting from China (Smyczek et al., 2019). 
Several sexual practices have been investigated as potential risk factors for 
acquiring resistant gonorrhea. A high number of sexual partners was identified 
by univariate analysis in several studies but only remained a statistically significant 
risk factor following multivariate analysis in one of these studies (Abraha et 
al., 2018). Sex with partners abroad and commercial sex work have also been 
associated with a higher risk of resistant gonorrhea (Abraha et al., 2018). There 
is potentially a correlation between men who have sex with men and resistant 
gonorrhea, but studies in several countries have had conflicting results (Abraha 
et al., 2018). Results from a study looking at MRSA SSTIs in people with HIV 
also indicate that sexual contact may transfer MRSA and that high-risk sexual 
behaviours may increase the risk of acquiring this type of infection (Crum-
Cianflone et al., 2011). 
18 Estimates of syphilis provided by PHAC relate to cases of infectious syphilis only, as the number 
of cases of non-infectious syphilis are unknown.
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Substance Use Disorder
Use of injection drugs has been identified in Canada as a risk factor for MRSA 
SSTIs (Stenstrom et al., 2009; Vayalumkal et al., 2012). Two studies in Vancouver’s 
downtown east side, which has a large population of people with substance use 
disorder, showed that the MRSA colonization rate in those who use injection 
drugs more than doubled in a six-year period, increasing from 7.4% in 2000 to 
18.6% in 2006 (Daly et al., 2002; Al-Rawahi et al., 2008). In 218 patients who used 
Vancouver’s supervised injection facility in 2008, 59 patients had at least one 
wound and of these, 16 wounds (27%) tested positive for community-associated 
MRSA (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2010). Similarly, a Calgary study found that illicit 
drug use was one of the factors that put people at highest risk of acquiring a 
community-acquired MRSA SSTI (Gilbert et al., 2006). In addition to SSTIs, 
which include abscesses and cellulitis, S. aureus can cause other severe infections 
in people who use injection drugs, including bacteremia and endocarditis 
(infection of a heart valve or the endocardial surface of the heart) (Bassetti & 
Battegay, 2004; Cahill & Prendergast, 2016). 
AMR associated with substance use disorder is particularly relevant given the 
Canada-wide opioid crisis. Opioids, including fentanyl, can be injected and 
therefore put users at increased risks of certain types of infection. Another 
narcotic of concern is methamphetamine (i.e., crystal meth) whose popularity 
has surged in recent years in the Prairies, and Manitoba in particular (Froese, 
2018; The Canadian Press, 2018). It is suspected that the increase in injection 
methamphetamine use is linked to a significant increase in syphilis, as well as 
other more common blood-borne illnesses (e.g., hepatitis, HIV) in Manitoba 
(Froese, 2018; Malone, 2019). A 2018 retrospective cohort study of emergency 
department and in-patient visits in California, Florida, and New York found that, 
since 2008, there has been a steady rise in the percentage of infections related 
to injection drug use (Miller & Polgreen, 2019). While use of narcotics is a 
risk factor for bacterial infection generally, there are no data relating directly 
to resistant infections. 
Participation in Sports
MRSA infections have become increasingly common in people who participate 
in sports, particularly those that involve physical contact (Kirkland & Adams, 
2008; Redziniak et al., 2009; Braun & Kahanov, 2018). MRSA SSTIs usually 
occur in athletes when open abrasions (e.g., turf burns, irritations from 
abrasive equipment, other skin traumas) become infected after close contact 
with a person who is infected or colonized with MRSA. Indirect infection can 
occur due to shared environments (e.g., locker rooms, whirlpools), shared 
equipment, and shared personal items (e.g., towels, balms) (Kirkland & Adams, 
2008; Redziniak et al., 2009; Braun & Kahanov, 2018).
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A meta-analysis by Karanika et al. (2016) of 15 studies from around the world 
(though none from Canada) estimated that 6% of asymptomatic athletes are 
colonized with MRSA. The authors noted that this prevalence was at least 
three times higher than that of the general community and comparable to the 
prevalence in other high-risk populations, such as people receiving dialysis. 
Colonization rates were highest among those participating in wrestling (22%), 
American football (8%), and basketball (8%) (Karanika et al., 2016). In a study 
of patients presenting to three emergency departments at academic healthcare 
centres in London, Ontario, competitive sports participation was a significant 
predictor of MRSA SSTIs (Achiam et al., 2011).
Pet Ownership
Several studies have shown that identical MRSA strains can be isolated from 
people and their pets (mainly dogs and cats), either in the context of a colonized 
pet and infected human or vice versa (reviewed in Weese, 2010). These studies 
could not confirm the direction of transmission or the possibility of a common 
infection source (Weese, 2010). Many of the MRSA strains found in pets are 
widespread among humans, suggesting that transmission between humans and 
pets can occur, but pets may harbour these strains and re-infect or re-colonize 
people (Damborg et al., 2016). Dog owners have been found to carry bacteria 
that are not commensal in humans (e.g., methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
pseudintermedius or MRSP, which has a canine origin), providing indirect evidence 
that pet-to-human transmission of resistant pathogens indeed occurs (Ishihara 
et al., 2010; Walther et al., 2012). In a study of hospital personnel in Austria 
and Germany, contact with pets was identified by multivariate analysis as a risk 
factor for colonization with ESBL-producing E. coli (Meyer et al., 2012). Thus, 
although the evidence is not strong enough to suggest that owning a pet is a 
risk factor for acquiring a resistant infection, it is clear that resistant pathogens 
may be shared between pets and people (Weese, 2010).
5.1.4	 Travel	Is	a	Key	Risk	Factor	for	Contracting	a	Resistant	Infection
Population mobility is one of the main reasons why AMR has become a global 
problem (MacPherson et al., 2009; Schwartz & Morris, 2018). Worldwide, 
international tourist arrivals increased from 528 million in 2005 to 1.2 billion 
in 2015 (Statista, n.d.). This potential for increased spread of AMR due to 
global mobility is compounded by the fact that asymptomatic travellers may 
unknowingly bring resistant bacteria to Canada. 
The spread of AMR from low- and middle-income countries to high-income 
countries is particularly apparent for organisms that spread via the fecal-oral 
route, and ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae have emerged as, by far, the 
most common resistant pathogens acquired during travel (Woerther et al., 
2017; Schwartz & Morris, 2018). Nonetheless, international travel has played 
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a role in spreading other resistant organisms, such as carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), MRSA, and several enteric pathogens (e.g., species 
of Salmonella, Campylobacter, Shigella) (Schwartz & Morris, 2018), as well as 
resistant STIs (Lefebvre et al., 2018; Smyczek et al., 2019), although the risk of 
these infections is much smaller compared with ESBL. 
International travellers are much more likely to acquire ESBL-producing 
Enterobacteriaceae compared to CRE and MRSA, particularly after visiting 
India (Ruppé et al., 2018; Schwartz & Morris, 2018). The estimated ESBL 
colonization rates for travellers to various regions are: the Indian subcontinent 
(64%), other parts of Asia (50%), the Middle East (36%), Africa (34%), and 
South and Central America (19%) (Schwartz & Morris, 2018). In a study of 
patients in the Calgary Health Region from 2004 to 2006, 247 patients acquired 
ESBL-producing E. coli (Laupland et al., 2008a). More detailed information was 
available for 163 patients, and of these, 71 (44%) reported travel to an area 
other than the United States. Travellers to India had a significantly increased 
risk of acquiring ESBL than travellers to other countries (Laupland et al., 2008a).
It should be noted that, although ESBL colonization is associated with a greater 
risk of ESBL infection (Ruppé et al., 2018), in most cases, those who are colonized 
do not develop an infection (Woerther et al., 2017). However, they can still 
spread the bacteria to others. The median duration of colonization with MDR 
Enterobacteriaceae after travelling is less than 30 days, and by 3 months, fewer 
than 10% of people remain colonized (Ruppé et al., 2018).
Based on surveillance data from 58 hospitals across Canada collected between 
2010 and 2014, the five-year incidence rate of CRE was 0.07 per 1,000 admissions, 
and 24% of cases involved people who reported international travel within the 
past 12 months (Mataseje et al., 2016). Of these cases, 86% indicated that they 
sought medical care while travelling and 31% travelled to India (Mataseje et 
al., 2016). By calculating the weighted average of several published studies, 
Schwartz and Morris (2018) estimate the CRE colonization rate for healthy 
people visiting the Indian subcontinent and other parts of Asia to be 0.4%, 
whereas it was zero for visiting any other region. 
Medical treatment obtained in other countries, including medical tourism, 
combines two risk factors, namely contact with a healthcare system and travel. 
In 2019, PHAC announced that at least 30 people in Canada who underwent 
weight-loss surgery at a hospital in Tijuana, Mexico may have been exposed to 
a resistant strain of P. aeruginosa (Cook, 2019). A detailed example of a patient 
acquiring a resistant infection in a healthcare setting in India before returning 
to Canada is provided in Box 5.4. 
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Given the social and economic importance of travel for Canada, it is probable 
that international travel will continue to provide a mechanism for resistant 
human pathogens to move quickly from other countries into Canada. Therefore, 
AMR in all regions of the world will continue to have direct impacts in Canada. 
This emphasizes the global nature of AMR and the opportunity for Canada to 
participate in global actions to combat its spread.
5.2 THE POTENTIAL SEVERITY OF INFECTIONS IN A FUTURE 
WITH LIMITED ANTIMICROBIALS
Increasing rates of AMR, combined with a lack of new antimicrobials, have led 
some to suggest that a return to the pre-antibiotic era is possible (Cars et al., 2008). 
Although the sharp decline in mortality due to infectious diseases — which began 
at the start of the 20th century — has been largely attributed to improvements in 
public health (e.g., sewage disposal, drinking water treatment, better housing) 
(Armstrong et al., 1999; CDC, 1999), the introduction of antibiotics was still 
associated with a further decline (Armstrong et al., 1999; IDSA, 2011). During 
Box 5.4
Transmission	of	Resistant	Bacteria	from	India	to	Alberta
A 62-year-old female who lived in Canada (Patient A) had surgery for a fractured femur 
in India, which then developed an infection that did not respond to treatment. She 
flew back to Canada and was admitted to a surgical ward in an Edmonton hospital 
on March 31, 2012. Two types of MDR Gram-negative bacteria (K. pneumoniae and 
Acinetobacter baumannii) were cultured from the patient’s thigh tissue and a separate 
rectal swab cultured K. pneumoniae. All strains produced carbapenemases. Both 
K. pneumoniae strains produced the carbapenemase NDM-1, which is widespread 
in the Indian subcontinent and confers broad resistance to various drug classes. 
Five other patients in the same hospital acquired either the A. baumannii strain or 
the rectal K. pneumoniae strain, likely from Patient A. Collectively, these patients 
spread the pathogens across three different surgical units. On May 8, blood and 
an endotracheal specimen cultured A. baumannii from a 74-year-old male who 
had undergone surgery to remove a lung nodule. He developed organ failure and 
septic shock, was transferred to intensive care, and died several hours later. During 
the outbreak, which was declared over on May 25, transmission occurred even after 
the implementation of active surveillance and infection control precautions. 
(Ahmed-Bentley et al., 2013)
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the first 15 years after antibiotics were introduced in the 1940s, the overall 
infectious disease mortality rate in the United States fell by approximately 
75% (Armstrong et al., 1999). Estimates of changes in mortality rates from the 
pre-antibiotic to the antibiotic era indicate that the most serious infections 
experienced the greatest reductions. For example, IDSA (2011) summarized 
several studies and found that mortality from bacterial endocarditis fell from 
approximately 100 to 25%, and bacterial meningitis from greater than 80% 
to less than 20%. 
Based on the Panel’s model (Section 4.1), the cumulative number of deaths in 
Canada between 2020 and 2050 that will be attributable to AMR would range 
between just under 256,000 if resistance stayed at today’s rates to just over 
396,000 if there is a gradual increase to 40% resistance to first-line antimicrobials 
(Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 
Cumulative Population Change in Canada Due to Antimicrobial Resistance, Projected 
Through 2050
The figure illustrates cumulative population decline due to antimicrobial resistance, as projected by 
the Panel’s model through 2050, if resistance rates to first-line antimicrobials remain at 26% (navy 
blue), or reach 40% (teal) or 100% (red) by 2050. Canada’s population will decline an estimated 
250,000 by 2050 if resistance rates remain constant. If resistance rates reach 100% by 2050, Canada’s 
population decline may reach approximately 800,000.
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In 2012, then Director-General of the WHO Margaret Chan stated that a 
“post-antibiotic era means, in effect, an end to modern medicine as we know 
it. Things as common as strep throat or a child’s scratched knee could once 
again kill” (WHO, 2012a). Whether or not such a sombre portrayal of the post-
antimicrobial era is likely, there is no doubt that, as the number of effective 
antimicrobials decreases, morbidity and mortality from previously treatable 
diseases will drastically increase. As resistance increases, it will become more 
challenging to achieve a balance between conserving the remaining effective 
antimicrobials while still providing optimal care for patients.
5.3 POTENTIAL SOCIAL IMPACTS OF AMR IN A FUTURE 
WITH LIMITED ANTIMICROBIALS 
It is impossible to determine unequivocally the nature and magnitude of all 
future social impacts of increased AMR in Canada, due to the absence of a 
counterfactual (i.e., modern societies without AMU). Accordingly, this section 
presents plausible hypothetical future scenarios informed by the Panel’s expert 
knowledge. Evidence is drawn from the data and projections presented thus 
far, as well as from other infectious disease outbreaks, such as severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS). The Panel judged that the SARS example provides 
a pertinent evidence base — as Canada was the country most affected outside 
of the Asian region — and its social impacts have been well documented, 
including the restructuring of health agencies at both the provincial/territorial 
and federal levels (National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, 
2003; Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious Disease Control, 2004). 
It may be argued that disease outbreaks such as SARS are rapid disruptions 
from the norm associated with major uncertainties, whereas AMR is an endemic 
problem, growing slowly through time. Thus, one might assume systemic 
adjustments will be made progressively as resistance increases, and may never 
lead to a crisis situation such as SARS. However, there are already examples of 
resistant strains spreading rapidly, and exhibiting outbreak patterns resembling 
those of SARS. For example, recall Box 5.4, which describes a patient who was 
infected with resistant bacteria while in India and brought the strains back to a 
Edmonton hospital, where they spread across three surgical units. Furthermore, 
there are already examples of bacterial outbreaks impacting communities in 
Canada. The Walkerton E. coli outbreak in May 2000 had devastating impact. 
Briefly, the water system in Walkerton, Ontario (population 4,800) became 
contaminated with E. coli, eventually causing 2,300 people to become sick 
and leading to 7 deaths (O’Connor, 2002; Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006). A 
judicial inquiry was formed by the Ontario government (Kondro, 2000), and 
Justice Dennis O’Connor found that the outbreak could have been prevented 
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by the Ontario government (which cut Ministry of Environment funding) and 
Walkerton’s water supply managers (O’Connor, 2002). In the aftermath of 
the outbreak, “citizens were terrified of using tap water to satisfy basic human 
needs” (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006). Those who were infected or lost loved 
ones suffered psychological trauma, the larger community suffered anxiety, and 
people across Ontario and Canada worried about whether similar fatal events 
could occur elsewhere (Vicente & Christoffersen, 2006). While not caused by a 
resistant organism, the Walkerton outbreak provides a compelling illustration 
of how the potential social impacts of a bacterial outbreak can resemble those of 
a viral one. Therefore, the Panel believes there is utility in examining societal 
responses to past viral outbreaks in order to inform our understanding of what 
a future with limited antimicrobials might be like.
While this section primarily uses a human-centred approach to identify impacts, 
“the consequences of the spread of resistant bacteria could also include 
shortages of food due to untreatable infections in livestock and, as leaders 
seek to slow the spread of pathogens, restrictions on trade in foodstuffs, and 
even on travel and migration” (World Economic Forum, 2013). Because of the 
dearth of direct evidence on the impacts that may occur if AMR spreads, Panel 
members also drew on their expertise to hypothesize how AMR may affect the 
day-to-day lives of people in Canada. These ideas are presented through fictional 
vignettes of people living in a future Canada (contained within teal boxes) to 
illustrate some of the scenarios that might arise if effective antimicrobials were 
to become limited.
5.3.1	 AMR	Impacts	on	Individuals
As noted in Section 5.1, certain socio-demographic risk factors put segments 
of the Canadian public at greater risk of developing a resistant infection. 
As the general population level of risk increases, these groups will likely 
experience compounded risks. The well-being of those with resistant infections 
will undoubtedly decrease due to decreased life expectancy and increased 
morbidity. Additionally, protocols put in place to prevent the spread of resistant 
pathogens, such as isolation of infected individuals, may adversely impact their 
health. It has been shown that isolated patients are twice as likely as patients who 
are not isolated to experience adverse health effects during their hospitalization 
(Stelfox et al., 2003).
AMR Will Lead to Increased Inequality
The impacts of rising resistance would be unequally distributed among people 
in Canada. It would be reasonable to assume that those currently among at-
risk groups (Section 5.1) would continue to be at greater risk; as the number 
of resistant infections increases, people in these groups would experience a 
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disproportionate burden, leading to increases in social inequality. The Panel 
notes that, while such inequalities could be made avoidable, doing so would 
require the implementation of very strong monitoring and equity policies. 
AMR Will Decrease Well-Being
While it is clear that AMR is detrimental to health, it will also negatively 
affect quality of life through decreased well-being, for example. As Sachs 
(2018) explains, the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network examines six variables to determine well-being: income, healthy life 
expectancy, social support, freedom, trust, and generosity. Happiness similarly 
correlates with these variables (Helliwell et al., 2018). AMR directly impacts life 
expectancy through increased morbidity and mortality associated with infections 
(Section 5.1). Resistant STIs may impact female fecundity, impacting well-being 
(Section 2.3). AMR will also decrease well-being indirectly through changing 
trust and social capital, as outlined later in this chapter.
5.3.2	 AMR	Impacts	on	Community	and	Social	Behaviours
If AMR were to increase, the consequences would spread beyond patients, 
directly affecting many facets of society. Behavioural adaptations that result 
from a lack of access to antimicrobials, are likely to be substantial, and yet 
these ramifications are often overlooked in reports that examine this topic 
(NAS, 2018). Because of this lack of evidence related specifically to AMR and 
behavioural changes, this sections draws from studies examining behaviours 
during infectious disease outbreaks to suggest plausible impacts of rising AMR. 
AMR May Decrease Social Capital and Public Trust
Social capital can be thought of as “the resources available to individuals and 
groups through membership in social networks” (Alvarez & Romani, 2017). 
These resources can be emotional, social, and economic, and confer tangible 
benefits to both individuals and communities. Through social bonds (i.e., people 
linked by a sense of common identity), “social capital provides the glue which 
facilitates co-operation, exchange and innovation” (OECD, 2001). Thus, social 
groups characterized by higher levels of social capital perform better on a range 
of outcomes; in healthcare settings, for instance, social capital has been found 
to be as important as financial capital in promoting coordination, increasing 
job satisfaction, and resulting in better patient outcomes (Norrish et al., 2013). 
With a rise in AMR, the increased incidence and prevalence of people 
with resistant infections would lead to a greater number of social groups with 
affected individuals. However, as noted above, some groups will be at greater 
risk, and will count a much larger number of affected individuals, while other 
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groups could have very few. Social awareness of these risk factors will also 
likely grow, and with it, the risk of stigma associated with the condition and 
with belonging to a group with greater risk of resistant infection (Box 5.5). 
This poses a risk for social trust and social capital, as less affected groups may 
increasingly view themselves as dissimilar from those who have contracted 
resistant infections. During the SARS outbreak, people also attempted to limit 
contact with those assumed to be potential carriers of the virus, such as people 
displaying symptoms of the common cold, healthcare workers, and people of 
certain races or nationalities (Lee-Baggley et al., 2004). In contrast to adaptive 
health behaviours (e.g., handwashing), avoidance of certain populations is 
unlikely to be effective and can lead to racism and ostracism (Lee-Baggley et 
al., 2004). Similar avoidant behaviours were observed during avian and swine 
flu outbreaks, both in affected and unaffected areas (e.g., avoiding public 
transport, hospitals, and large gatherings; cancelling travel; eating less poultry 
or pork) (Bish & Michie, 2010).
Box 5.5
Stigma	and	Infectious	Disease
Stigma is a social process that people (in groups, communities, etc.) use to label and 
stereotype individuals or other groups (e.g., as dangerous or as a threat), thereby 
distinguishing themselves from such labelled individuals or groups. Ultimately, it 
allows the group to exert power over others through acts of exclusion (Link & Phelan, 
2001). Dimensions of stigma can include exclusion, fear, intolerance, and mistrust 
of people (Pescosolido, 2015).
Stigma is associated with anger, disgust, contempt, and other negative feelings. It 
prevents full social acceptance (Vega, 2016), and can include acts of discrimination, 
labelling, status loss, and stereotyping (Davtyan et al., 2014). One of the most common 
conditions associated with stigma is infectious disease (Williams et al., 2011); it has 
been directly associated with HIV/AIDS, TB, SARS, and other diseases (Davtyan et al., 
2014; Vega, 2016). Stigma has broad negative consequences not only on personal 
and interpersonal levels, but also on social levels, impacting quality of life (Davtyan 
et al., 2014). Because stigma has potential effects on social trust and social capital, 
it may also interfere with public health prevention efforts, which aim to reduce 
population risks (Valdiserri, 2014). As certain sub-groups perceive themselves to be 
increasingly dissimilar from the general population or from other sub-groups, they 
tend to be less supportive of population interventions, which require a perception 
of the “common good.” 
110 When Antibiotics Fail
In addition to increasing fear of infection and stigma, AMR could undermine 
interactions within network ties and/or limit the extent to which people (whether 
sick themselves or having ties to sick people) can rely on others in their own 
families, communities, and other networks. The potential impacts on the extent 
and quality of community relations and interactions, on living arrangements or 
preferences (especially for the elderly and youth in schools), and on general 
interaction and behaviour in public spaces stand to be significant.
AMR Could Affect Consumer Behaviour
If past behaviour during outbreaks can inform future reactions to increased 
AMR, consumer behaviour is expected to change, as consumers tend to decrease 
their consumption of certain services (e.g., restaurants) and in some locations 
(e.g., shopping malls) during serious infectious disease outbreaks. 
In Hong Kong (an area affected by SARS in 2003), for instance, people avoided 
activities outside their homes because of fears of SARS in the community; this 
reduced sales at restaurants and retail outlets by 10 to 50% and increased 
unemployment (Siu & Wong, 2004; Beutels et al., 2009). Canada’s accommodation 
and food services sectors were also impacted; the estimated effect of SARS was 
US$4.3 billion on these sectors (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008). The future 
impact of AMR on the food services sector is illustrated in Robert’s vignette. 
It is not known when the endemic and more gradual nature of AMR will allow 
for adaptation of consumer behaviour. For instance, current trends in online 
shopping and meal delivery could expand further to substitute for in-person 
experiences, while technological innovations in self-driving vehicles or drone 
deliveries could altogether eliminate human contact from these commercial 
interactions. 
AMR Could Lead to Changes in Travel Behaviour
It is anticipated there will be an aversion to travel in a world with large, widespread 
AMR (O’Neill, 2014; NAS, 2018). During the SARS outbreak, air travel to and 
from Hong Kong, and general tourism, were affected (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 
2008). From March to April 2003, the number of airline passengers and land 
travellers decreased by 77% and 52%, respectively, and visitors to Hong Kong 
decreased by 63% (Siu & Wong, 2004). Whether this was because of personal 
choice, the result of travel advisories (Section 5.3.3), or both, is unknown. 
Therefore, in a future with limited or no antimicrobials, global travel is likely 
to decrease as people isolate themselves or heed advisories that warn against 
travel to certain high-AMR areas. Both local and international transport and 
tourism may be impacted as a result. Similarly, travel restrictions would also 
impact business travel, which may endanger the interconnectedness of the 
Canadian economy with the rest of the world. 
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AMR Could Affect Public Trust in Government and Other Institutions
Finally, these social processes could also affect public trust in government 
and other institutions (e.g., medicine, science, public health). Should AMR 
become an increasing problem that proves, or is perceived, to be intractable 
by governmental and scientific interventions, it could affect public trust and 
undermine government credibility and public health responses, likely causing 
further health, social, and economic impacts. For example, vaccination, 
despite being a scientifically demonstrated successful public health measure, 
is increasingly “perceived as unsafe and unnecessary by a growing number of 
individuals” (Dubé et al., 2013). It has been found that perceptions about risk 
(Brewer et al., 2007), as well as ideas of trust in health professionals, public 
health institutions, and the government (Streefland et al., 1999; Hobson-West, 
2007), are strong predictors of vaccination behaviour. 
Vignette:	Robert
Robert is a 26-year-old living in Halifax. He 
originally moved to the city for university, 
and stayed after he graduated. Unable to find 
employment in his field, he is currently working 
as a barista in an independent coffee shop. 
Robert has five shifts a week. This allows him 
to pay his portion of the rent for his shared 
apartment and have money left over for an active 
social life. Additional shifts are often available, making Robert secure in knowing 
he has enough money to live on. Robert enjoys working for an independent shop 
because it has regular clientele and often has outreach activities within the broader 
community.
Two years later, there is an outbreak of a particularly resistant and highly transmissible 
pathogenic bacterium in Halifax. Both the news and social media report that it came 
off a ship transporting food goods, although the exact source is unknown. In the 
month since the outbreak started, everyday life has changed in the city. Although 
Robert does not know anyone who has been infected, business at the coffee shop 
has significantly decreased. While apologetic, the owners have had to cut staff 
hours and, for the first time, Robert is unable to pay his rent. He is stressed and 
anxious, and does not know how he can make up the difference in salary, as many 
other local businesses are also cutting staff hours. 
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5.3.3	 Policies	and	Legislation	to	Limit	the	Spread	of	AMR
Limited effective antimicrobials will lead to national and international public 
health emergencies, having profound impacts on society. In an attempt to 
curb the spread of resistance, the delivery of healthcare will change, and other 
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures will be adopted that will impact 
society. Based on evidence from previous infectious disease outbreaks, there 
are several likely types of IPC-related responses should effective antimicrobials 
become limited. The responses can be broadly categorized as healthcare delivery 
changes; surveillance; isolation and quarantine; and travel restrictions (Gostin 
et al., 2003), either on human travel or trade of foodstuffs. 
AMR Will Change Healthcare Delivery
It is simplistic to believe that social impacts would be confined to infected 
individuals if antimicrobials were to become ineffective, or resistance were to 
increase dramatically. Rather, our entire healthcare system, which is now heavily 
reliant on antimicrobials, would be disrupted (Smith & Coast, 2013). Thus, as 
stated by Smith and Coast (2013), “resistance is not just an infectious disease 
issue; it is a surgical issue, a cancer issue, a health system issue.”
Antibiotics transformed the practice of medicine from a profession of “diagnostic, 
non-interventional field, to a therapeutic, interventional profession” enabling 
“complicated and deeply invasive surgery, aggressive chemotherapy for treatment 
of cancer, fundamental elements of critical care such as central venous catheter 
placement and mechanical ventilation, supportive care for premature infants, 
and solid and liquid organ transplantation” (IDSA, 2011). Modern health 
systems and treatments that rely heavily on antimicrobials could be significantly 
destabilized if antimicrobials were to become ineffective. If society were to 
experience a true return to the pre-antibiotic era, treatments used during that 
time may be used again. For example, treatment might be reduced to reliance on 
toxic drugs (Erdem et al., 2011) or, if possible, removal of the source of infection 
(e.g., through amputation) (Friedman et al., 2016). Removing compromised 
tissue might not be possible for infections in certain areas (e.g., lungs), likely 
leading to worse outcomes for patients, including death (Harris et al., 1999). 
Further, the actual delivery of care itself may change, as increasing AMR may 
bring about conversations about the duty to care versus risk to those providing 
care (Reid, 2005; Ruderman et al., 2006). 
113
Chapter 5 The Social Impacts of Antimicrobial Resistance Today and in a Future with  
 Limited Antimicrobials
Some of the changes to healthcare delivery enacted during the SARS outbreak 
in Toronto may be put in place again in the future, including: 
•	 closures of entire hospitals; 
•	 severe restricting of hospital services (e.g., no elective surgeries); 
•	 screening of people entering hospitals; 
•	 limited access to healthcare facilities; 
•	 screening of healthcare workers going to community care centres; and, 
•	 widespread quarantine of people who had casual contact with infected 
individuals.
(Gov. of ON, 2003 in Conly & Johnston, 2003) 
Similar changes may be enacted in response to AMR, either periodically or 
put into place as a permanent IPC measures. In particular, it is likely that 
widespread AMR would lead to fewer elective surgeries, as the risk of infection 
would be too great without the use of prophylactic antimicrobials. It is unclear 
how many people would get infections if prophylactic antimicrobials were not 
available to them prior to surgery, nor is it clear how many would opt to 
not have surgery. However, it has been estimated that a reduction in efficacy 
of antibiotic prophylaxis of 30% would result in 120,000 additional infections 
and 63,000 infection-related deaths per year in the United States (Teillant et 
al., 2015). If certain elective surgeries were deemed too risky to perform (by 
patients, healthcare providers, or both) some chronic diseases may become 
untreatable, leading to decreased well-being. This would have a large impact on 
the Canadian public as a whole, where aging populations, as well as demographic 
trends such as decreased rates of physical activity, mean that rates of chronic 
diseases are expected to increase (World Economic Forum, 2013). An example 
of how healthcare delivery may change is illustrated in Renée’s vignette.
Vignette:	Renée
Renée is a 52-year-old from Winnipeg who has 
been suffering from osteoarthritis for many 
years. She was forced to retire early from her 
job as a nurse when her symptoms became 
too debilitating. Due to decreased mobility, 
Renée developed obesity and type 2 diabetes. 
Her left hip is the most severely affected joint 
and her doctor says that, in the past, a total hip 
replacement would have been the recommended 
course of action. However, the doctor is reluctant to suggest surgery as resistance 
continued on next page
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Healthcare infrastructure would also have to change in efforts to increase 
infection prevention and control measures (further discussed in Chapter 6). 
More single-occupancy hospital rooms, many with additional sterilization 
measures, would increase healthcare costs overall. The Panel believes there 
may also be a shift away from hospital care, with greater treatment occurring 
within the community. Additionally, there may also be a shortage of healthcare 
providers and other healthcare workers (e.g., cleaning staff in hospitals), as 
people may deem the field to be too risky to work in.
to first-line antimicrobials has reached 65% in Canada, several MDR strains with 
few treatment options have emerged, and local hospitals have been experiencing 
major outbreaks of two different MDR pathogens. Because of these factors, as well 
as the extra risk of infection caused by Renée’s diabetes, both she and her doctor 
feel that, although the infection risk would be low, a resistant infection after surgery 
would be untreatable, leading to very negative health outcomes. For now, Renée 
and her doctor decide to manage her pain and hope that surgery might be a less 
risky option in the future.
Three years later, Renée’s physical and mental health have deteriorated markedly. 
She now depends on a motorized scooter and has become increasingly isolated and 
withdrawn. She is receiving medication and counselling for depression and anxiety. 
Her son, who lives in Calgary, had a baby six months ago, and Renée is considering 
whether she can make the trip to meet her new granddaughter. However, she has 
been struggling with diabetic foot ulcers and recently required a prolonged hospital 
stay to treat a foot infection caused by S. aureus, which was resistant not only to 
methicillin, but also vancomycin (the drug of choice for MRSA infections). Given her 
issues with wound healing and the fact that her son lives at the epicentre of a large 
community-associated MRSA outbreak, Renée is advised by her doctors not to travel.
A year later, Renée and her doctor again discuss the possibility of a hip replacement. 
Her left hip is causing her constant pain that is increasingly difficult to control. Renée 
has made some dietary changes to address her obesity and diabetes, and is now a 
better candidate for surgery. Given her severely reduced quality of life, she feels that 
a hip replacement is worth the risk and her doctor agrees. A new hospital designed 
specifically to reduce the spread of AMR has been overwhelmed with surgical patients; 
it is currently only performing essential and emergency surgeries and placing all other 
patients on a waiting list. While Renée is waiting for surgery, she develops another 
MDR S. aureus infection on her foot that spreads to her bloodstream. It fails to respond 
to the drug combination of last resort, prompting Renée’s healthcare team to treat 
her with an experimental drug that is known to be toxic to the kidneys. Renée dies 
from a combination of drug- and sepsis-induced acute kidney injury at the age of 56. 
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Changes to Healthcare in Response to AMR May Result in Increased 
Health Inequality
The impacts of rising resistance would be unequally distributed among people 
in Canada. Some patient groups would be impacted indirectly because of the 
nature of their treatment. For example, most cancer treatment suppresses 
patients’ immune systems, and without effective antimicrobials to prevent and 
treat infections, chemotherapy and other treatments would be much riskier 
(O’Neill, 2014). Increasing resistance would also have worrying impacts on 
the safety of childbirth, including caesarean sections, with a significant rise in 
infant and maternal mortality (O’Neill, 2014). The 20th century saw a 50-fold 
reduction in maternal deaths in developed countries with the use of prophylactic 
antimicrobials (O’Neill, 2014). 
Changes to Healthcare in Response to AMR May Result in Decreased 
Trust Leading to Changes in Care-Seeking Behaviour
AMR “deeply affects care-seeking behaviors” (NAS, 2018). If resistance is 
associated with healthcare settings, people may avoid seeking care (NAS, 
2018). In the Panel’s view, they may instead turn to less effective alternative 
therapies, or live with medical issues that decrease their well-being and quality 
of life. Someone who thinks they might have an infection may also not seek 
care for fear of being isolated, quarantined, or stigmatized based on their 
perceived association with resistance. This in turn could lead to a worsening 
of the infection and a spread of the bacteria. As discussed before, public trust 
may be eroded to the point where public health institutions are no longer 
perceived as effective. 
Surveillance Will Continue to Feature Prominently as Part of a Response 
to Increased AMR 
The identification and reporting of resistant infections are likely to continue to 
be central features of the response to AMR, as they have been in past outbreaks 
(Gostin et al., 2003). However, if AMR were to become a larger public health 
crisis, surveillance may advance concerns about the limits of privacy should 
there be a need to breach doctor-patient confidentiality, or report details 
identifying specific patients (Gostin et al., 2003). 
Surveillance May Lead to Decreased Trust and Increased Inequality
Surveillance data may inadvertently impact certain geographic or ethnic 
communities, as they did in Toronto during the SARS outbreak (Gostin et 
al., 2003). When it became known that the disease originated in China, there 
was evidence of overt discrimination and racism (Cheng, 2003; Rider, 2003 
in Gostin et al., 2003; Smith, 2006). Similar responses may occur if a highly 
resistant pathogen were to spread globally from a single area. An example 
of this scenario is illustrated in Rahul’s vignette, wherein Rahul experiences 
stigmatization based on preconceived ideas that he may have a resistant infection. 
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Vignette:	Rahul
Rahul is an 18-year-old who moved from India 
to Vancouver at the age of nine. He and his 
family travel to India at least once a year to 
visit relatives, and this summer, before Rahul 
begins university, they plan a month-long trip. 
In an effort to control the global AMR crisis, 
Canada has introduced mandatory screening 
protocols for those who travel to certain areas. 
Upon their return to Canada, travellers must 
report to a designated healthcare facility where they are tested for colonization or 
infection with resistant organisms. Infections are treated promptly and patients who 
are colonized are counselled on the risks of spreading bacteria to others, particularly 
those who reside in their household. 
Rahul’s family is well aware of the screening procedures. His mother is a surgeon 
and his father is a medical laboratory technician at a major hospital. They are also 
aware of the precautions to take while travelling to reduce the risk of infection. 
Rahul is particularly careful since he lives with atopic dermatitis, a condition that 
causes periodic flares of eczema on his hands and face. Though the condition is not 
infectious, it makes him vulnerable to skin infection and colonization, particularly 
with S. aureus. When Rahul and his family arrive back in Canada, their tests come 
back negative for infection, but as is the case for almost all travellers to India, they 
have all become colonized with ESBL- and carbapenamase-producing E. coli, which 
is highly ubiquitous in the Indian subcontinent. 
Rahul moves out of the family home to attend university. Due to the stress of moving 
away from his family, his eczema worsens and he is very unhappy to be starting his 
university experience with a flare-up on his face. He is finding it difficult to form any 
connections with new people. His roommate is particularly unfriendly, and a few weeks 
after the term begins, Rahul is notified that his roommate will be moving elsewhere. 
Rahul continues to struggle socially and mentally, which affects his academic 
performance. He later discovers that, after hearing about a recent AMR crisis in 
India — which involved the outbreak of an extensively resistant strain of S. aureus 
causing death in many cases — his roommate requested to move because of Rahul’s 
ethnicity and the appearance of his skin. His roommate was aware of his visits to 
India and assumed that Rahul was suffering from an infection acquired during his 
travels. Even after the situation was explained, his roommate was still uncomfortable 
living with someone who “might spread germs around.” Rahul is devastated and 
decides not to go back to university after he finishes his first term. 
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Increased AMR Will Lead to Increased Isolation and Quarantine
If antimicrobials were to become increasingly ineffective, infected people may 
be isolated to prevent or limit transmission. This is already standard practice 
in hospitals for cases of resistant infections (PHAC, 2016b). However, a second 
group — those who are healthy but who have been exposed to a resistant 
infection — may be quarantined with the hopes of limiting transmission during 
the incubation period (Gostin et al., 2003; National Advisory Committee on 
SARS and Public Health, 2003; Smith, 2006). There is precedent for quarantine 
responses to a public health emergency in Canada, such as school and hospital 
closures in response to SARS in Toronto (National Advisory Committee on SARS 
and Public Health, 2003). At one such school, 1,500 students were quarantined 
at home after a single student exhibited symptoms of SARS (Brown, 2003); 
elsewhere, continuing medical education courses were cancelled or postponed 
(Davis et al., 2005). 
As the number of isolated people (those who are infected), and the number 
in quarantine (those who were exposed and may be infected) would likely 
increase if AMR were to rise, broader social impacts would subsequently occur. 
The fear created by AMR may make it more challenging to balance among risk 
of infection, personal liberty, and social and economic harms, as has occurred 
in other infectious disease outbreaks (Bradsher & Altman, 2003).
Isolation and Quarantine May Increase Inequality
Those quarantined are likely to also suffer from lost income, loneliness, and 
fear of developing an infection. Such outcomes were observed in Toronto by 
those quarantined during the SARS outbreak (National Advisory Committee 
on SARS and Public Health, 2003).
Isolation and Quarantine May Decrease Social Capital
The segregation of isolated and quarantined people would greatly impact their 
social connectedness and well-being. Public health measures designed to control 
the spread of resistant infections may also, unintentionally, lead to decreased 
connectedness: for example, measures designed to minimize contact between 
susceptible and infectious individuals, such as travel restrictions, quarantine, 
and isolation, will result in more segregation within the population as a whole. 
AMR’s isolating impact is illustrated in Raymond’s vignette, while his daughter 
Rochelle’s farm shows how adapting to AMR may be profitable in some sectors 
(innovations that may allow various industries to adapt to AMR are discussed 
in Chapter 6).
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Travel Restrictions May Become More Common in Response to 
Increasing AMR
The SARS outbreak demonstrated how international travel could spread disease, 
as a physician from China infected people in a hotel in Hong Kong, who then 
carried the disease to Toronto, Singapore, and Vietnam (National Advisory 
Committee on SARS and Public Health, 2003). As discussed in Section 5.1.4, 
Canadian travellers can become infected with resistant strains of bacteria 
abroad; these can be brought back to Canada and spread through healthcare 
Vignette:	Rochelle	and	Raymond
Rochelle is a 44-year-old in rural Quebec. She 
is a married mother of two who has taken 
over running the family farm from her father, 
Raymond, who is 66 years old. Rochelle recently 
followed the lead of the cattle industry and 
virtually eliminated the use of antimicrobials 
while adopting the use of alternative therapies. 
Although initially concerned this would cut 
into her bottom line, Rochelle now sees that 
the changes, once implemented, are yielding good return — consumer demand for 
meat products that are certified from antimicrobial-free farms has grown exponentially 
in recent years. 
Five years later, Rochelle’s farm continues to be successful, and the profits have 
allowed her to build an apartment onto the homestead for her aging father. While 
volunteering at the local community centre, Raymond catches pneumonia and, 
because of a combination of co-morbid conditions and a lack of response to first-line 
antimicrobials, he requires hospitalization. The closest hospital is several hours away, 
and due to commitments on the farm, family are unable to visit Raymond every day. 
Raymond becomes lethargic, suffering from depressive symptoms while becoming 
increasingly isolated within the confines of the hospital. He also contracts C. difficile 
while in hospital, which prolongs his stay as the first-line treatment does not work. 
Rochelle, anxious about her father’s recovery, hires help at the farm and travels to 
be closer to Raymond. 
After several months, Raymond is able to move back to the farm. He is weaker 
physically, and also less willing to volunteer because he is fearful he will catch 
another infection. Rochelle is spending more time caring for Raymond, and has had 
to continue to use hired help, which is decreasing the farm’s profits.
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facilities (Box 5.4). If antimicrobials were to become increasingly ineffective, 
travel to areas associated with outbreaks or specific resistant bacterial strains 
may be limited or cease, may be advised against by the WHO or national 
governments, and may be accompanied by unpleasant public health procedures 
(e.g., mandatory isolation on return). 
Travel advisories associated with health outcomes, such as those that warned 
against travel to Toronto during the SARS outbreak (National Advisory Committee 
on SARS and Public Health, 2003), have significant economic and social 
impacts (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008). Travel behaviours were significantly 
impacted by SARS (Keogh-Brown & Smith, 2008; Beutels et al., 2009), and this 
was supported by travel advisories to areas deemed to be significantly impacted 
(National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, 2003). 
Travel restrictions may also be instituted by other stakeholders. For example, 
institutions imposed their own restrictions during SARS, with universities 
cancelling summer programs for students from China (Murphy & Arenson, 
2003), and discouraging travel to China, Taiwan, and Singapore (Harvard 
University Health Services, 2003 in Gostin et al., 2003). Another potential 
national response to AMR could be detaining travellers returning from certain 
regions or who exhibit certain symptoms. This occurred in the United States 
during the SARS outbreak, where officials authorized immigration and customs 
agents to detain travellers who appeared to have SARS-associated symptoms 
(Sheldon, 2003). 
Travel Restrictions May Decrease Social Capital and Well-Being
Were AMR to trigger these types of responses, well-being and social connectedness 
would decrease. Travel allows people to conduct business, see family and 
friends, and pursue goals (Gostin et al., 2003). Indeed, travel is important to 
people living in Canada, and in 2018 Canada ranked seventh in spending on 
outbound international tourism, spending US$31.8 billion (UNWTO, 2018). 
While international law allows people to travel within one’s country and 
abroad, this can be restricted on public health grounds (UN, 1999). Further, 
travel may be restricted in Canada, such that travel to certain regions may be 
discouraged. This would further decrease social connectedness within the 
nation, and decrease individual well-being. 
Determining what public health measures are appropriate may also be 
problematic, as “there is no international consensus on travel screening and 
border controls” (Naylor et al., 2004). This could lead to confusion, as there 
may be different rules and procedures in different cases. Further, in some cases, 
the fear associated with a certain resistant strain or infection could lead to the 
implementation of protection measures that are ineffective or unnecessary. 
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For example, a large Canadian pilot project in Toronto and Vancouver used 
thermal scanners to screen millions of travellers, with thousands being referred 
for further assessment; however, not a single case of SARS was identified (Naylor 
et al., 2004; St. John et al., 2009). 
5.4 CONCLUSION
The burden of disease associated with AMR is not shared uniformly among 
people in Canada. The risk of acquiring a resistant infection is higher for those 
in certain demographic groups, such as the very young and those who live in 
crowded housing; those who engage in certain sexual practices or certain sports; 
and, most significantly, those who already have contact with the healthcare 
system. Of note, the greatest risk factor for acquiring a resistant infection is 
previous antimicrobial treatment.
Yet, everyone is likely to be affected by AMR in the future, either by becoming 
infected themselves, by living a more isolated, restricted existence, or by losing 
loved ones to previously treatable infections. AMR will have broad negative 
social impacts on people in Canada, decreasing well-being, social capital, and 
trust, and increasing inequality. As demonstrated by the journeys of Robert, 
Renée, Rahul, and Rochelle and Raymond, the general health and well-being 
of people will be negatively affected if treatments were delayed or avoided 
altogether, if travel within and outside the country were considered dangerous, 
and if certain populations were discriminated against due to their ethnicity 
or health status. 
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Key	Findings
Effective approaches to addressing AMR will require evidence-based, multifaceted, and 
coordinated initiatives that use elements from four mitigation strategies — surveillance, 
infection prevention and control (IPC), stewardship, and research and innovation.
Surveillance underpins successful mitigation efforts because it can provide an up-to-date 
and accurate portrayal of the current state of resistance and use of antimicrobials, 
deliver feedback to healthcare providers, and allow for targeted use of resources. 
IPC measures that result in fewer infections include adequately resourced and 
trained IPC teams in hospitals and other healthcare settings that enforce, for example, 
hand hygiene and cleaning protocols. Widespread adoption of immunization by the 
Canadian public, along with other practices such as respiratory hygiene, proper food 
handling, and clean water, would reduce community-acquired infections.
Based on the Panel’s model, a multifaceted approach to IPC that reduced the infection 
rate by 33% would save 120,000 to 200,000 lives and $117 to $177 billion in GDP 
between 2020 and 2050, if resistance to first-line antimicrobials remains constant 
at 26% or rises to 40%, respectively. 
Antimicrobial stewardship promotes judicious use of antimicrobials, and the best 
initiatives coordinate approaches and stakeholders from both the human and animal 
health sector; however, it is unclear how long lasting their effects might be using 
measures such as changes in prescribing practices and AMR awareness.
Research and innovation are fundamental to tackling AMR, whether directly through 
the development of new therapies to treat resistant infections, or by supporting 
surveillance, IPC, and stewardship strategies.
Potential benefits may stem from research and innovation related to, for example, 
new antimicrobials, therapies, vaccines, rapid diagnostics, the microbiome, hospital 
practices, data analytics, medical technologies, nanotechnologies, and cellular agriculture. 
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In Canada, the federal, provincial, and territorial governments, along with other 
stakeholders, have programs that aim to address the problem of AMR in some 
way. These work to prevent infections, to quantify AMR, to prevent and control 
its spread, and to support research and innovation for new therapies and a 
greater understanding of how AMR evolves. Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance 
and Antimicrobial Use: A Pan-Canadian Framework for Action (hereafter Pan-
Canadian Framework) (GC, 2017), a federal government report, describes 
how various orders of government, the private sector, and the general public 
must collaborate to address AMR in Canada. Actors include officials from all 
orders of government, healthcare providers, business leaders, researchers, and 
members of the public. 
The Pan-Canadian Framework identified four core strategies to tackle AMR: 
surveillance, IPC, stewardship, and research and innovation (GC, 2017). This 
chapter reviews these four strategies in order to identify opportunities that, if 
put in place, could reduce infection and slow resistance. For an overview of 
current Canadian surveillance, stewardship, and IPC strategies, the Panel refers 
readers to task force reports on each of the four mitigation components used 
to inform the Pan-Canadian Framework (F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task Group, 
2016; AMR Research and Innovation Task Group, 2017; AMR Stewardship Task 
Group, 2017; IPC TG, 2017). The Panel takes a forward-thinking approach to 
explore how these four mitigation strategies can be used to combat AMR. The 
potential implications of various mitigation strategies are also explored based 
on different scenarios in the Panel’s model. The Panel notes that tackling 
AMR will require coordinated action across multiple fronts through various 
mitigation strategies (Figure 6.1). 
6.1 SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance strengthens the AMR evidence base, allowing assessment of the 
spread of AMR, the identification of emerging problems, and the effectiveness of 
various interventions (Queenan et al., 2016; WHO, 2017e). Without surveillance, 
the impact of local, national, and global strategies cannot be assessed. Surveillance 
of both AMR and AMU is therefore needed to inform stewardship activities 
to reduce unnecessary AMU, and interventions and policy decisions to help 
combat AMR (F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task Group, 2016). Existing provincial/
territorial and federal surveillance resources could be combined to form a 
cohesive, integrated national surveillance system (F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task 
Group, 2016). Surveillance can also inform treatment guidelines and patient 
care. For example, the WHO’s Gonococcal Antimicrobial Surveillance Program 
(GASP) uses surveillance data to inform practice, and Canadian gonococcal 
treatment guidelines are updated based on these data (WHO, 2018b).
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In Canada, PHAC has led AMR surveillance initiatives, and established the 
Canadian Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System (CARSS) in 2015 as 
the overarching coordinating program for all AMU and AMR surveillance 
systems and programs in Canada (PHAC, 2015). CARSS collects AMU and 
AMR data from:
•	 The Canadian Integrated Program for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance 
(CIPARS). CIPARS monitors AMU and AMR trends for select bacteria in 
humans, animals, and retail meat in Canada. The collected data are analyzed 
by drug and by province/territory. 
•	 The Canadian Nosocomial Infection Surveillance Program (CNISP). CNISP 
collects data from more than 50 hospitals from 10 provinces to calculate trends 
in healthcare-associated infections at healthcare facilities across Canada. 
•	 Surveillance programs for specific diseases, such as the Enhanced Surveillance 
of Antimicrobial-Resistant Gonorrhea program (ESAG) and the Canadian 
Tuberculosis Laboratory Surveillance System (CTLSS)
(GC, 2016) 
Antibiotics in 
agriculture and 
the environment
Surveillance
Human capital
Global Innovation Fund
Sanitation and hygienePublic awareness
Vaccines and alternatives
Rapid diagnostics
Drugs
International coalition 
for action
Adapted with permission from O’Neill (2016a) 
Figure 6.1 
Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance Requires Coordinated Global Action on Many Fronts
Strategies to mitigate antimicrobial resistance will require coordinated action across multiple fronts, 
involving numerous stakeholders locally, nationally, and worldwide.
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There is an opportunity to further enhance Canadian AMU and AMR surveillance 
using existing strengths. For example, CIPARS notably takes a One Health 
approach to surveillance through a system that “meets stakeholder needs while 
providing a holistic understanding of AMR in Canada” (Deckert et al., 2015). 
The provincial/territorial systems work with federal systems, for instance, 
by providing up-to-date AMU and AMR data to CARSS and CIPARS (PHAC, 
2014b). Not all provinces and territories participate equally, and there are 
regional disparities in the reporting of data. Further, some areas of Canada 
lack any surveillance. Weaknesses in current Canadian surveillance include: 
•	 limited AMR data focused on priority pathogens, especially data from animals 
(both domestic and wild); 
•	 a lack of AMU data, especially in rural, northern, and First Nations communities, 
in both healthcare and community settings, and for veterinary prescriptions; 
and, 
•	 a lack of national AMR data from animals (with the exception of data collected 
by CIPARS) and the environment.
 (Canadian Committee on Antibiotic Resistance, 2009; Grant et al., 2014; 
F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task Group, 2016) 
6.1.1	 One	Health	Approach	to	AMR	Surveillance
A One Health approach to surveillance includes AMU and AMR data from 
humans, animals, and the environment. This would help combat AMR because 
it necessitates a broad, systems-based approach to a complex problem (Zinsstag 
et al., 2011). Queenan et al. (2016) propose a framework for a One Health AMR 
surveillance system with the key facet being the integration of AMU and 
AMR surveillance data for humans, animals, food, and the environment. 
To enable integrated analysis, data from various sectors would need to be 
collected in similar ways, facilitated by a centralized program led by experts with 
inter-sectoral knowledge (Queenan et al., 2016). Centralized leadership and 
funding would be required in order to build a functional One Health surveillance 
system in Canada. Impediments to achieving this type of centralized, integrated 
surveillance include traditionally siloed institutions, variation in definitions and 
data collected, cost, and complexity, and jurisdictional challenges. Increased 
cooperation and integration would facilitate the analysis and interpretation of 
results and the evolution of joint recommendations should these be required 
(Queenan et al., 2016). 
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6.1.2	 International	AMU	and	AMR	Surveillance
International surveillance programs have addressed some of the gaps and 
impediments identified by previous reports. Globally, the WHO is taking a 
leadership role in standardizing AMR surveillance through various programs, 
such as the Global Antimicrobial Surveillance System (GLASS) and the WHO 
Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR) 
(F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task Group, 2016). GLASS fosters a standardized 
global AMR surveillance system, and AGISAR supports the WHO’s effort to 
minimize the public health impact of AMR associated with AMU in food animals 
(F/P/T AMR Surveillance Task Group, 2016).
A 2014 program evaluation of AMR surveillance initiatives compared major 
Canadian AMR surveillance programs to select programs from other countries 
(Grant et al., 2014). Programs were evaluated based on criteria such as data 
quality, sensitivity in detecting trends, organism samples, stability and timeliness 
of reporting, and availability of data. The evaluation found that all national 
Canadian AMU and AMR surveillance programs were limited in scope in one 
of two ways: by the patient population from which the resistance organism is 
collected, or by the pathogens under surveillance. The majority of surveillance in 
Canada involves a limited number of hospital patients and specific antimicrobial-
resistant organisms under public health surveillance, or focuses on Salmonella 
surveillance in food animal production (Grant et al., 2014). Previous evaluations 
had similar findings (Canadian Committee on Antibiotic Resistance, 2009).
This evaluation also found that highly ranked international public 
health surveillance programs feature integrated oversight of national and 
regional surveillance, across veterinary, food animal, and human medicine (Grant 
et al., 2014) — these are crucial for a One Health approach to surveillance. 
Specifically, the Danish DANMAP program, the Dutch NethMap program, 
and the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-Net) 
stood out as exemplary programs (Grant et al., 2014; Queenan et al., 2016). 
DANMAP and NethMap had the strongest community AMR surveillance, whereas 
EARS-Net surveyed fewer pathogens but was notable for its coordination across 
multiple jurisdictions, and its provision of current, accessible, and useful data 
(Grant et al., 2014). Components of these programs could be used to improve 
Canadian surveillance: DANMAP and NethMap provide examples of how to 
survey across the entire food chain, while EARS-Net models how to incorporate 
data in different forms from several member states. The Panel also identified 
two programs in the United States with components that might inform future 
Canadian surveillance initiatives: the Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and 
Research (AMRoR) program (Lesho et al., 2014) and the Active Bacterial Core 
Surveillance System (ABCs) (CDC, 2018).
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With respect to AMU surveillance in the veterinary sector, DANMAP and NethMap 
use benchmarking systems that could be emulated (Mills et al., 2018), as these 
have been highly effective in reducing food animal AMU in these countries 
(Speksnijder et al., 2015). Benchmarking — that is, evaluating AMU by a given 
industry, company, veterinarian, etc., using a common set of guidelines — need 
not be punitive, but instead can be informative and provide a standardized 
means of measurement for a given sector. In the future, one possible surveillance 
strategy could be having regulators monitor and evaluate AMU by veterinarians 
and farms against agreed-upon benchmarks (Prescott, 2017). In Canada, the 
Food Safety Recognition Program (FSRP) provides government recognition 
to on-farm and post-farm food safety systems developed and implemented by 
national industry organizations (CFIA, 2018). If this type of program were to 
include AMU benchmarking as part of its recognition criteria, it may be feasible 
and fairly inexpensive to implement. 
6.2 INFECTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL
IPC is relevant for all types of infections, and plays an important role in limiting 
the acquisition and transmission of AMR organisms (Kiernan, 2017; Price 
et al., 2017). IPC programs were introduced in healthcare facilities in the 
1950s as a response to Staphylococcus aureus outbreaks that were associated 
with substantial mortality (Scheckler et al., 1998; Forder, 2007). Progressing 
over decades, they have become comprehensive, evidence-based programs, 
integral to the delivery of safe healthcare (Scheckler et al., 1998; Price et al., 
2017). In healthcare settings, IPC practices include appropriate hand hygiene, 
environmental cleaning, facility construction, occupational health, and best 
practices for management of invasive procedures and devices. These are now 
considered routine practices (PHAC, 2016b). For suspected or confirmed 
infections caused by selected pathogens that bring an increased risk of severe 
infection, additional precautions are required. These may include gowning 
and gloving for patient contact, engineering controls requiring specific air 
handling characteristics for airborne pathogens, and the use of enhanced 
employee barrier protection (PHAC, 2016b). 
IPC programs have been expanded to include long-term care facilities, out-
patient healthcare facilities, and home healthcare. Community measures, such 
as immunization, community hygiene, and appropriate follow-up of those 
who have come into contact with infectious pathogens, are also important 
IPC measures. For example, flu vaccinations can prevent the unnecessary 
use of antimicrobials in the treatment of viral infections. In some cases, IPC 
recommendations for specific organisms, such as community MRSA, have also 
been developed (Henderson & Nimmo, 2017). 
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Animal health and welfare depend on the effectiveness, availability, and 
appropriate use of antimicrobials (OIE, 2016), but IPC is also integral. Routine 
IPC practices discussed above, including handwashing and waste management, 
are also used. In the agricultural sector more broadly, IPC practices are important 
for biosecurity (Higgins et al., 2016), food safety, and maintaining exports of 
food animals (Ministry of Environment and Food of Denmark, n.d.). The World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has encouraged the implementation 
of international standards related to AMU in animals, the production of food 
products, and the circulation of these products worldwide (OIE, 2016). The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) also recognizes 
the importance of prevention; it is working on promoting improved hygiene 
and biosafety, with global and local campaigns “to prevent disease outbreaks 
through flock and herd health schemes,” including improved nutrition and 
vaccination (FAO, 2018).
IPC activities limit the emergence and dissemination of AMR organisms in 
several ways: 
•	 By decreasing the overall burden of infection in healthcare, the community, 
and animal husbandry, thereby limiting the overall need for antimicrobials 
(Swaminathan et al., 2017; FAO, 2018).
•	 By preventing transmission of resistant organisms from colonized or infected 
individuals or animals to other individuals in healthcare facilities or the 
community (Swaminathan et al., 2017; FAO, 2018).
•	 By controlling outbreaks attributed to antimicrobial resistant organisms in 
healthcare facilities. This may include additional precautions implemented for 
management of selected resistant organisms such as MRSA or carbapenemase-
producing organisms (Price et al., 2017).
6.2.1	 One	Health	Approach	to	IPC
From a One Health perspective, human, animal, and plant sectors all have a 
shared responsibility and role in preventing and minimizing AMR selection 
pressures through both human and non-human AMU. One of the ways to decrease 
AMU in every sector is through preventing and controlling infections. As noted 
above, not only are IPC measures important in human health settings, but the 
WHO, OIE, and FAO have stated that “through stringent implementation of good 
agricultural practices, including good animal husbandry and good veterinary 
practices, it is possible to reduce the necessity for antimicrobials” (FAO et al., 
2004). Biosecurity measures that help prevent and control infections are likely 
part of the “good practices” in both animal husbandry and veterinary methods 
that reduce AMU. The WHO has principles for the containment of AMR in 
animals intended for food, supported by the FAO and OIE (FAO et al., 2004). 
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6.2.2	 Pan-Canadian	Framework	and	the	IPC	Task	Group	for	AMR
PHAC’s Infection Prevention and Control Task Group developed a report to 
inform the Pan-Canadian Framework (IPC TG, 2017). It identified issues that 
may compromise the optimal practice of IPC in Canada, and potentially limit 
the effectiveness of these programs in addressing AMR. Specific gaps include:
•	 Variability in the accessibility, competence, and practice of IPC programs.
 – Some rural and remote communities, where access to clean water and 
sanitation is limited, have particular challenges in implementing IPC 
strategies.
 – Some IPC guidelines are not adapted into practice for non-traditional 
settings, such as long-term care facilities or out-patient clinics.
•	 Limitations in consistency and timelines of data collected, so evidence is not 
optimally used to promote action.
•	 Inconsistent application of core IPC practices across jurisdictions and facilities 
(e.g., hand hygiene, additional precautions).
•	 Inadequate monitoring of compliance with IPC standards and practices.
•	 Limitations of IPC resources in some settings.
•	 Healthcare workers receiving inadequate or inconsistent IPC training, which 
compromises their ability to provide optimal practice.
•	 A failure of coordination and cooperation among relevant IPC stakeholders.
•	 A lack of research identifying the most effective IPC strategies in community 
settings.
(IPC TG, 2017)
In Canadian food animals, biosecurity measures have been put forward for 
various types of livestock, but there is a lack of practical tools (e.g., templates, 
checklists) and insufficient sharing of best practices among veterinarians and 
farmers (IPC TG, 2017). There are also few economic drivers to facilitate the 
implementation of on-farm food safety certification systems. One such possible 
driver would be requiring IPC programs to be put in place as a pre-requisite 
for access to antimicrobials through a farm’s veterinarian. Existing production 
and marketing systems, such as auction markets, community pastures, and 
assembly yards, may allow pathogens to spread among many animals from various 
sources, thereby imposing a risk for the spread of infection (IPC TG, 2017). As 
AMU decreases in animal agriculture, there are major opportunities for IPC 
improvements (i.e., biosecurity) through, for example, increased vaccination 
and better hygiene standards.
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Moving forward, a One Health approach requires that human, animal, and 
plant sectors all have a shared role in efforts to prevent and control infections, 
thereby reducing the need for AMU. There may be challenges in coordinating 
actions and sharing knowledge among different sectors. Additionally, without 
clear economic incentives in all sectors, IPC practices may not be implemented 
in the same way, or at all, across Canada.
6.2.3	 Reducing	the	Impact	of	AMR	with	Better	IPC	in	Hospitals	and	
Communities
Hospitals 
It has been estimated that approximately 1 in 10 adults contract an infection 
while in hospital (Gravel et al., 2007a; Gravel et al., 2007b). Although surveillance 
data on the exact number of resistant infections in all hospitals do not exist, 
the Panel estimates that 80,000 resistant infections were acquired in hospitals 
in 2018, costing the Canadian healthcare system around $1.4 billion. As 
noted in Section 5.1.2, patients with weakened immune systems or chronic 
disease are particularly susceptible to resistant infections; however, as the rate 
of resistance rises, it is likely that resistant infections will be an increasingly 
common occurrence among all patients admitted to hospitals. AMR will 
disproportionately affect women giving birth as well as children, older adults, 
and others who are frequently admitted to hospitals (Figure 6.2). 
One of the top patient safety priorities in Canadian healthcare has been 
reducing the rate of healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) (CIHI, 2008). In 
2018, the public sector spent about $72 billion on hospitals, the largest share of 
healthcare spending (CIHI, 2018b). As shown in Chapter 3, resistant HAIs result 
in extra costs for hospitals compared to other HAIs. If resistance to first-line 
antimicrobials continues to increase, these costs may jeopardize the financial 
sustainability of hospitals; reducing HAIs will therefore become a growing 
priority. A variety of IPC policies and practices can help provide better care to 
patients and reduce the number of infections, as well as decrease costs (OECD, 
2018a). Following the WHO core components of IPC (Figure 6.3), the Panel 
briefly discusses hospital IPC programs, guidelines, and training; surveillance 
and monitoring; and patient care activities and bed occupancy (WHO, 2018a).
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Figure 6.2 
Top Five Reasons for In-Patient Hospitalizations and Surgeries, 2017
This figure shows the top five reasons for in-patient surgeries (top) and hospitalizations (bottom) 
in Canada in 2017. It also plots the average length of stay (LOS) associated with surgeries (top) and 
hospitalizations (bottom).
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Hospital IPC Programs, Guidelines, and Training
IPC plays a key role in patient safety, reducing risks and significantly decreasing 
rates of infection, potentially by more than 30% (PHAC, 2010). As the WHO 
(2018a) points out, the “development and maintenance of an IPC programme 
is the foundation for the implementation of all other core components” since 
it “ensures that facility leadership and the right technical expertise [are] in 
place.” This requires evidence-based guidelines about reducing infections 
and AMR,19 dedicated and trained IPC teams, clearly defined objectives based 
on local epidemiology and risk assessments, and measurable indicators and 
targets (WHO, 2018a). 
19 The WHO (2018) lists the following standard precautions: hand hygiene; transmission-based 
precautions; prevention of surgical site infection; prevention of vascular catheter-associated 
BSI; prevention of hospital-acquired pneumonia; prevention of catheter-associated urinary tract 
infections; prevention of transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDRO); disinfection 
and sterilization; healthcare worker protection and safety; injection safety; waste management; 
antibiotic stewardship; and outbreak preparedness and management.
MULTIMODAL STRATEGIES
IPC PROGRAMS
and all Relevant Program Linkages
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT
Built Environment, 
Materials, and Equipment
Workload, Staffing, 
and Bed Occupancy
GUIDELINES
EDUCATION 
AND TRAINING SURVEILLANCE
MONITORING, 
AUDIT, AND 
FEEDBACK
Adapted with permission from WHO (2018a) 
Figure 6.3 
WHO Core Components of Hospital Infection Prevention and Control
This figure shows the relationship among the eight components of the WHO’s Infection Prevention 
and Control (IPC) model.
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The Canadian Institute for Health Information (2008) notes than “[a]n infection 
control practitioner (ICP) and a physician trained in infection control are key 
requirements for a hospital’s infection control program.” ICPs are healthcare 
providers with IPC expertise and training who work with entire organizations to 
prevent infection. They do this by educating staff, planning and implementing 
infection control practices, and evaluating existing healthcare practice (CIHI, 
2008). Many Canadian healthcare institutions have IPC programs, but previous 
expert groups have found that these practices need to be fully resourced (Buick 
et al., 2015; IPC TG, 2017). The need for adequate resources to implement 
effective IPC programs has been identified within hospitals (Zoutman et al., 
2003; Zoutman & Ford, 2008) and other healthcare institutions, such as long-
term care facilities (Zoutman et al., 2008). The Panel supports these findings, 
and believes that IPC programs need to be enhanced and adequately resourced 
in order to be fully effective.
Surveillance and Monitoring 
The WHO (2018a) notes that hospital surveillance “should be performed to 
identify the most frequent HAIs and detect HAI outbreaks, including AMR 
surveillance.” Monitoring and reporting on HAIs, in coordination with prevention 
activities, can decrease their rate (CIHI, 2008). Surveillance within hospitals 
varies such that it can be institutional-wide, targeted to specific departments 
(such as intensive care), or to specific priority infections. In a 2008 survey of 
Ontario hospitals, “hospital-wide surveillance was reported as the most commonly 
used approach to routinely track and monitor nosocomial infections (74%), 
whereas one-quarter (26%) of hospitals reported that targeted surveillance was 
their most commonly used method” (CIHI, 2008). Strategies depended on the 
type of hospital: “most small (84%) and community hospitals (78%) reported 
hospital-wide surveillance as their most common surveillance method, while 
teaching hospitals reported an even split between hospital-wide (47%) and 
targeted surveillance (53%)” (CIHI, 2008).
The low rate of MRSA infections in Dutch hospitals (approximately 1%) is 
attributed to their search and destroy strategy (CUPE, 2009; Souverein et al., 
2016). The search and destroy approach, as outlined by CUPE (2009), includes 
“screening, isolation cohorting, decolonization of MRSA infected patients, 
education of healthcare workers, and daily disinfection of rooms and the 
healthcare environment;” this approach is further detailed by Vos (2007). The 
labour-intensive nature of search and destroy makes it costly (CUPE, 2009); 
however, analysis by Souverein et al. (2016) demonstrates that this approach 
is less expensive than the treatment costs associated with MRSA infections. 
It is not clear whether such an approach could be used in a Canadian context. 
Monitoring of changes in AMR within hospital settings after an IPC policy is 
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enacted allows for impact monitoring that can help to ensure that IPC policies 
lead to lower infection rates while improving transparency and accountability 
(CUPE, 2009). 
Patient Care Activities and Bed Occupancy
According to the WHO (2018a), patient care activities “should be undertaken 
in a clean and/or hygienic environment that facilitates practices related to the 
prevention and control of HAI, as well as AMR.” Indeed, for more than 150 years, 
proper handwashing has been acknowledged as a critical step in preventing 
the spread of infection (CIHI, 2008; Pittet et al., 2009; WHO, 2009). While 
new concerns related to IPC have emerged, proper handwashing — which 
includes using antiseptic hand wash, hand rub, or surgical hand antisepsis — “is 
considered the single most important practice for preventing the transmission 
of hospital-acquired infections” (CIHI, 2008). Rates of HAIs have been shown, in 
some cases, to fall between approximately 15 to 50% when hospital staff adhere 
to handwashing and other infection control programs (Luangasanatip et al., 
2015). Australia launched its National Hand Hygiene Initiative, and there is 
evidence that improved hand hygiene compliance is associated with declines in 
the incidence of S. aureus bacteremia in that country’s major hospitals (Grayson 
et al., 2018). The OECD (2018a) recently ranked hand hygiene as the best and 
most cost-effective approach to reduce infections: a 70% compliance rate in 
healthcare facilities was estimated to cost between US$0.90 and US$2.50 per 
capita, and resulted in fewer HAIs.
Given that guidelines and practices for hand hygiene are already in place (PHAC, 
2012; IPAC, 2017), the potential to reduce HAIs through improved practices 
may be somewhat limited in Canadian hospitals. In Ontario, where hospitals 
are required to publicly report how often staff wash their hands, the average 
compliance rate is approximately 88%, although there is a large variation 
among hospitals (32 to 100%) (Health Quality Ontario, 2019). Similarly, 
Bernard et al. (2018) found that handwashing compliance ranged from 53 
to 77% in two Quebec healthcare centres. The Provincial Infectious Diseases 
Advisory Committee on Infection Prevention and Control recommends that a 
“multifaceted, multidisciplinary hand hygiene program must be implemented in 
all healthcare settings” (PIDAC, 2014) This means that effective hand hygiene 
requires a collaborative approach that involves everyone — physicians, nurses, 
attendants, housekeeping, visitors, and even patients — and is supported by 
administrative leadership and incentives. Handwashing compliance may be 
improved by health education, on-the-job training, employee monitoring, and 
behavioural nudges (Blackwell et al., 2018).
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IPC experts also put in place proper cleaning protocols in hospital healthcare 
settings (IPC TG, 2017). Without thorough cleaning, some procedures may 
spread bacteria. Without adequate disinfection, some detergent-based cleaning 
procedures could increase contamination in the environment (PHAC, 2010; 
Han, 2015). For example, Ontario’s Provincial Infectious Diseases Advisory 
Committee (PIDAC) recommends that, if a patient has or is suspected of 
having Clostroides difficile, hospitals should clean “[a]ll horizontal surfaces in 
the patient’s room and all items within reach of patients twice daily with a 
hospital-grade disinfectant. Particular attention should be paid to the cleaning 
of patient-specific items and ‘high touch’ surfaces including bed side-rails, 
telephone, call bells, light switches, door handles, faucets, commodes, and 
toilets” (PIDAC, 2004). As with handwashing, clear cleaning guidelines and 
practices are already in place in Canadian healthcare settings (e.g., PIDAC, 
2004; CHICA, 2012). Cleaning compliance can be improved, however, by on-
the-job training and employee monitoring in addition to adopting evidence-
based cleaning protocols (IPC TG, 2017).
Nurses in both hospitals and long-term care facilities play a central role in 
patient care activities, assessing and diagnosing infections, administering 
antimicrobials, and monitoring outcomes (CNA, 2017). There is a strong 
link between infection rates and numbers of registered nursing staff. Using 
administrative data from 799 U.S. hospitals in 11 states and employing several 
regression models, Needleman et al. (2002) found that UTIs and pneumonia 
rates were 9% and 6% lower, respectively, in hospitals with a higher proportion 
of registered nurses. Numerous other studies have shown that understaffing, 
overstaffing, and other imbalances between nursing skills and patient needs 
are correlated with increasing infection rates (Shang et al., 2015). PHAC (2010) 
recommends that hospitals should “ensure that there is adequate nurse staffing 
with the appropriate skills to apply infection prevention and control measures 
when providing patient care.” Since 2008, however, the growth in the supply 
of nurses has slowed to less than 1% per year while spending on healthcare 
has increased approximately 4% per year (CBOC, 2017; CIHI, 2018b). This 
decrease in the supply of nurses, coupled with increasing rates of resistance, 
may be problematic in future Canadian healthcare settings.
High patient turnover and high bed occupancy rates are contributors to 
breakdowns in IPC practices (CUPE, 2009). For example, “overcrowding and 
rapid turnover between patients seriously hamper infection control procedures 
and are a major factor in infection outbreaks” (CUPE, 2009). As explained 
by CUPE (2009), “[c]urrent policies promoting higher patient turnover have 
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resulted in many hospitals working at near or full capacity,” as demonstrated 
in a study by Clemens et al. (2008). This is a particular problem in Canadian 
hospital emergency departments (Drummond, 2002; Affleck et al., 2013), and is 
associated with adverse patient outcomes and inferior levels of service (Affleck et 
al., 2013). The most significant factor contributing to overcrowding in emergency 
departments is a lack of in-patient beds in other hospital departments (Affleck 
et al., 2013). In acute care hospital settings across Canada, overcapacity is 
increasingly the norm. A survey of 235 IPC professionals working in acute care 
hospital settings showed that a quarter of sites (26%) had to continuously (i.e., 
every one to seven days) use overcapacity/full capacity protocols (Ocampo et 
al., 2017). Canada has fewer acute care beds per capita than the OECD average 
and the third highest occupancy rate, at 92% (the OECD average in 2005 was 
75%) (CUPE, 2009; OECD, 2017). By contrast, the Netherlands had the lowest 
bed-occupancy rate at 64% in 2005, as well as a low rate of hospital-acquired 
MRSA (CUPE, 2009). Decreases in the number of hospital beds continue to 
contribute to overcrowding — nationwide, hospital beds decreased from 3 per 
1,000 populations in 2006 to 2.5 in 2017 in Canadian hospitals (OECD, 2018b).
Communities
Although the majority (70%) of infections are community-acquired, as the IPC 
Task Group’s report points out, there is limited evidence on which community-
based IPC interventions are most effective (IPC TG, 2017). The IPC Task Group 
nonetheless highlights five areas: 
•	 immunization against vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g., Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, Bordetella pertussis);
•	 effective hand and respiratory hygiene in daycares and schools; 
•	 safe food handling practices and proper environmental cleaning in all 
community and institutional settings;
•	 clean water, sanitation, and adequate housing in rural and remote communities; 
and
•	 staying home from work and avoiding community settings (e.g., public 
transportation, sporting/music venues) when ill.
The Panel stresses that the widespread adoption of immunization by the Canadian 
public may be a particularly effective community IPC intervention. Vaccines can 
reduce the number of bacterial infections that require antimicrobial treatment, 
but they can also help prevent viral infections such as the flu for which antibiotics 
are incorrectly prescribed (Lipsitch & Siber, 2016; O’Neill, 2016b). As such, 
immunization can reduce infections, AMU, and potentially AMR.
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Simulating an Improvement in IPC
As summarized above, effective IPC is multifaceted, requiring the adoption of best 
practices and adherence to guidelines in both hospital and community settings. 
Reducing the rate of infections requires buy-in from hospital management, 
doctors, nurses, pharmacists, hospital staff, and the general public. The Panel 
used its model (Section 4.1) to simulate the effect of a multifaceted approach 
to IPC, which reduced the spread of infection by 33%. According to those 
simulations, such an IPC program would save 120,000 to 200,000 lives and 
$117 to $177 billion in GDP between 2020 and 2050, if resistance remains 
constant or gradually reaches 40%, respectively (Figure 6.4). The low cost of 
some IPC interventions, such as hand hygiene and safe food handling, makes 
them particularly attractive from a policy perspective.
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Figure 6.4 
The Effect of an IPC Program on Mortality and GDP in Canada
This figure plots the cumulative number of lives saved by the introduction of a nationwide, coordinated 
infection prevention and control (IPC) effort. By 2050, based on simulations from the Panel’s model, 
the IPC program saves between 120,000 if resistance remains at 26% in 2050 (navy blue bar) and 
200,000 (teal bar) lives, if resistance reaches 40% by 2050. By saving these lives (as well as the associated 
morbidity), an IPC program would contribute between $117 billion and $177 billion to Canadian 
GDP between 2020 and 2050, if resistance remains constant at 26% (status quo – navy blue line) or 
grows to 40% (teal line).
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6.3 STEWARDSHIP
Antimicrobial stewardship (AMS) is “a system-wide approach that includes 
coordinated interventions designed to promote, improve, monitor, and evaluate 
the judicious use of antimicrobials to preserve their future effectiveness and 
promote and protect human and animal health” (AMR Stewardship Task Group, 
2017). AMS stakeholders are everyone who prescribes, dispenses, uses, sells, or 
influences AMU for human or animal health (AMR Stewardship Task Group, 
2017). While AMS measures have had success in promoting AMR awareness, a 
key to further advancement will be transitioning from awareness to engagement. 
The gap between raising knowledge and awareness about AMR, and changing 
public and prescriber behaviour around the use of antimicrobials, remains 
a challenge. In order for AMS initiatives to be successful in the long term, 
engagement from all stakeholders — ranging from healthcare providers and 
veterinarians to all who consume antimicrobials — will be necessary and the 
effort will have to be sustained.
6.3.1	 One	Health	Approach	to	AMS
Effective AMS must include both human health and animal/agricultural 
sectors; the Panel believes a One Health approach is warranted. Importantly, 
this approach emphasizes that human and animal sectors need to be aligned 
and work towards the same outcomes, though it does not mean equality of 
actions. This type of approach was also endorsed by the AMR Stewardship 
Task Group’s report, which informed the Pan-Canadian Framework (AMR 
Stewardship Task Group, 2017). One example of a principle that looks at 
AMS from a One Health perspective is the Good Stewardship Practice (GSP), 
which takes “a continuous improvement and dynamic approach to addressing 
resistance and sustaining the future of antimicrobial therapy” (Weese et al., 
2013) and allows for multiple interventions with cumulative impact (Prescott, 
2014). While practitioners, whether it be doctors or veterinarians, are at the 
front line of stewardship, a GSP approach also involves many other elements 
and actors, and requires ways of measuring outcomes of various AMS initiatives 
(Weese et al., 2013). 
The Global Framework for Development & Stewardship to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance 
also takes a One Health approach, stating that AMS includes practices that 
promote appropriate AMU in human, animal, and plant health across different 
societal levels (i.e., from the individual to the hospital/community level to the 
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national level) (WHO et al., 2017). The Framework notes that AMS programs 
depend on the capacity and context of national regulatory authorities, and 
suggests programs could, for example, include:
•	 regulation of labelling, pricing, and distribution of new antimicrobials 
(global level);
•	 regulation, legislation, and national treatment guidelines (national level);
•	 optimizing AMU for patients (hospital level)20; and
•	 promoting access and appropriate AMU in primary healthcare settings and 
in animal health by raising awareness and targeted interventions for the 
public and prescribers (community level).
(WHO et al., 2017)
6.3.2	 Canadian	AMS	Responsibilities
In Canada, human health AMS is generally concentrated on prescriber education, 
health promotion directed at consumers of antimicrobials, and hospital-based 
oversight programs, while AMS in the animal health sector has centred on 
promoting regulatory changes and is expanding to include AMS campaigns within 
industry groups (AMR Stewardship Task Group, 2017). To date there have been 
no joint initiatives across sectors. Various stakeholders have responsibilities to 
promote AMS, and many stakeholders have introduced one or more initiatives 
(AMR Stewardship Task Group, 2017). From the human health perspective, 
AMU as measured through prescriptions dispensed remains stable in Canada; 
an opportunity for increased judiciousness may therefore be present in this 
area (PHAC, 2017a).
Accreditation Canada is a key component of stewardship in healthcare facilities 
in Canada (HealthCareCAN & NCCID, 2016). It provides AMS requirements 
for organizations delivering in-patient rehabilitation, in-patient cancer care, in-
patient acute care, and continuing care, and it offers incentives for investment 
in AMS (HealthCareCAN & NCCID, 2016). 
Successful AMS extends far beyond the hospital and other healthcare facilities 
to include community-based measures and veterinary practice. Within the 
community, AMS will primarily be undertaken by independent clinicians, 
including physicians, dentists, and nurses (HealthCareCAN & NCCID, 2016). In 
these settings, AMU is guided by consumer demand and prescriber tendencies 
(HealthCareCAN & NCCID, 2016), and is therefore a primary focus of AMS 
measures. Some provinces assist their community prescribers by operating 
sustained programs of prescriber and public education (Carson & Patrick, 
20 The Panel notes that AMS programs included at the hospital level could also apply to long-term 
care facilities.
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2015). Such programs provide up-to-date, readily accessible guidelines on the 
appropriate treatment of infections and include targeted efforts to decrease 
the public’s demand for antimicrobial therapy (Carson & Patrick, 2015).
Veterinary practice in Canada also has important stewardship components. 
Veterinary oversight can provide guidance and direction for appropriate AMU 
in animals (CVMA, n.d.). For example, the College of Veterinarians of Ontario 
includes guidelines for veterinary stewardship of antimicrobials (CVO, 2017). 
As discussed in Section 2.2, an increase in veterinary oversight was instituted by 
Health Canada over the use of medically important antimicrobials (GC, 2018). 
Important stakeholders who continue to work with Health Canada include the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Canadian Veterinary Medical Association, 
Animal Nutrition Association of Canada, Canadian Animal Health Institute, 
and national produce associations (e.g., Canadian Cattlemen’s Association, 
Canadian Pork Council, Chicken Farmers of Canada, Dairy Farmers of Canada, 
and Equestrian Canada) (GC, 2018). 
6.3.3	 International	Examples	of	Successful	AMS
A recent review of interventions to improve prescribing practices in hospital 
settings (n=221 studies) found strong evidence that interventions are effective and 
can lead to patients receiving appropriate treatments according to prescribing 
policies; it also found moderate evidence that interventions reduced hospital 
length of stay without increasing patient mortality, and that both restrictive 
and enabling techniques could be effective interventions (Davey et al., 2017).
Several systematic reviews have tried to identify the characteristics of successful 
AMS initiatives in out-patient settings. A 2005 review examined the effectiveness 
of professional interventions (e.g., printed education materials for doctors, 
educational outreach visits, healthcare and financial system changes, patient-
based interventions) in reducing the unnecessary prescription of antimicrobials 
for viral infections in out-patient settings (Arnold & Straus, 2005). Based on 
39 studies, the authors found that intervention effectiveness in prescribing was 
largely dependent on particular prescribing behaviours and the barriers to 
change in a particular community: “[m]ulti-faceted interventions combining 
physician, patient, and public education in a variety of venues and formats 
were most successful in [decreasing antimicrobial] prescribing for [viral 
infections]” (Arnold & Straus, 2005). Another systematic review examined 
various quality improvement strategies that were implemented to decrease 
prescribing for out-patient illnesses for which antimicrobials are inappropriate 
(Ranji et al., 2008). Among the 30 trials included in the quantitative analysis 
of prescribing practices, the median reduction in the proportion of patients 
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receiving antimicrobials was 9.7%. No single strategy was superior to others, 
but active clinician education strategies trended towards greater effectiveness 
than passive strategies (Ranji et al., 2008).
Targeting patients as well as clinicians in stewardship initiatives is important, as 
patient expectations and demands for antimicrobials are often put forward as 
key reasons why clinicians inappropriately prescribe antimicrobials (Hamm et al., 
1996; Coenen et al., 2006). Interventions have been used to target unnecessary 
use of antimicrobials by the public. A systematic review of both qualitative and 
quantitative studies (n=54) that examined the public’s beliefs and knowledge 
about AMU and AMR found that the public has an incomplete understanding 
and misconceptions about the causes of AMR, and do not believe the use of 
antimicrobials would contribute to the development of AMR (McCullough 
et al., 2016). Therefore, raising public awareness and understanding before 
people become patients could play a role in combatting AMR.
A recent systematic review sought to examine a broad range of interventions that 
spanned hospital and community settings, including community-led campaigns, 
randomized clinical trials, and studies from low- and middle-income countries, 
in order to determine what parts of an intervention make it successful (Cross 
et al., 2017). The authors found that communication interventions that were 
multifaceted and target both the general public and clinicians can decrease 
antimicrobial prescriptions in high-income countries, but it was unclear whether 
the reduction would last through time, based on 14 studies with an estimated 
74 to 75 million total participants (Cross et al., 2017). One might conclude 
that sustained programs will be more valuable than one-time campaigns as an 
approach at all levels. Within hospitals, a systematic review of 221 studies found 
that interventions designed to improve prescribing practices to in-patients can 
lead to increased compliance with antimicrobial hospital policy, and decreased 
length of antimicrobial treatment (Davey et al., 2017). 
Successful National AMS Initiatives in Comparator  
High-Income Countries
Huttner et al. (2010) reviewed 22 public stewardship campaigns targeted at 
improved AMU in out-patients; these were performed between 1990 and 2007 
in high-income countries at the national or regional level. Campaigns varied 
from low-cost, simple internet campaigns to more expensive, mass media 
campaigns. The evaluated campaigns indicated they had the intended effect 
of decreasing AMU (Table 6.1), with multifaceted campaigns repeated over 
several years being the most effective (Huttner et al., 2010). 
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6.3.4	 Antimicrobial	Consumption	in	Canada
As discussed in Section 2.1, an important driver in the emergence and increase 
in AMR is AMU. Therefore, the impacts of AMR can be reduced through better 
stewardship of antimicrobials. In comparison with eight peer OECD countries, 
people in Canada consumed an average amount of antimicrobials in 2015 
(defined daily dose, DDD, of 21 per 1,000 population) (CIHI, 2018c). This 
consumption is considerably greater than the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, 
and Norway (10, 12, 14, and 16 DDD per 1,000 population, respectively), though 
it should be noted that use in some provinces (e.g., British Columbia, Quebec) 
is considerably lower than the Canadian average and compares favourably with 
lower-use OECD countries (CIHI, 2018c). 
In Canada in 2016, an estimated 22.6 million prescriptions were filled, at a cost 
of almost $700 million. As shown Figure 6.5, drug prescriptions vary significantly 
across provinces and territories (PHAC, 2017a). This may reflect variation in 
climate, age, population, and income, among many other factors.
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Figure 6.5 
Variation in Prescription Rates Per Capita Among Provinces and Territories, 2017
This figure plots antimicrobial prescriptions per 1,000 inhabitants across Canadian provinces and 
territories in 2017. PHAC reported prescription data from PE & NL together for 2017.
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Prescribing Practices
Many studies have demonstrated a relationship between inappropriate AMU and 
the development of AMR. Prescribing practices govern inappropriate AMU, 
which can refer to prescribing the wrong antimicrobials for a given affliction, 
prescribing antimicrobials when none are necessary, or prescribing the wrong 
amount of antimicrobials. While physician prescribing practices are important 
to AMS, it is also important to recognize other practitioners who can prescribe 
antimicrobials in Canada, including dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists, and 
nurse practitioners (e.g., Gov. of ON, 1991; CVMA, n.d.).
For example, a multi-site, multi-study investigation of prescribing patterns 
among American physicians in out-patient settings revealed wide-scale overuse 
and misuse of antimicrobials (Fleming-Dutra et al., 2016). Half the prescriptions 
for acute respiratory conditions — 110 per 1,000 population — were deemed 
to be appropriate for the diagnosed condition (Fleming-Dutra et al., 2016). 
A follow-on study from the workgroup concluded that, in 2010 and 2011, 
recommended first-line antimicrobials were correctly prescribed by physicians 
only about 50% for otitis media, sinusitis, and pharyngitis, leading to around 
40 million incorrect prescriptions (Hersh et al., 2016). As Zhuo et al. (2018) 
describe, complex factors influence physician prescribing behaviour, including 
the “availability and acceptance of guidelines and other information sources; 
level of knowledge and training; perceptions about the causes, impacts and risks 
of AMR; availability of diagnostic facilities and diagnostic uncertainty; pressure 
from patients/clients; fear of clinical failure; [and] time pressures and social 
and organisational contexts.” Prescribing may be improved by behavioural 
nudges (Meeker et al., 2016).
A recent low-cost intervention used social norm feedback to general practitioners 
as a way to reduce antimicrobial prescriptions (Hallsworth et al., 2016). 
It was performed using a national randomized controlled trial targeting 
1,581 general practitioners in the United Kingdom with the highest antimicrobial 
prescribing rates in their areas. First, letters were sent to general practitioners 
(the intervention group) from the United Kingdom’s Chief Medical Officer 
stating their prescribing rates were higher than 80% of neighbouring practices. 
Those in the control group did not receive a letter. These letters also included 
resources to help physicians decrease their prescribing rates, including ways to 
offer a delayed prescription and support self-care among their patients. Over 
a six-month period, the rate of antimicrobials dispensed per 1,000 weighted 
population was approximately 127 in the intervention group and 131 in the 
control group. This translated into 73,406 fewer antimicrobial prescriptions 
(Hallsworth et al., 2016).
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Changing prescribing practices is not limited to human health: the use of 
antimicrobials in food animals now requires a veterinary prescription in 
Canada (GC, 2018). Therefore, there is an important role for provincial/
territorial veterinary regulators to promote and require stewardship programs 
and standards of practice.
6.4 RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 
Research and innovation are fundamental to the other three mitigation avenues 
(surveillance, IPC, and stewardship) discussed in Sections 6.1 to 6.3. As the AMR 
Research and Innovation Task Group (2017) notes, addressing the challenge 
of AMR requires “research that supports the epidemiology and understanding of 
the emergence and transmission of AMR and/or relates to the development 
of solutions to AMR.” Developing solutions to the problem of AMR requires 
both fundamental research as well as innovation, whereby research ideas are 
translated into new therapies, technologies, and practices that benefit their 
users. Innovation puts research into practice, whether in hospitals or on farms, 
in ways that help treat infections, reduce AMU, or better target interventions. 
The AMR Research and Innovation Task Group (2017) found that Canada’s 
research and industry sectors involved in AMR are small, but that there are 
pockets of expertise, centred in a few research and innovation hubs across 
the country. Specific areas of expertise include pre-clinical drug discovery, 
microbiology, epidemiology, AMU, herd management, and housing. Canadian 
researchers also pursue collaborative research opportunities, which have been 
identified as particularly important for combatting AMR, as it requires initiatives 
across disciplines, sectors, and international borders. For example, there is 
strong collaboration between PHAC’s National Microbiology Laboratory and 
the academic research community with respect to their facilitation of access to 
information and strains of pathogens. The Task Group concluded that Canada 
should focus on its strengths in the areas of alternatives to antimicrobials, 
adjuvants, vaccines, diagnostics, livestock management practices, and supporting 
clinical (i.e., human) and field (i.e., livestock) trials to identify the most cost-
effective practices to minimize risks from AMR (AMR Research and Innovation 
Task Group, 2017). 
This section discusses 10 areas of research and innovation that the Panel deems 
important in the struggle against AMR. The list is neither comprehensive 
nor exhaustive, but represents areas and examples that the Panel considers 
particularly promising. In Figure 6.6, these 10 areas are grouped according to 
the general timeframe in which innovations might be widely adopted, reflecting 
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the level of technological maturity and regulation in each area (e.g., vaccines 
vs. nanotechnology). Given data limitations and the inherent uncertainty 
of innovation, the Panel did not attempt to forecast future developments in 
these areas. Moreover, the Panel did not prioritize these areas of research 
and innovation, in order to emphasize the need for sufficient investment and 
effective cooperation to help diversify the response to AMR.
6.4.1	 Short-Term	Innovations
Antimicrobials
The discovery of penicillin in 1929 (Fleming, 1929) and the isolation of 
streptomycin in 1943 (Comroe, 1978) ushered in a golden era of antimicrobials 
(Brown & Wright, 2016). By exploiting the specialized metabolism of fungi 
and bacteria to uncover new antimicrobial scaffolds or by chemically modifying 
previously identified scaffolds, researchers discovered many new and highly 
effective antimicrobials (Brown & Wright, 2016). With subsequent use of these 
antimicrobials, resistance became a problem, which sparked a new model of 
drug discovery — rational drug design — that primarily created synthetic, 
broad-spectrum versions of the naturally occurring scaffolds discovered in 
the golden era (Brown & Wright, 2016). However, even with significant drug 
discovery efforts, no new classes of antibiotics have been developed for decades 
(Tyers & Wright, 2019). The “crisis of the deteriorating antibiotic pipeline 
for resistant bacteria is well known” (Rex et al., 2013), with the number of 
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Figure 6.6 
Ten Important Areas of Research and Innovation 
The Panel identified 10 promising areas of research and innovation that it deems important in the 
struggle against antimicrobial resistance. These areas are grouped by the timeframe in which 
innovations might be widely adopted.
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approved novel antimicrobials falling from 19 between 1980 and 1984, to 6 
between 2010 and 2014 (Ventola, 2015). A 2017 report by the WHO focusing 
on the antibacterial pipeline confirms that there are few novel antimicrobials 
in development, with “a lack of potential treatment options for priority resistant 
bacteria” (WHO, 2017b). 
Nonetheless, antimicrobials remain essential to treating infection. While it is 
unlikely given current trends that broad-spectrum drugs will be discovered 
(Brown & Wright, 2016), using innovative methods, such as treatment with 
combinations of drugs (Tyers & Wright, 2019), or focusing on unconventional 
targets, should help to create new narrow-spectrum drugs that target specific 
causative pathogens (Brown & Wright, 2016). For example, over the past decade, 
antimicrobials that specifically target Acinetobacter or Neisseria gonorrhoeae, as 
well as two new classes of anti-TB drugs, have been approved (Brown & Wright, 
2016). Indeed, the Pew Charitable Trusts estimates that, as of December 2017, 
there are 42 antimicrobials in Phases I to III clinical trials (PEW, 2019). The 
Panel believes that the narrow-spectrum approach to antimicrobial discovery 
will require more fundamental research, more flexible regulations, and new 
economic models to overcome three major challenges:
Scientific Challenges: Relative to other therapeutic fields, “[s]cientific and 
clinical advancements in antibiotic development are inherently challenging” 
(Simpkin et al., 2017). While narrow-spectrum antibiotic discovery is considered 
to be the most likely field to yield results, it will yield only a narrow selection of 
chemical compounds, with a limited range of mechanisms (Brown & Wright, 
2016; Tyers & Wright, 2019). The chemical properties and complex mechanisms 
of existing antibiotics are incompatible with and elusive to medicinal-chemistry 
approaches and modern drug-discovery platforms, respectively. As “new targets 
and approaches to antibiotic drug discovery are fraught with risk, there is 
a substantial need for fundamental research” on the biological action of 
antimicrobials as well as on unconventional targets and discovery platforms 
(Brown & Wright, 2016). 
Regulatory Challenges: Traditionally regulations require the completion of 
two large clinical trials before a new antimicrobial can be approved (Rex et al., 
2013). In the case of “narrow-spectrum agents, or those focused on emerging 
forms of resistance, it might be possible to generate only limited clinical data... 
Because the clinical applicability of preclinical data for antibiotics is unusually 
high relative to other drug classes, initiatives such as learn and confirm models 
and single clinical trials with causal evidence seem to be especially applicable 
to new antibiotics” (Rex et al., 2013). Ultimately, balancing data needed for 
registration with medical need would boost research in this area (Rex et al., 2013).
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Market Challenges: The challenge of developing a new antimicrobial relates 
as much to the structure of pharmaceutical markets as to the scientific and 
regulatory challenges (Renwick et al., 2015). Large pharmaceutical companies 
invest less in antimicrobial research and innovation than in other areas, 
with 15 of the 18 largest global pharmaceutical companies abandoning the 
antimicrobial field over the last two decades (Bartlett et al., 2013). Developing 
new antimicrobials to treat resistant infections lacks a sufficient return on 
investment for three reasons (Rex & Outterson, 2016). First, infections generally 
occur over a short time-scale, unlike other therapies for chronic conditions 
that may bring in revenue for the remainder of a patient’s lifetime. Second, the 
costs of clinical trials are high and the prices for antimicrobials comparatively 
low, contributing to a lack of revenue. Third, since clinicians are unwilling to 
use new antibiotics as they did in the past, the volume sales model is smaller, 
making these drugs a poor investment (Renwick et al., 2015). Addressing this 
challenge may require “delinking reward from antibiotic sales through prizes, 
milestone payments, or insurance-like models in which innovation is rewarded 
with a fixed series of payments of a predictable size” (Rex & Outterson, 2016).
While Canada has a history of discovering antimicrobials such as Tazobactam 
(NAEJA-RGM, n.d.), in general, the national research and innovation system 
struggles to support the commercialization of research in the pharmaceutical 
industry (CCA, 2018). The AMR Research and Innovation Task Group (2017) 
identified three barriers specific to Canada in commercializing antimicrobials: 
regulations, jurisdictions, and resources. The relatively small Canadian market 
(for both the testing of therapies and also for number of customers), coupled 
with the length of time and costs relative to potential profit associated with 
obtaining approvals for new products, may present a regulatory barrier that 
results in industry not seeking Canadian approval, especially smaller companies. 
Similarly, the Canadian-specific regulatory and approval issues for new drugs and 
products — a jurisdictional barrier — may lead to less international collaboration 
on alternative solutions to antimicrobials. Finally, additional funds are needed 
to overcome resource barriers, and to continue to work on the challenge of 
AMR (AMR Research and Innovation Task Group, 2017). Currently, the federal 
government provides about $10 million per year to support AMS and AMR 
research, with very little of this directed to help researchers transform their 
lab discoveries into commercial treatments (HESA, 2018). 
Globally, research and innovation into novel antimicrobial therapies “needs 
to address the issue of the challenging commercial model, and come up with 
strategies to reconcile public health needs with an attractive economic model for 
the pharmaceutical industry” (Roca et al., 2015). The WHO has taken a leading 
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role in efforts to incentivize research and innovation into novel therapies through 
its Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance, which identifies partnerships 
as a key way forward to develop and conserve antimicrobials (WHO, 2019a). 
For example, the WHO participates in many partnerships to foster research and 
innovation (e.g., the Global Antibiotic Research and Development Partnership, 
or GARDP) (WHO, 2019a). Internationally, governments have used various 
initiatives to increase investment in antimicrobial research and development, 
primarily targeted at industry. Generally, incentives can be grouped as push 
incentives, targeted at pre-clinical and clinical trial phase development, including 
grants and pipeline coordination to bring down research and development 
costs, and pull incentives, targeted at therapies that have made it to market, 
including market entry rewards and long-term incentives to increase return 
on investment (Shlaes & Bradford, 2018; Roope et al., 2019).
There are several examples of push incentives such as CARB-X, funded by 
BARDA (the U.S. Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority) 
and the Wellcome Trust. This non-profit public–private partnership is “dedicated 
to accelerating antibacterial research to tackle the global rising threat of drug-
resistant bacteria” by providing research support through the early stages of 
product development and Phase I testing (CARB-X, 2018). A European example 
is the Innovative Medicines Initiative, which supports collaborative research 
projects across sectors, including academia and the pharmaceutical industry, 
and combines public and private funding to advance the development of, and 
patient access to, the next generation of vaccines, medicines, and treatments 
such as new antibiotics (Innovative Medicines Initiative, n.d.).
There are fewer examples of pull incentives, however. In the United States, the 
Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act of 2012, and the more recent Re-
Valuing Antimicrobial Products (REVAMP) Bill, were implemented to incentivize 
the development of new antimicrobials through longer market exclusivity. The 
GAIN Act incentivized research by extending the years of market exclusivity 
for new antibiotics (Shales, 2018). This approach did not have the anticipated 
results, as it did not make the non-profitable product (the new antibiotic) 
profitable. The newer REVAMP Bill also centres on longer periods of exclusivity, 
but it is transferrable such that the company that develops a new antibiotic 
could transfer the exclusivity period to another (more profitable) therapeutic 
product (Shales, 2018). 
There remain great hopes for new antimicrobial discoveries, especially those 
with narrow-spectrum, but scientific, regulatory, and market challenges need 
to be addressed. The Panel supports a wide-ranging approach to antimicrobial 
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development, not picking any winners, but making sure that sufficient resources 
and incentives are available to encourage the development of antimicrobials 
with the greatest social value. Without Canadian-based incentive programs 
encouraging research into novel antimicrobials, the solutions will be found in 
other jurisdictions, and a potentially fruitful avenue of exploration will be lost. 
Without these incentives, Canada will continue to lag behind other countries 
in this important field.
Therapies
Given the challenges associated with developing new antimicrobials, researchers 
and companies have turned to developing alternative therapies (also called 
non-traditional products) to treat or prevent AMR infections, including phage 
therapy, lysins, adjuvants, and probiotics (PEW, 2018). Alternative therapies, such 
as phage, lysins, and adjuvants, may hold promise to treat infections once 
they are acquired. An American study of the drug development pipeline for 
non-traditional products found that the majority were vaccines (12/32) and 
antibodies (10/32), and few had reached advanced phases of clinical testing 
(PEW, 2018). 
Therapies that could help to treat resistant infections include antibiotic 
adjuvants, phage, and lysins. Antibiotic adjuvants are compounds with “little 
or no antibiotic activity themselves, but act to block resistance or otherwise 
enhance antibiotic action” (Wright, 2016). They are delivered in combination 
with antibiotics, thereby providing a way to slow resistance and salvage the activity 
of existing antibiotics, acting as a complementary strategy to the discovery of 
new antibiotics. There are several examples already in clinical trial (Wright, 
2016); therefore, this class of therapy is likely a low-risk area of research. 
Phage therapy uses bacterial viruses (phage) to treat infections, and has 
been used in some parts of the world for almost a century (Lin et al., 2017). 
Traditionally, this type of therapy relies on naturally occurring phages to infect 
and lyse bacteria at the infection site. More recently, biotechnological innovations 
have expanded phage therapy to include new strategies that use bioengineered 
phages or purified phage lytic proteins. Ongoing research suggests that phage 
therapy has the potential to be used as either a supplement, or an alternative, 
to traditional antibiotic treatment. Phage therapy has been explored for use 
in both humans and animals (Lin et al., 2017).
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Some therapies used to treat non-bacterial infections have been repurposed to 
treat bacterial infections. For example niclosamide — originally used to treat 
human tapeworm infections — has now been shown to protect human colon 
cells from CDI, and may be repurposed to help prevent infections (Tam et al., 
2018; Hospital News, n.d.-a). Therapy breakthroughs such as this one may help 
to minimize drug discovery costs.
Vaccines 
The successful introduction of immunization programs to prevent and control 
vaccine-preventable diseases has reduced dependence on antimicrobials, in 
turn reducing risks associated with AMR. While the developmental pathway 
for vaccines is clear, the research into developing safe, effective vaccines has 
proven difficult. 
Large pharmaceuticals are eyeing this market: Sanofi Pasteur, Merck, Pfizer, 
and others have all been involved in developing MRSA vaccines (Schneewind & 
Block, n.d.), and three candidate vaccines for CDI are in clinical trial (Kociolek 
& Shulman, 2017). Merck was leading the race towards an S. aureus vaccine 
but ended a clinical trial over safety concerns (Reid, 2011). In Canada, the 
Canadian Action Plan on Vaccine Research, Innovation and Development is guiding 
prioritization of innovative vaccines that may help to prevent resistant infections 
(PHAC, 2015). PHAC and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) 
have established the Canadian Immunization Research Network (CIRN), 
which is composed of researchers studying vaccine safety and efficacy, as well 
as the development of interventions aimed at improving immunization levels 
(PHAC, 2015). For example, researchers at The Ottawa Hospital and the 
Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario developed a smartphone app called 
CANImmunize (formerly ImmunizeCA) that allows the public to track their 
immunization history and schedule (Hospital News, n.d.-b). The app includes 
customizable schedules, catch-up schedules for recent immigrants to Canada, 
and information for patients about their health conditions (CANImmunize, 
2019; Hospital News, n.d.-b). 
To better understand how a vaccine might reduce the impact of AMR, the Panel 
simulated the effect of a CDI vaccine in its model (Section 4.1); resistant CDIs 
were responsible for 115 deaths and 64,000 extra days in hospital. In the Panel’s 
model, eradicating CDI would save 6,000 to 46,000 lives and $7 to $44 billion 
in GDP between 2020 and 2050 (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.7 
The Effect of a CDI Vaccine on Mortality and GDP
This figure plots the cumulative number of lives saved by the introduction of a hypothetical 
Clostridioides difficile vaccine in 2020. By 2050, the C. difficile infection (CDI) vaccine saves between 
6,000 (navy blue bar) and 46,000 (teal bar) lives. By saving these lives (as well as the associated 
morbidity), the vaccine would contribute between $7 billion and $37 billion to Canadian GDP between 
2020 and 2050, if resistance remained constant at 26% (status quo – navy blue line) or grows to 40% 
(teal line).
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Rapid Diagnostics
Faster and more effective detection and diagnosis of resistant infections are 
important because giving a patient or animal the correct treatment earlier can 
improve clinical outcomes and decrease transmission. Until recently, identifying 
the most appropriate treatment was done via an empirical diagnosis — physicians 
or veterinarians using their expertise, professional judgment, and intuition to 
determine the cause of an infection, thereby identifying the most appropriate 
treatment; in some cases, diagnostic tools, typically lab-based, are later used to 
confirm or change the diagnosis and prescription (O’Neill, 2016c). With advances 
in genomics, researchers can now look for genes that indicate resistance to 
specific antimicrobials, thus making it possible to detect and describe resistant 
bacteria rapidly, reducing the time to get test results to healthcare providers so 
that patients can be treated with effective drugs in a timely manner. This also 
improves the capacity of national laboratories and other public health facilities 
to prevent outbreaks (Burnham et al., 2017).
Researchers in Canada were early leaders in using rapid molecular diagnosis, 
developing various assays that can detect antibiotic resistance genes directly 
from clinical samples including MRSA (Turner et al., 2017), CDI (Longtin et al., 
2016), and other organisms (Bergeron et al., 2000; Vidovic et al., 2014; Perera et 
al., 2018; Rumore et al., 2018). PHAC’s National Microbiology Laboratory, along 
with collaborators, have developed technology for diagnosing AMR gonorrhea 
using bioinformatics: Neisseria gonorrhoeae Sequence Typing for Antimicrobial 
Resistance, or NG-STAR (Demczuk et al., 2017). NG-STAR includes the DNA 
sequences of seven genes associated with resistance for hundreds of isolates 
of drug-resistant strains of gonorrhea. Making their data publicly available in 
Canada and internationally enables researchers and public health officials to 
compare a given strain of gonorrhea to the sequences in the NG-STAR database, 
allowing them to determine whether that strain is likely to be resistant to a given 
antimicrobial (Demczuk et al., 2017). Many countries, including Canada, are 
already performing whole-genome sequencing of pathogens to rapidly detect 
drug-resistant bacteria to inform outbreak analysis (Quainoo et al., 2017).
6.4.2	 Medium-Term	Innovations
Microbiome
The human microbiota consists of all invisible microbes, including bacteria, 
fungi, viruses, and protozoa, that live symbiotically in and on the human body, 
primarily in the gut; the microbiome consists of the collection of genes these 
cells harbour (Turnbaugh et al., 2007). The “human gut microbiota is a complex 
microbial community and implicated in a large number of beneficial host 
functions,” involved in both health and disease (MacPherson et al., 2018). Gut 
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microbiota have a vital role in human well-being, and changes in gut microbiota 
composition can impact on health, including both acute or chronic disease states 
(MacPherson et al., 2018). Prior exposure to antimicrobials, the environment 
(such as diet), and host immune system activity shape microbiome structure and 
function (Relman & Lipsitch, 2018). The microbiome relates to AMR because 
of the impact of antimicrobials on its general composition. Antibiotics do not 
target specific microbes, but instead affect many diverse microbes in addition 
to those specifically causing infections. Normal microbiota can harbour AMR 
genes, which can serve as a genetic reservoir for AMR that can be passed on 
to pathogens. Additionally, modifying the microbiome can be used to alter 
disease outcomes, as witnessed by the effective therapeutic use of fecal transfers 
to treat certain infections. 
The negative impact of antimicrobials on microbiota composition and the 
damaging consequences of AMU on human health through resultant changes 
to the microbiome have been illustrated in multiple studies (Perez-Cobas et 
al., 2013; Gillies et al., 2015; Raymond et al., 2016). For example, changes to 
the microbiome, which can be brought about by AMU, may lead to obesity, 
diabetes, asthma, allergies, and depression (Tilg & Kaser, 2011; Foster & McVey 
Neufeld, 2013; Ohland & Jobin, 2014; Arrieta et al., 2015; Kostic et al., 2015). 
CDIs can be an unintended consequence of AMU. C. difficile primarily causes 
infections after the use of broad-spectrum antimicrobials, often in hospitalized 
patients or residents of long-term healthcare facilities (Cascals-Pascual et al., 
2018). Ironically, fecal transfers are an effective therapy for this disease, while 
antibiotics (which triggered the disease) have limited utility in treatment. 
Because antimicrobials have severe negative impacts on the microbiome, any 
new antimicrobials may be harder to approve.
However, the microbiome itself has great potential for therapy. The use of 
fecal transplants to displace resistant or pathogenic bacteria and to restore 
colonization and gut microbiome function is now a CDI treatment (Cascals-
Pascual et al., 2018), and shows promising results in treating inflammatory 
bowel disease (Anderson et al., 2012). Despite the success of stool transplants 
in treating CDIs, many patients find the idea of receiving someone else’s 
stool unappealing. In the future, it is hoped that defined mixtures of key 
microbes can be used to replace fecal transfers. Other research has shown 
how changes that decreased the diversity of a baby’s microbiome affected their 
risk of childhood asthma (Arrieta et al., 2015); there is hope that repairing the 
microbiome could potentially decrease asthma rates, which are partly caused 
by AMU. The microbiome is also being applied to displace resistant organisms, 
although not yet clinically. 
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Overall, maintaining a healthy microbiome can be viewed as a method of 
preventing infection, whereby healthy microbes already present in the body 
displace incoming pathogens via competitive exclusion (Ohland & Jobin, 
2014). These healthy microbiomes in turn help prevent infections, thereby 
decreasing AMU.
Hospital Practices 
Hospitals are frequently associated with the transmission of resistant infections. 
Poor hand hygiene is likely responsible for thousands of HAIs every year in 
Canada (Section 6.2.3). To help address this problem, researchers at University 
Health Network’s Toronto Rehabilitation Institute have developed a badge that 
uses sensors in patient areas to determine if hospital staff have washed their 
hands: if a staff member fails to do so, the badge buzzes as a reminder (Pong 
et al., 2018; Hospital News, n.d.-b). This intervention increased overall hand 
hygiene performance (Pong et al., 2018). Similar technology could be used to 
prevent infections in other settings where healthcare is delivered.
Technologies that sterilize large areas reduce the transmission of infections. 
Vancouver General Hospital has become the first hospital in Canada to test a 
germ-killing robot, Trudi,  that uses ultraviolet light to kill viruses and bacteria 
in hospital rooms (Hospital News, n.d.-b; Tru-D SmartUVC, 2019). Two U.S. 
companies, AltaPure and Medizone, already sell machines that can help sanitize 
hospitals. AltaPure sells a technology that sanitizes a room using a disinfectant 
fog, and Medizone’s AscepticSure technology uses ozone-based gas (Altapure, 
2019; AsepticSystems, 2019). As with all new medical technologies, patient safety 
must be paramount when considering sterilization technologies.
Data Analytics
Research and innovation can also support better data collection, improving 
surveillance and informing stewardship and IPC. Gathering more infection 
data from healthcare facilities allows for better measurement of the challenges 
facing healthcare quality and patient safety. This includes determining the 
effectiveness of interventions and their potential economic impacts on healthcare 
systems and the agricultural sector (AMR Research and Innovation Task Group, 
2017). In order to respond to the threat of AMR, potential solutions should 
be evidence-based, and will require research and innovation that allows for 
the advancement of medical knowledge and practices (e.g., rapid diagnostic 
tests) as well as new therapies. 
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There are numerous gaps in understanding the dimensions and scale of the 
contribution of AMU in food and companion animals to AMR problems in 
humans. Attribution of the animal contribution to AMR in humans is a complex 
and multi-dimensional problem (Section 2.1); not all AMR contributors are 
clear, and obtaining an integrated and balanced perspective is challenging 
and can readily revert to a blame game. Whole-genome sequencing offers 
considerable promise in source attribution but is best when supported by well-
designed surveillance systems. The international dimension of the problem is 
important, including the role of imported foods from countries with poor use 
of antimicrobials in food animals. The relative importance of AMU in food 
versus companion animals needs to be investigated as part of the prioritization 
process in addressing AMR.
Medical Technologies 
Catheter-related infections are common when using catheters for extended 
periods. In a systematic review of the effectiveness of antimicrobial-coated 
central venous catheters, 23 of 33 trials found significant differences in rates 
of catheter-related BSIs (Wang et al., 2018). Compared with standard catheters, 
those made of chlorhexidine/silver sulfadiazine and antibiotic-coated catheters 
were associated with decreased rates of infection (Wang et al., 2018). Many 
medical technology companies are developing this type of device: Cook Medical 
has developed a central venous catheter that contains the antimicrobials 
minocycline and rifampin, meeting the CDC’s highest recommendation for 
reducing catheter-related infections (Cook Medical, 2019).
Surgical site infections (SSIs) are another common source of healthcare-
associated resistant infections. Teillant et al. (2015) estimate that between 39 
and 51% of pathogens causing SSIs are resistant to antimicrobials in the United 
States. One technique that reduces the likelihood of infection is minimally 
invasive surgery because it minimizes or even eliminates surgical incisions as 
well as reduces the trauma to a patient’s body (Tonutti et al., 2017). Minimally 
invasive surgeries have surged in popularity over the past few decades because 
of rapid technological advances. Tonutti et al. (2017) provide several examples: 
high-resolution miniaturized cameras, stereovision, and optimal lighting 
“provide a detailed view of targets inside the body;” and precision of surgery by 
providing “planning and real-time navigation during surgery.” Finally, virtual and 
augmented reality systems offer new opportunities for training and guidance, 
using realistic simulations and anatomical renderings.
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6.4.3	 Long-Term	Innovations
Nanotechnological Delivery Systems
Nanotechnology can preserve and extend the effectiveness of existing 
antimicrobials by acting as an enhanced drug delivery system, providing more 
selective delivery (Baptista et al., 2018; Muzammil et al., 2018). It has been 
used in targeted cancer treatments for about a decade, but its application for 
antimicrobial delivery is more recent (Pharmaceutical Technology, 2014). 
Currently nanotechnology is used synergistically to enhance antimicrobial 
delivery and treatment, alone as treatment, or to detect infection (Pharmaceutical 
Technology, 2014; Baptista et al., 2018; Muzammil et al., 2018). 
Researchers at the Methodist Hospital Research Institute have used a 
nanotechnology approach to detect multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-
TB); using wafers filled with TB cells, diagnosis and susceptibility testing can 
be assessed simultaneously, thereby streamlining diagnosis (Pharmaceutical 
Technology, 2014). At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital, researchers have developed nanoparticles that 
can deliver antibiotics directly to the site of an infection, where they release a 
high and prolonged dose in order to maximize effectiveness (Pharmaceutical 
Technology, 2014).
Beyond extending the effectiveness of existing antimicrobials, nanotechnological 
innovations offer a number of possible alternative therapies. Nanoparticles 
that can be used as replacement therapies include metal and metallic oxide 
nanoparticles, especially silver nanoparticles, which have been shown in studies 
to be effective against MRSA and Escherichia coli (Pharmaceutical Technology, 
2014; Baptista et al., 2018; Muzammil et al., 2018). IBM Research and Singapore’s 
Institute of Bioengineering and Nanotechnology (IBM, 2013) have created 
“novel nanostructures that are effective at targeting and destroying bacteria 
[that] unlike [antimicrobials]... attack the bacterial cells physically rather than 
chemically, ripping open the cell wall and membrane so the cell breaks down” 
(Pharmaceutical Technology, 2014).
Cellular Agriculture 
In 2016, about 78% of antimicrobials were used in industrial agriculture (PHAC, 
2017a). In the same way that alternative forms of energy have been developed 
to reduce fossil fuel dependence, cellular agriculture may enable diversification 
of animal agriculture. Cultured meat, part of cellular agriculture, generates 
animal products from cells and not from whole animals (Datar, 2018; Stephens 
et al., 2018). Instead of raising an animal from birth to slaughter — requiring 
antimicrobials as well as feed, water, and land — animal protein can be created 
without farms (Mattick, 2018; Stephens et al., 2018).
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The central challenge to cellular agriculture is scaling up the technology; 
currently, most cellular agriculture is experimental and small scale (Cosgrove, 
2017; Datar, 2018). In 2013, Mark Post, the co-founder of Mosa Meats, was 
the first to make a cell-cultured beef burger (Cosgrove, 2017). The process 
took three lab technicians about three months to culture the 20,000 fibres 
of the burger, costing about $1.2 million per pound. However, progress has 
been made that decreases the price of cultured meat. Currently, Memphis 
Meats is developing lab-made chicken meat, which would sell at about $6,000 
per pound — about a 99% reduction in price (Cosgrove, 2017). Ultimately, 
cellular agriculture is an entirely new industry — a new field of science and 
new set of products that may change the entire structure of the animal food 
industry. How this technology will be adopted is unclear, especially with the 
recent increase in vegetable-based meat alternatives that are currently more 
economically feasible. 
6.5 CONCLUSION
Since healthcare is a complex system, it is virtually impossible to predict 
the impact of a given intervention on the behaviour of patients, healthcare 
providers, hospitals, governments, communities, and companies. The effect 
of each intervention is subject to significant uncertainty, since the feedback 
loops among human behaviour, infection rates, resistance rates, and costs per 
patient are interconnected. As such, the Panel stresses that the most effective 
approach to addressing AMR is multifaceted, combining elements of all four 
mitigation strategies that have been shown to be effective. This includes greater 
immunization of people living in Canada and adequate training and resourcing 
of hospital IPC programs, which would prevent infections and thereby decrease 
AMU. Physicians and veterinarians can also play a central role in decreasing AMU 
through changes in prescribing practices; however, a multifaceted approach would 
also involve other stakeholders through the use of regulations, organizational 
accreditation requirements, as well as consistent standards for prescribing and 
dispensing antimicrobials. Whether interventions target decreased AMU or 
AMR, both IPC and stewardship require a robust system for collecting data, 
assessing the impact of the problem, and supporting the measurement of the 
success of each intervention. Therefore, both surveillance and research and 
innovation are integral to any multifaceted mitigation strategy.
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There are also opportunities to limit the impact of AMR beyond the health 
sector, animal industry, and government. Informed and encouraged by public 
health campaigns, all people in Canada can improve their handwashing and 
food-preparation practices, get vaccinations, engage in safer sexual practices, 
and change their behaviour in other ways to prevent the spread of infections. 
They can also engage in their own personal stewardship, asking their doctors 
or vets to prescribe antimicrobials only when necessary. 
AMR is a global tragedy of the commons. Each individual country uses 
antimicrobials to improve human and animal health, but this use contributes 
to the spread of resistant bacteria and declining antimicrobial effectiveness 
around the world (McLean & Dye, 2018). This dichotomy between individual 
benefit and global cost can lead to overuse of antimicrobials, sacrificing global 
human and animal health as individual countries prioritize their own economy 
and the health of their citizens. This is more challenging for countries with 
broad scale AMU combined with high population density, and low levels of 
economic and social development (Laxminarayan et al., 2013). Indeed, the 
increase in healthcare expenditures resulting from AMR are expected to be 
the most severe in low- and middle-income countries (Ahmed et al., 2018).
Since no single country can manage AMR alone, this challenge calls for 
coordinated global action. In its 2015 Global Action Plan on AMR, the WHO 
specifically calls for international collaboration to establish surveillance networks, 
enforce medical and veterinary codes of practice, develop inspection teams to 
monitor drug quality, and encourage research and innovation into new drugs, 
technologies, and medical and industrial practices (WHO, 2015). Like other 
OECD countries, Canada has approved the WHO plan and developed its own 
Pan-Canadian Framework (PHAC, 2017d). But Canada is in the middle of the 
pack among OECD countries when it comes to AMU, AMR, and mitigation 
efforts (OECD, 2018a). As a scientifically and economically advanced country, 
Canada has an opportunity — and obligation — to play a significant role in 
this coordinated global effort, helping to reduce AMU, improve surveillance, 
and foster innovation.
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7 Conclusion
This report reflects the findings of an interdisciplinary expert panel assembled 
to answer the timely and important question: What is the socio-economic impact of 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for Canadians and the Canadian healthcare system? 
The Panel used multiple approaches to examine its charge. These included 
consideration of evidence in the literature on antimicrobial use (AMU), AMR, 
and the costs associated with infections; a detailed estimation of the current 
morbidity and mortality impacts of resistant infections in Canada today; and 
the commission of an economic model to estimate the future economic impacts 
of AMR. In this chapter, the Panel summarizes its key findings and concludes 
by emphasizing the importance of taking steps to tackle AMR immediately.
7.1 KEY FINDINGS
Antimicrobials are an essential part of contemporary life in Canada, forming 
the basis for modern healthcare and playing a central role in agriculture. 
Antimicrobials have reduced the burden of infectious diseases; enabled 
commonplace medical interventions, such as caesarean sections, joint 
replacements, and tonsillectomies; and improved agricultural productivity. 
While their full economic value is difficult to quantify, according to simulations 
of the Panel’s model, antimicrobials saved at least 17,000 lives and 2.6 million 
hospital days in 2018, thereby contributing $6.1 billion to the Canadian economy.
Antimicrobials are indispensable, but those used in healthcare and agriculture, 
as well as those found in the environment through processes such as run-off 
from farms and sewage treatment, all contribute to AMR. While all AMU 
contributes to resistance, the misuse and overuse of antimicrobials in all 
sectors have further compounded the problem. The Panel therefore chose 
to examine the issue of AMR through a One Health lens that recognizes the 
interconnected nature of AMR; that there is no benefit in apportioning blame 
for AMR between medicine and agriculture; and that a holistic approach is 
needed to address the problem now and in the future.
The Panel further chose to examine the health and economic impacts of AMR 
based on important clinical syndromes. Using this approach, it estimated 
epidemiological measures (incidence, rate of resistance, morbidity, and mortality) 
of resistant infections associated with 10 syndromes that encompass the majority of 
resistant infections in Canada. The 10 syndromes examined in this report are: 
bacterial gastro-intestinal infections (BGIs), bloodstream infections (BSIs), 
Clostridioides difficile infections (CDIs), intra-abdominal infections (IAIs), 
163Chapter 7 Conclusion
musculoskeletal infections (MSIs), pneumonia, sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs), skin and soft tissue infections (SSTIs), tuberculosis (TB), and urinary 
tract infections (UTIs).
AMR	already	leads	to	substantial	negative	health	impacts	in	Canada,	
which	are	unequally	distributed	among	socio-demographic	groups.	
AMR is not only an issue for future generations. It already impacts people 
across Canada. Using epidemiological estimates of the 10 important clinical 
syndromes, the Panel estimates that resistance to first-line antimicrobials is 
already about 26% and that there were over 250,000 resistant infections in 2018. 
Perhaps most significantly, the Panel estimates that, in 2018, over 14,000 deaths 
in Canada were caused by resistant infections. Furthermore, about 5,400 of 
these deaths, or almost 15 a day, were directly attributable to AMR (i.e., would 
not have occurred had people contracted an infection susceptible to first-line 
antimicrobial treatment). 
The negative health impacts of AMR are substantial, but the burden of resistance 
is not shared equally across the Canadian population. This is because some 
groups are more at risk of acquiring resistant infections. In many cases, the 
acquisition of a resistant infection stems from contact with the healthcare 
system, so those who have cancer or other medical conditions are at greater 
risk. Additionally, the risk of infection is higher for those with compromised 
or weaker immune systems, including the very young and older adults.
Other demographic groups are also at higher risk of getting a resistant infection. 
For instance, some of the conditions that contribute to the risk of acquiring 
a resistant infection, such as crowded living conditions and inadequate access 
to clean water, are known to be more prevalent in Indigenous communities. 
Others who live in crowded conditions, such as people in homeless shelters or 
on very low incomes, are also at higher risk compared to the general population. 
Additionally, certain behaviours increase the risk of AMR, including risky 
sexual practices, substance use disorder, participation in certain sports, and 
pet ownership.
Global travel and trade make AMR a worldwide problem. People who travel 
internationally can bring resistant microbes back to Canada, whether they exhibit 
symptoms of infection or not. Travel to regions where resistant microbes are 
more common is therefore an important risk factor for acquiring a resistant 
infection.
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AMR	places	a	significant	financial	burden	on	the	Canadian	healthcare	
system,	costing	about	$1.4	billion	in	2018.	If	resistance	rates	increase	
to	40%	by	2050,	it	is	estimated	that	the	cumulative	costs	of	AMR	to	
the	healthcare	system	will	be	$120	billion.
Resistant infections are associated with additional costs to the Canadian 
healthcare system. Each resistant infection related to the 10 important clinical 
syndromes that results in hospitalization has an average inpatient cost of about 
$18,000. The most common resistant infections — those that lead to SSTIs, 
UTIs, and IAIs — place the greatest financial burden on the healthcare system. 
The healthcare costs of resistant infections are already substantial, representing 
about 0.6% of all national healthcare spending, equal to the entire budget for 
all hospital expenditures in Newfoundland and Labrador. The cost of AMR is 
expected to increase even further as it becomes more prevalent. If resistance 
to first-line antimicrobials were to slowly rise to 40% by 2050, AMR would cost 
the healthcare system $8 billion per year, roughly equal to the current total 
expenditure on all hospitals in Atlantic Canada. Even if resistance rates stayed 
at the current levels, AMR would still cost $6 billion per year by 2050. The Panel 
notes that such an increase in costs associated with only a single dimension 
of healthcare would create financial strain and may lead to spending cuts in 
other healthcare or government services.
AMR	has	a	sizable	negative	impact	on	the	economy,	having	reduced	
Canada’s	GDP	by	an	estimated	$2	billion	in	2018.	By	2050,	rising	
resistance	rates	could	lead	to	the	economy	losing	between	$13	and	
$21	billion	per	year.
The Canadian economy is already negatively impacted by AMR, beyond costs 
directly attributable to healthcare. The Panel estimated the impact of AMR 
on the Canadian economy using a quantitative economic model that considered 
the effects of mortality and morbidity on the labour force and GDP. The model 
found that the industries most negatively affected by AMR are those that are 
labour-intensive, including recreation and culture, transportation, and public 
services. As with healthcare costs, the magnitude of these economic impacts is 
only going to grow as rates of AMR increase.
The reduction in Canada’s GDP as a result of AMR was 0.13% in 2018, equal 
to one-third the value of the Canadian motor vehicle manufacturing industry. 
If resistance rates were to rise to 40% by 2050, Canada’s GDP would decrease 
by $21 billion that year. Overall, the yearly economic reductions due to AMR 
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would mean that Canada’s economy would lose more than $388 billion over 
the next 30 years. Even if resistance rates were to remain constant, the economy 
would still be losing $13 billion per year by 2050. 
These estimated projections of AMR’s economic and healthcare costs underscore 
a time lag between the cause and effects of resistance. AMR is a growing problem, 
and inaction today will only lead to impacts that are much greater in the future. 
Increased	AMR	will	lead	to	direct	and	indirect	social	impacts	that	may	
include	a	reduction	in	social	capital,	quality	of	life	and	trust,	and	
greater	inequality.	
AMR is unlike any other healthcare crisis Canada has ever faced. It is therefore 
impossible to fully predict the nature and magnitude of all of the social impacts 
that will result from increased AMR. Despite this, it is clear that these impacts 
will be both significant and far-reaching.
A range of social impacts will stem directly and indirectly from measures put 
in place because of increased AMR. One important class of measures may 
be changes to healthcare delivery, including fewer elective surgeries due to 
the increased risk of infection resulting from an inability to use prophylactic 
antimicrobials. Fewer surgeries would lead to decreased quality of life for 
people with certain chronic diseases or conditions, such as joint pain, which 
can only be alleviated by replacement.
The implementation of national and international public health measures 
to contain the effects of AMR may also lead to negative social impacts. These 
measures could include additional surveillance; isolation and quarantine of 
people infected with, or exposed to, resistant microbes; and travel restrictions. 
While these measures could have merit, it may be challenging to find a balance 
between mitigating AMR and the loss of liberty, increased fear, and reduced 
quality of life caused by such measures. Enhanced surveillance may impinge on 
people’s right to privacy, and may inadvertently create stigma against certain 
geographic or ethnic communities. Those in isolation and quarantine may be 
stigmatized in addition to potentially losing income and experiencing loneliness 
while dealing with the fears associated with developing an infection. Lastly, 
travel restrictions may decrease the quality of life and social connectedness of 
those wishing to visit restricted regions, while travel advisories against Canada 
would have significant social and economic impacts due to reduced tourism 
and participation in the economy (e.g., eating in restaurants). 
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The	most	effective	way	to	address	AMR	is	to	take	a	multifaceted	
approach	that	coordinates	initiatives	related	to	four	key	mitigation	
strategies:	surveillance;	infection	prevention	and	control	(IPC);	
stewardship;	and	research	and	innovation.
The health and economic costs of AMR are large, but so too are the potential 
benefits of measures to reduce resistant infections. Based on the Panel’s model, 
an intervention that reduces the infection rate by 33% would save 120,000 
to 200,000 lives and $117 to $177 billion in GDP between 2020 and 2050, if 
resistance remains constant at 26% or rises to 40%.
A key element that supports mitigation is surveillance, as a clear picture of the 
current state of AMU and AMR in Canada would enable targeted use of resources. 
Limited data on priority pathogens, AMU in northern Canada, and AMR in 
animals, along with the absence of an effective federal/provincial/territorial 
framework for coordination of data collection and sharing, are hindering 
current surveillance efforts in Canada.
By reducing the rate of infections, IPC practices can have a significant effect on 
the transmission and spread of resistant infections, provided they are adequately 
resourced and fully implemented. Beneficial IPC practices that have a large 
impact include hand hygiene, appropriate environmental and device cleaning, 
hospital IPC, monitoring processes and outcomes, hiring healthcare staff, and 
reducing occupancy rates. Ensuring that good IPC practices are followed in 
healthcare settings (e.g., cleaning protocols, best-practice hand hygiene) limits 
the occurrence and spread of infections.
Stewardship initiatives that promote the judicious use of antimicrobials in both 
healthcare and agriculture provide opportunities to slow the increase in rates 
of resistance and therefore limit the spread of AMR. This includes ensuring, 
for example, that best practices in medicine are followed — particularly in 
hospitals — and that consistent messaging and education reach the public. 
Progress in the agricultural sector has been made, demonstrating that change 
is possible. While agriculture accounted for over three-quarters of AMU in 
Canada in 2016, the federal government eliminated medically important AMU 
for growth promotion in 2018 and, for the first time, mandated that all AMU in 
food animals be under veterinary prescription.
While known interventions can have a great and immediate impact in reducing 
the effects of AMR, research and innovation are also fundamental. This includes 
directly through the development of new therapies to treat resistant infections, 
167Chapter 7 Conclusion
but also through innovations that decrease infection rates, such as vaccines and 
improvements in IPC, stewardship, and surveillance. Potential benefits may 
result from research and innovation related to, for example, new antimicrobial 
therapies and vaccines, the microbiome, hospital practices, rapid diagnostics, 
data analytics, medical technologies, nanotechnologies, and cellular agriculture. 
7.2 A TIME FOR ACTION
AMR is both a One Health and One World problem. There is no single sector at 
fault, no part of the world immune, and no one solution to solve the challenges 
brought on by resistant microbes. There is also a time lag between the cause 
and effect of AMR: AMU in one place today may lead to resistant infections in 
another place tomorrow. The negative impacts of AMR are already experienced 
in Canada and around the world; inaction today ensures that, as resistance 
grows, these impacts will only worsen with time. The importance of AMR as a 
world issue has been recognized by the United Nations, which has stated that 
AMR is a fundamental and long-term threat throughout the world (UN, 2016). 
There is an opportunity for Canada to build on its history in global health 
innovation by becoming a driving force in addressing the challenge of AMR, 
benefiting both this country and the world.
The economic and health estimates calculated by the Panel should not be taken 
as exact. Gaps in the available data and the need to make certain assumptions 
limited the level of precision possible. Having said this, the methodologies 
behind the Panel’s calculations and model are strong, and the resulting 
estimates should be considered representative of the types of impacts Canada 
could face as a result of increasing AMR. A lack of precision should not prevent 
action. The magnitude of these estimates is alarming, sending a strong signal 
for global investment and cooperation.
There have been few health crises on this scale in Canadian history. If AMR is 
not slowed and measures to limit its effects not taken, Canada will be a different 
country within a few decades. More and more lives will be lost from infections 
that used to be treatable. The economy will suffer because of illness and loss of 
life. And there may be broad social impacts, such as increased inequality and 
stigma against those most at risk of infection. The time to act is now.
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Appendix A — Epidemiological Estimates of  
      Important Clinical Syndromes
The Panel chose to examine syndromes for which AMR is prevalent and has 
the greatest impact. The syndromes included in this report are bacterial 
gastro-intestinal infections (BGIs), bloodstream infections (BSIs), Clostridioides 
difficile infections (CDIs), intra-abdominal infections (IAIs), musculoskeletal 
infections (MSIs), pneumonia, sexually transmitted infections (STIs), skin and 
soft tissue infections (SSTIs), tuberculosis (TB), and urinary tract infections 
(UTIs). The epidemiological measures of incidence, resistance (to first-line 
antimicrobials), mortality, and morbidity (additional length of stay in hospital, 
or LOS) were estimated for each syndrome, details of which are described 
below (and summarized in Table 2.2). In order to consider effects for all people 
in Canada (as opposed to only those who have had recent contact with the 
healthcare system), the Panel used estimates that related to both healthcare- 
and community-associated infections, where possible. The estimated rates were 
established through the Panel’s expert appraisal of the literature, but it did not 
carry out a systematic review. The Panel notes that its challenges in developing 
these estimates illustrate the important data gaps related to AMR in Canada.
A.1 BACTERIAL GASTRO-INTESTINAL INFECTIONS (BGIs)
Incidence
A descriptive study of reportable gastrointestinal infections in Ontario from 
2007 to 2009 found that the average incidence of all reportable BGIs, excluding 
C. difficile, was 55 per 100,000 (Vrbova et al., 2012). The Panel notes that this 
is an under-estimate of all BGIs in Canada as it only includes those that are 
reported to a public health agency in Ontario.
Resistance
PHAC reports resistance associated with Salmonella (PHAC, 2017a). The rate 
of multi-class-resistance in S. typhi and S. paratyphi was 19%, and non-typhoidal 
Salmonella was 11%. The average of these two values was 15%, and was used by 
the Panel as an approximation of the rate of resistance in BGIs. 
Mortality
A review of outbreaks involving non-typhoidal Salmonella in the United States 
found that the mortality rate of infections caused by resistant bacteria was 0.04% 
higher than that of infections caused by susceptible strains (0.1% versus 0.06%) 
(Varma et al., 2005).21 The Panel used these numbers as a proxy for the mortality 
rate, and increased mortality rate for all BGIs. 
21 The authors note the difference in these rates is not significant (p = 0.57).
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Morbidity
Contrary to the measures of morbidity for all other syndromes (other than STIs), 
the Panel here decided to use additional days with diarrhea, not additional days 
in hospital, for the morbidity of BGIs. The average of three studies reporting 
these data was 2.33 days (Marano et al., 2000 as cited in Smith et al., 1999; 
Travers & Barza, 2002; Nelson et al., 2004). 
A.2 BLOODSTREAM INFECTIONS (BSIs)
Incidence
In the Calgary area between 2000 and 2004, the annual incidence of community-
onset BSIs was 81.6 per 100,000 (Laupland et al., 2007a). In the Victoria area, 
between 1998 and 2005, the annual incidence of community-onset BSIs was 
101.2 per 100,000 (Laupland et al., 2013). The average incidence from these 
two studies is 91.4 per 100,000.
Resistance
In the Calgary area between 2000 and 2006, there were 1,373 MSSA and 169 MRSA 
cases of bacteremia (a BSI) (Laupland et al., 2008c), therefore 11% of cases 
involved resistant S. aureus. In the Calgary area between 2000 and 2006, among 
E. coli BSI isolates tested, reduced susceptibility to amoxicillin-clavulanate was 
observed in 19% of cases, to ciprofloxacin in 12%, to ceftriaxone in 4%, to 
piperacillin-tazobactam in 3%, and to imipenem in no cases (Laupland et al., 
2008b). The average resistance for E. coli BSIs was therefore 7.6%. The average 
resistance of S. aureus and E. coli BSI isolates was 9.3%.
Mortality
In the studies of both Calgary and Victoria area BSIs, the in-hospital case-fatality 
rate for all infections was 13% (Laupland et al., 2007a; Laupland et al., 2013); 
this rate was used as a proxy for the mortality rate of susceptible infections. 
According to the PHAC CARSS report, the mortality rate of MRSA bloodstream 
infections across Canada in 2015 was 20%; this was used as a proxy for the 
mortality rate for resistant BSIs (PHAC, 2017a). The difference between these 
rates, 7%, was used as the estimate for additional mortality due to AMR.
Morbidity
Additional LOS for resistant S. aureus BSIs was 8.5 days in a study of adult 
patients from four hospitals in Toronto (Thampi et al., 2015) and 12.7 days in 
a study of 22 South Korean hospitals (Kim et al., 2014). The average of these 
two studies is 10.6 days.
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A.3 CLOSTRIDIOIDES DIFFICILE INFECTIONS (CDIs)
CDIs are different from the other important syndromes as they often occur 
following previous antimicrobial therapy. This means CDIs are doubly affected 
by AMR as they can be resistant infections themselves, but also may be more 
likely to occur in people who have had other resistant infections. This is because 
people who have a resistant infection are more likely to require longer or 
multiple courses of antimicrobials (as compared to susceptible infections). As 
CDI is impacted by AMR in general, the morbidity rate used is for all CDIs, as 
opposed to those related specifically to resistant infections. 
Incidence
Based on data from Manitoba and information from other sources, Levy et al. 
(2015) estimate that the rate of CDIs in Canada was 109.2 cases per 100,000 
people in 2012. This value was selected over other estimates as it includes both 
healthcare-acquired and community-acquired infections.
Resistance
CNISP reports CDI resistance to three antimicrobials — clindamycin, 
moxifloxacin, and rifampin. The average resistance of CDI to one or more of 
these antimicrobials in 2017 was 11.58% (CNISP, 2018).
Mortality
Leal (2019) found that the attributable mortality rate of hospital-acquired CDIs 
in Alberta hospitals between April 2011 and April 2016 was 4.5%. Labbé et al. 
(2008) examined the mortality rates associated with different strains of CDI 
in a hospital in Montréal. The authors found that the adjusted odds mortality 
ratio for a strain of CDI that was less susceptible to metronidazole (which was 
almost always the antibiotic first provided for treatment), relative to all other 
strains, was 2:2. Using this odds ratio and assuming a mortality rate of 4.5% 
for all resistant infections, the additional mortality rate of resistance for CDI 
is 2.45% (Labbé et al., 2008; CNISP, 2018).
Morbidity
A study on CDI in Canada found CDIs (both healthcare- and community-
associated infections) were associated with an additional LOS of 13.6 days in 
2012 (Levy et al., 2015). The Panel used this as a proxy for LOS as a result of 
CDI while noting it is related to all CDIs, and that LOS is relative to no infection. 
No specific data related to the attributable morbidity due to resistance were 
identified by the Panel. 
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A.4 INTRA-ABDOMINAL INFECTIONS (IAIs)
Incidence
Data from a multicentre observational study underway at 57 medical institutions 
worldwide were used to estimate the proportion of different types of complicated 
IAIs (Sartelli et al., 2013). The proportion of appendicitis relative to other 
complicated IAI was then used in combination with data on incidence of 
appendicitis in Canada (CIHI, 2013) to calculate an incidence rate of 287.3 
per 100,000 people.
Resistance
Resistance was estimated from an American study of hospitalized adults with 
complicated IAIs (Edelsberg et al., 2008). This study was based on a large U.S. 
multi-institutional database that included 6,056 patients who were adults with 
any complicated IAI. Of 6,056 U.S. patients, 22.4% of complicated IAIs failed 
initial antibiotic therapy (Edelsberg et al., 2008).
Mortality
In the study by Edelsberg et al. (2008), patients who failed initial antibiotic 
therapy were more likely to die in hospital (9.5% vs. 1.3%). Therefore, the 
mortality associated with resistant infections increased an additional 8.2%. 
The Panel chose to use measures of mortality associated with all complicated 
IAIs and, based on members’ expertise, recognizes that bacterial peritonitis 
would be associated with higher rates of mortality (which are not captured in 
the Panel’s estimates). 
Morbidity
In the study by Edelsberg et al. (2008), patients who failed initial antibiotic 
therapy stayed in hospital an additional 4.6 days on average. 
A.5 MUSCULOSKELETAL INFECTIONS (MSIs)
Incidence
Incidence was estimated using an American retrospective cohort study of 
in-patient and emergency visits in California, Florida, and New York, which 
found the yearly incidence of osteomyelitis and septic arthritis was 104 per 
100,000 (Miller & Polgreen, 2019). The Panel used these two conditions as a 
proxy for all MSIs.
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Resistance
A retrospective review of U.S. pediatric patients who had a diagnosis of 
osteomyelitis, septic arthritis, or both found that the prevalence of S. aureus 
MSIs caused by MRSA in 2009-2010 was 34.8% (Sarkissian et al., 2016). The 
study included only those who had community-acquired MRSA. This was used 
as a proxy of resistance of MSIs.
Mortality
In the study by Miller and Polgreen (2019), the in-hospital mortality rate for 
all cases of osteomyelitis and septic arthritis was 2.8%. Al-Nammari et al. (2007) 
carried out a retrospective review of the differences in the clinical features 
and outcomes of adult patients with septic arthritis caused by MRSA versus 
susceptible S. aureus. The authors found that the average sepsis-related mortality 
rate of patients with an MRSA infection was 13%, versus 5% for a susceptible 
infection (Al-Nammari et al., 2007).22 Converting the additional mortality to a 
crude odds ratio for all MSIs, and assuming an overall mortality rate of 2.8% for 
resistant infections, the additional mortality due to resistance in MSIs is 1.72%.
Morbidity
In the study by Sarkissian et al. (2016), pediatric MRSA infections resulted in 
five additional days in hospital compared to MSSA infections. This estimate 
was used as a proxy to represent morbidity in the model for all MSIs. 
A.6 PNEUMONIA
Incidence
A U.S. study of community-acquired pneumonia (CAP) found that the average 
yearly incidence rate of CAP requiring hospitalization was 248 per 100,000 in 
2010-2012 (Jain et al., 2015). 
Resistance
A U.S. retrospective analysis of adult patients diagnosed with CAP in out-patient 
settings treated with levofloxacin or macrolides found an average treatment 
failure rate of 22.1% (Ye et al., 2008). 
Mortality
Zilberberg et al. (2017) conducted a retrospective cohort study of data 
from 175 U.S. hospitals examining the impact of carbapenem-resistant 
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) on the outcomes of patients with Enterobacteriaceae 
22 The authors note this difference is not significant (p > 0.2).
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infections. The mortality rate for CRE pneumonia was 10.2%, whereas it was 
8.4% for carbapenem-susceptible infections. Therefore, the additional mortality 
due to resistance was 1.8% (Zilberberg et al., 2017).
Morbidity
A European cohort study of patients admitted to intensive care units found that 
patients with pneumonia with resistant strains caused by E. coli, P. aeruginosa, 
or S. aureus stayed on average 1.33 days longer than patients with pneumonia 
with susceptible strains (Lambert et al., 2011). Strains of E. coli (tested with 
third-generation cephalosporins), P. aeruginosa (tested with ceftazidime), and 
S. aureus (tested with oxacillin) were included in the analysis. 
A.7 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS (STIs)
For the measures of incidence, resistance, morbidity, and mortality associated 
with resistant STIs, the Panel chose to use estimates associated with N. gonorrhoeae 
infections, as there are no good estimates related to the epidemiology of Canadian 
Mycoplasma genitalium infections, and there is no considerable resistance in 
Canadian chlamydia infections. 
Incidence
National surveillance data on N. gonorrhoeae are “passively collected by PHAC 
through collaboration with provincial public health laboratories” (PHAC, 
2017a). The submissions are voluntary and there are no standardized methods 
for submission across Canada. The incidence of gonorrhea has increased in 
Canada, from 22 cases per 100,000 in 2001, to 55 per 100,000 in 2015 (PHAC, 
2017a). The 2015 data were used as an input for the Panel’s model. The Panel 
notes, however, that a number of provinces and territories appreciably exceed 
this rate. 
Resistance
The average resistance of gonococcal isolates to azithromycin, cefixime, or 
ceftriaxone in 2015 was 3.4%; this was used as input for the Panel’s model 
(PHAC, 2017a). The Panel notes that, for some strains of resistant gonorrhea, 
the antimicrobials listed above are the last effective antimicrobials. 
Mortality	
There are no specific data on deaths from gonococcal infections; therefore the 
Panel used members’ expert knowledge to estimate a mortality rate of 0.1% 
for its model, and assumes this is entirely due to resistant infections.
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However, fetal or maternal deaths due to ectopic pregnancies can occur due 
to N. gonorrhoeae infections, so this input may be an under-estimate of impact. 
Generally, complications of gonococcal infections are not fatal but have 
devastating long-term consequences on female health (e.g., infertility). 
Morbidity	
Morbidity as measured by increased LOS likely will not capture the long-term 
impacts of gonococcal infections. Therefore, for STIs, disability adjusted 
life years (DALYs) were used and translated into additional days lost due to 
morbidity. The use of DALYs for gonorrhea for morbidity was possible because 
the mortality rate was approximately zero. A study that included an analysis 
of morbidity due to gonorrhea in the United States found that there were 
2,678 DALYs per 650,300 infections. This translates to 1.5 additional days per 
infection (Ebrahim et al., 2005).
A.8 SKIN AND SOFT TISSUE INFECTIONS (SSTIs)
Incidence
An American retrospective cohort study of in-patient and emergency visits in 
California, Florida, and New York found an incidence rate of 1,073 per 100,000 
(Miller & Polgreen, 2019). 
Resistance
Borgundvaag et al. (2013) studied patients with acute purulent SSTIs presenting 
at 17 Canadian hospital emergency departments and 2 health centres between 
July 1, 2008 and April 30, 2009. To be included in the study, the SSTI wound 
culture had to grow S. aureus. The authors found that 32% of the SSTIs were 
due to MRSA (versus MSSA). 
Mortality
Weigelt et al. (2010) studied 8,302 patients who were readmitted to 97 U.S. 
hospitals from 2003 to 2007 because of a surgical site infection (SSI, a type of 
SSTI). The mortality rate associated with MSSA (monomicrobial) infections was 
0.9% versus 1.4% for MRSA (mono- or polymicrobial) infections. The Panel 
used the MRSA increased mortality rate for surgical site infections (0.5%) as 
a proxy for all SSTIs. 
Morbidity
Weigelt et al. (2010) studied 8,302 patients who were readmitted to 97 U.S. 
hospitals from 2003 to 2007 because of a SSI. The raw LOS associated with 
MRSA infections (mono- or polymicrobial) was, on average, two days longer 
than infections caused by MSSA (monomicrobial). The Panel used the MRSA 
increased LOS for surgical site infections as a proxy for increased LOS for all 
SSTIs. 
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A.9 TUBERCULOSIS (TB)
Incidence
PHAC monitors active TB infections through a national surveillance system, 
the Canadian Tuberculosis Reporting System (CTBRS) (Vachon et al., 2018). 
CTBRS is a case-based surveillance system that collects data from provinces and 
territories about individuals infected with active cases of TB. The incidence rate 
of TB reported in Canada in 2017 was 4.9 per 100,000 (LaFreniere et al., 2019a).
Resistance
In 2017, a study from PHAC found that 8.1% of TB isolates were resistant to 
first-line antimicrobials (LaFreniere et al., 2019b). 
Mortality
In a study by Ronald et al. (2016) of all cases of TB in Montréal between 1996 
and 2007, the mortality rate was found to be 6.9%. Very few of these cases 
were considered drug-resistant. Marks et al. (2016) found the mortality rate of 
135 patients with MDR TB in California, New York City, and Texas was 9.6%. The 
difference in mortality due to resistance was therefore estimated to be 2.7%. 
Morbidity
The study by Ronald et al. (2016) found that those patients who were hospitalized 
initially because of TB (where the majority of cases were susceptible) had a 
median LOS of 17.5 days. In the study by Marks et al. (2016), however, patients 
with MDR TB were hospitalized an average of 94 days. The difference in LOS 
due to resistance was therefore 76.5 days. This estimate of morbidity is low, 
as patients with resistant TB are more likely to be hospitalized (Marks et al., 
2016; Ronald et al., 2016). 
A.10 URINARY TRACT INFECTIONS (UTIs)
For the measures of incidence, resistance, morbidity, and mortality associated with 
resistant UTIs, the Panel chose to consider only UTIs that lead to hospitalization 
(e.g., complicated UTIs, pyelonephritis). Complicated UTIs impose a high 
burden on healthcare systems and are frequent causes of hospitalization, whereas 
hospitalization and mortality are not expected with uncomplicated UTIs. 
Additionally, resistance is not typically associated with uncomplicated UTIs. A 
caveat of this approach is that, as the Panel only considered hospitalized 
patients, all community-based infections are not included. Most people who 
are treated for complicated UTIs are treated in the community, and failure of 
antimicrobials for this population is likely to substantially increase the need 
for parenteral therapy and hospital admission for some patients. 
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Incidence
Zilberberg and Shorr (2013) found there were 76.76 UTIs per 1,000 
hospitalizations in the United States in 2009. Using the Canadian hospitalization 
rate from 2016 to 2017, as reported by CIHI (7,980 per 100,000), the Canadian 
estimate of UTIs used for the Panel’s model is 613 per 100,000 (CIHI, 2018a).
Resistance
Koningstein et al. (2014) used 2012 data from the Dutch Infectious Diseases 
Surveillance Information System for Antibiotic Resistance to calculate the 
resistance of complicated UTIs to cefotaxime and ceftriaxone of 23.9%.
Mortality
Zilberberg et al. (2017) conducted a retrospective cohort study of data from 
175 U.S. hospitals examining the impact of CRE on the outcomes of patients 
with Enterobacteriaceae infections. The mortality rate for CRE UTIs was 
12.4%, whereas it was 8.9% for carbapenem-susceptible infections. Therefore, 
the additional mortality due to resistance was 3.5% (Zilberberg et al., 2017).
Morbidity
Zilberberg et al. (2017) conducted a retrospective cohort study of data from 
175 U.S. hospitals examining the impact of CRE on the outcomes of patients 
with Enterobacteriaceae infections. The study included adult patients with 
community-onset culture-positive UTIs. The difference in mean LOS for 
resistant UTIs was 14.6 days, whereas with susceptible infections it was 9.0 days. 
Therefore, morbidity associated with UTIs was approximated as 5.6 days 
(Zilberberg et al., 2017). 
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Appendix B — Hospital Costs and Bacterial Weighting
Cost of illness studies are often used to measure the economic burden of disease 
on patients, hospitals, and governments (Shrive et al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2010; 
Nelson et al., 2015b; Shrestha et al., 2017). The most common method measures 
the gross costs of infections based on the average cost of hospitalization per 
day. For example, if a patient stays in hospital for two weeks recovering from 
both a knee surgery and an MRSA infection, the gross cost would be calculated 
as the length of stay or LOS (14 days) x average cost of hospitalization (say 
$2,000 per day). This gross-costing approach would produce a biased estimate 
of the cost of MRSA for three reasons:
•	 LOS is determined by both post-operative recovery and infection treatment;
•	 cost of hospitalization varies by procedure and course of treatment; and
•	 both LOS and cost of hospitalization vary by patient, hospital, regional health 
authority, and province/territory. 
Micro-costing addresses these measurement challenges. It separates the 
incremental (or marginal) costs that result directly from the infection itself, 
involving the “direct enumeration and costing out of every input consumed 
in the treatment of a particular patient” (Frick, 2009). This is a bottom-up 
approach where each component of resource use is estimated, and a unit 
cost is applied to each specific patient. If, in the above example, the MRSA 
infection increases the LOS by a week and requires an additional course of 
antimicrobials, micro-costing would include only these costs (i.e., 7 extra days 
x $2,000 plus the cost of the antimicrobials). This approach requires financial 
and administrative data from hospitals, as well as observational data on patients. 
However, studies using observational data are prone to selection bias, with results 
confounded by individual, hospital, or other characteristics (Rovithis, 2013). 
Avoiding selection bias requires determining the incremental effect of resistant 
infections by accounting for systematic differences between patients with and 
without an infection. In patient groups with similar baseline characteristics 
(e.g., age, gender, health status, social determinants of health), the likelihood 
of acquiring the resistant infection is as good as random. It follows that cost 
differences between these two groups are a statistically unbiased estimate of the 
average cost of resistance for that bacterium. The precision of this approach 
can inform strategic planning in hospitals and regional health authorities as 
well as provide a key input to determine the cost-effectiveness of national health 
policies related to AMR (Rennert-May et al., 2018).
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To convert hospital costs of resistant bacteria into costs for resistant syndromes, 
the Panel used the weighting in Table B.1, which was based on members’ expert 
judgment on the causative relationship between bacteria and syndromes. The 
Panel recognizes that this weighting is imperfect, as syndromes are caused by 
bacteria that are not included but for which no cost estimates were available. 
Moreover, while BGIs, IAIs, and UTIs are sometimes caused by VRE infections, 
since these cases are often vulnerable patients, the bacteria weighting is based 
on ESBL bacteria, which is the more common cause. 
Table B.1 
Bacterial Weighting
Syndrome Bacteria Weighting
BGI ESBL bacteria
BSI MRSA, VRE
CDI C. difficile
IAI ESBL bacteria
MSI MRSA
Pneumonia MRSA, ESBL bacteria
SSTI MRSA
STI N. gonorrhoea
TB M. tuberculosis
UTI ESBL bacteria
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Appendix C — Technical Details of the Panel’s  
     DCGE Model
To estimate the impact of AMR on the Canadian economy, the Panel developed 
a dynamic computation general equilibrium model (DCGE), where Canada is 
connected to the rest of the world through production, investment, and trade 
patterns. This appendix provides technical details of the Panel’s DCGE model.
Consider country r (such as Canada) where output in sector i consists of goods and 
services Yir, that are produced by capital Kir, other inputs Nijr (e.g., intermediate 
inputs from sector j), and effective labour Lir (i.e., a labour input adjusted for 
efficiency units) (RAND Europe, 2014). Thus, production is modelled as a 
function of Y = F(K,N,L), where subscripts i and r are omitted for simplicity.
Similar to the method used by Yerushalmi et al. (2016) in a different context for 
the study of malaria, for each time period t, the model assumes that effective 
labour supply is adjusted for efficiency units by Lr,t = Lr,t ∙Er,t, with the physical 
supply of labour input Lr,t, and efficiency of labour Er,t  growing at a rate of gr,t 
and er,t, respectively, based on the model’s AMR scenarios.
The effective labour for country r therefore progresses over time by:
Lr,t + 1 = Lr,0(1 + gr,t) · Er,0(1 + er,t)                  (1)
Equation (1) breaks down effective labour supply into two components: 
demographic factors (on the left) and labour efficiency (on the right). The first 
component (demographic factors) was addressed by using a cohort-component 
model to estimate the size of both the working-age population and the overall 
population. An increase in AMR will reduce the size of the workforce and the 
population, leading to a smaller supply of workers (RAND Europe, 2014).
The cohort-component model is estimated from base population, which is 
categorized by age, skill, and gender, and which evolves based on assumptions 
of mortality, fertility, and migration rates. The model then projects annual 
population change, broken down by age, skill, and gender. The cohort-component 
model estimates population change based on a “natural” increase (births minus 
deaths) and net-migration (in-migration less out-migration) (RAND Europe, 
2014). Formally, the population by age cohort a, skill s, and gender g at time 
t is written as:
P(a,s,g,t1) = P(a,s,g,t0) + B(a,s,g) − D(a,s,g) + IM(a,s,g) − OM(a,s,g)     (2)
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where B(a,s,g) is total births, D(a,s,g) total deaths, and IM(a,s,g) and OM(a,s,g) 
inward and outward migration, respectively. The total number of births in a 
given period depends on age structure, age-specific fertility, and population 
sizes. The cohort-component model applied in the modelling exercise projects 
the population of Canada and other countries or regions (e.g., United States, 
OECD countries, the rest of the world) (RAND Europe, 2014).
The second component of the model (labour efficiency) is developed to link 
adult and child health to the number of days lost (or gained) by the workers. 
The idea is that an increase in AMR leads to a greater number of lost working 
days because adult workers are unable to work due to (i) their own illness, 
and (ii) caring for their ill children. In addition, lost days are also affected by 
adults who were ill as children. It follows that, in the model, labour efficiency 
is based on the number of lost days of work (normalized to a year) relative 
to the baseline yearly efficiency level with these AMR-attributable lost days a 
combination of the adult workers and children (RAND Europe, 2014). The 
yearly efficiency of a worker is thus:
E = 1 − Number of lost days normalized to a year
where an increase in AMR resistance rates raises the number of lost working 
days due to illness. Increasing rates of resistance will have a productivity-
reducing effect. Formally, let x be the frequency of infections per year at time 
t, with i being the syndromes incorporated in this model, and A = {a,c} for adult 
workers or children of adult workers, respectively. Furthermore,            is the 
probability of acquiring an infection,             the probability that infection is 
drug-resistant for scenario sc at time t, and            a loss function of the number 
of working days lost per infection of type i (RAND Europe, 2014). øsc,t  is the 
ratio of children to working-age adults for each scenario sc and time t. Efficiency 
can be expressed as:
In this setting, the efficiency parameter is affected by two components: (i) change 
in resistance rate              , and (ii) endogenous changes in the ratio of children 
to adult working population, driven by the demographics cohort-component 
model that depends on each future AMR scenario.
Key inputs into the demographics model are taken from the United Nations 
Population Database (UN, 2018). Tables C1 to C3 below provide information 
regarding the age-specific survival rates, the age-specific fertility rates, as well 
as the net migration rates and the sex ratio at birth (based on 2016 data).
( )Aip x
, ( )
A
sc t if x
( )Aiz x
( ), Asc t if x
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,1t sc ta a a c c ci i i i i i
i
sc t
i
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Table C.1 
Age-Specific Rates of Survival
Age group Female Male
0–4 0.996 0.995
5–10 1.000 1.000
11–14 1.000 0.999
15–19 0.999 0.998
20–24 0.999 0.996
25–29 0.998 0.997
30–34 0.998 0.996
35–39 0.997 0.995
40–44 0.995 0.993
45–49 0.992 0.989
50–54 0.988 0.982
55–59 0.982 0.972
60–64 0.972 0.956
65–69 0.955 0.932
70–74 0.928 0.892
75–79 0.881 0.825
80–84 0.797 0.714
85+ 0.718 0.643
Table C.2 
Age-Specific Fertility Rates (Births per 1,000 Women)
Age group Births per 1,000 women
Average five-year 
change since 1985
15–19 13.9 -10.89%
20–24 51.7 -9.52%
25–29 99.4 -4.21%
30–34 104.7 8.68%
35–39 48.9 19.61%
40–44 8.2 24.63%
45–49 0.4 45.83%
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The Panel’s theoretical model is calibrated to the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic features of Canada and other countries using the Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database (Aguiar et al., 2016). GTAP covers 
140 countries, 57 commodities, and includes all bilateral trade patterns, 
production, consumption, and intermediate inputs for the reference year 
2011. Table C.4 shows the 57 commodities included in the GTAP database.
Table C.3 
Sex Birth Ratio and Overall Net Migration Rate
Sex birth ratio 1.06
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population) 6.5
Net migration rate growth (5-year average since 1985) 0.16
Table C.4 
GTAP Sector Aggregation
Sector 
No.
Description
Aggregation 
No.
Description
1 Paddy rice 1 Crop Farming
2 Wheat 1 Crop Farming
3 Cereal grains 1 Crop Farming
4 Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1 Crop Farming
5 Oil seeds 1 Crop Farming
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet 1 Crop Farming
7 Plant-based fibres 1 Crop Farming
8 Crops 1 Crop Farming
9
Cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses
2 Animal Farming
10 Animal products 2 Animal Farming
11 Raw milk 2 Animal Farming
12 Wool, silkworm cocoons 2 Animal Farming
13 Forestry 2 Animal Farming
14 Fishing 2 Animal Farming
15 Coal 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
16 Oil 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
17 Gas 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
18 Minerals 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
continued on next page
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Sector 
No.
Description
Aggregation 
No.
Description
19
Meat: cattle, sheep, 
goats, horses
4 Animal Product Manufacturing 
20 Meat products 4 Animal  Product Manufacturing
21 Vegetable oils and fats 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
22 Dairy products 4 Animal Industry
23 Processed rice 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
24 Sugar 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
25 Food products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
26
Beverages and tobacco 
products
3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
27 Textiles 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
28 Wearing apparel 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
29 Leather products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
30 Wood products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
31
Paper products, 
publishing
3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
32 Petroleum, coal products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
33
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products
3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
34 Mineral products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
35 Ferrous metals 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
36 Metals 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
37 Metal products 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
38 Motor vehicles and parts 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
39 Transport equipment 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
40 Electronic equipment 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
41
Machinery and 
equipment 
3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
42 Manufactures 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
43 Electricity 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
44
Gas manufacture, 
distribution
3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
45 Water 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
46 Construction 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
47 Trade 3 Manufacturing, Construction, Retail Trade
48 Transport 5 Transportation
continued on next page
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Sector 
No.
Description
Aggregation 
No.
Description
49 Sea transport 5 Transportation
50 Air transport 5 Transportation
51 Communication 7 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
52 Financial services 7 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
53 Insurance 7 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
54 Business services 7 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
55 Recreation and other 
services
6 Recreating and Culture 
56 PubAdmin/Defence/
Health/Education
8 Public Services
57 Dwellings 7 ICT, Finance, Real Estate, Business
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